Lay Vegan's "#NameTheTrait is a Terrible Argument for Veganism" - Response

[esquizofrenico]

@Human_Garbage . I have to agree with @brimstoneSalad , Non-cognitivism appears to be mind reading. I think using this example you can see why I think so.

I say "Red is the best colour". For this sentence we can take a non-cognitivist and a error theorist approach depending on the context:

A) The normal scenario. You talk to me and realize that what I meant is that I really like "red" as a colour for a lot of different cases. What I meant really was "I really like red", but expressed myself "poorly". What I don't get is why this would make make it impossible to assign a true or false value to the statement, I may still be lying because in fact I hate red in which case my sentence will be wrong.

B) The weird, moral-objectivist case. When you talk to me you find out that I have created some weird theory about what gives colours their value. Applying that theory I arrived to a function which I optimized arriving to a frequency that is generally associated to the colour red. In this case it might very well be the case that I hate the colour red, but that I'm so convinced my theory is correct that I present my results. In this case my sentence does not mean "I really like the colour red", but "I say that the colour red is objectively the best colour because I came with this theory that gives colours their value and it gives maximum value to red". Clearly in this case we can say: that conclusion is wrong because it is based in a theory framework that is not correct. Colours do not have objective value, so you theory cannot assign some value to a colour.

When Kant says "Lying is wrong", he does not mean "I hate when people lie". He is saying that he believes one can give an objective moral value to a certain action, that he has found the correct theory that assigns value to actions and that the result is that lying is bad.

On the other hand, when people in parties say "There is nothing worst than hypocrite people", they are indeed expressing a feeling.

[Human_Garbage]

@esquizofrenico

Your post starts out saying you'd take an error theorist and non-cognitivism approach to your statement, but then you don't label which one you think is a non-cognivist's approach. Though its obvious you meant A, because you're under the same spell about definitions brimstone is.

This is exactly why I was reluctant to state that I'm a non-cognitivist. It's like making a post saying "I'm pro-gun", then someone forces me to say "are you liberal or conservative?" And if I sat "I'm liberal", they say "THEN YOURE NOT PRO GUN" and proceed to argue with me for hours about the definition of left, when they could have just taken me at my word that I'm pro gun. Very frustrating behavior. These are the weeds I prophetically said I didn't want to get into with @brimstoneSalad , but here we are.

I'll try to make this simple.

When I say that moral statements can't be assessed to be true or false, I'm not saying that someone can't literally have the belief that "Lying is wrong", I'm saying there's no method to verify if lying really is wrong. I don't just think I know Kants intentions are really asserting an emotion, instead of what he thinks is fact.

I definitely think the source of him thinking lying is wrong is from biological desires, emotions, etc... But not that in the moment he says it, that he doesn't think he really has the truth. He's just wrong to think he can get at the truth (or falseness) of moral systems.

As far as I can tell, this is non-cognitivism.

[brimstoneSalad]

Already we've reached another term you're trying to raise disagreement on. Obviously intellectual dishonesty refers to a particular kind of dishonesty, but to say it is not related to honesty at all is just absurd.

It's sometimes said that ordinary dishonesty is about lying to others, while intellectual dishonesty is about lying to yourself. Things like ignoring contrary evidence or applying inconsistent logic or double standards.

I have not said a single dishonest thing in my time talking to you in an attempt to win an argument.

You may not have knowingly lied, but the beliefs you hold are likely intellectually dishonest.

Wikipedia doesn't say much on the topic, wikiversity has a more extensive article:
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Intelle ... _Obstacles

Pay close attention to the obstacles, many of which aren't necessarily intentional dishonesty, but a failure of intellectual honesty.

Here are some more references/discussions for you:

http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/2010 ... al-honest/

But in every day discourse, few are aware of the logical fallacies they commit and even fewer are committed to discovering them and rethinking their position when they do realize it was based on a fallacy. And that is where intellectual honesty comes in. The most common form [of intellectual dishonesty], in my experience, is a refusal to follow one’s own logic to its obvious conclusion.

Rationalwiki's article is a bit underdeveloped and they don't spend enough time on self deception, but double standards are mentioned:
https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Intellectual_honesty

Common forms of intellectual dishonesty include plagiarism, applying double standards, using false analogies, exaggeration and overgeneralization, presenting straw man arguments, and poisoning the well (not literally).[1] A form of intellectual dishonesty common on conservative sites like Conservapedia is the suppression of evidence that contradicts their orthodoxy by reverting without explanation any edit that links to or otherwise presents such evidence.

The fact that you think you know my intentions is again, incredibly ironic.

Not saying I know your intentions. I'm saying that you're failing at intellectual honesty; you are expressing double standards and failing to follow your reasoning to its conclusions, and completely failing at taking the overwhelmingly clear criticism I'm offering of your mistakes.

You are defining words incorrectly, and intellectually dishonestly as well. You need to correct that if you want to engage in discussion here. If you don't, you're just going to talk in circles and confuse people.

As I predicted, you're just spitting the same arguments back at me, even after I clearly defined the reasons why I'm a non-cognitivist. I don't know why you're re-linking this definition again, because it's the same one I just linked to you.

I linked it back because you don't seem to have read it. You clearly contradicted the definition of non-cognitivism.

I didn't think I'd need to bring this up, because the original definition very clearly states: "Roughly put, non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions." (Which is what I think).

See, this right here is intellectual dishonesty. You've taken a little snippet and ignored a whole passage.
You don't understand what you're saying because you're not trying to: you assume you're already right and just looking to confirm your beliefs here.

Error theorists think the statements are not INTENDED to be fact statements, so they have no truth conditions because of the nature of the statement and its intent, NOT because of the nature of morality.

That's in contrast to error theorists who think the statements ARE intended to be fact statements, but are false because there is no fact of morality (that there are no true moral claims -- or false ones either, if you like).

Quote the whole first thesis from SEP rather than cherry picking:

One thesis might be called semantic nonfactualism. Simply put this thesis denies that predicative moral sentences express propositions or have substantial truth conditions. Thus semantic nonfactualism suggests that their contents are not apt for robust truth or falsity. (The terms ‘substantial’ and ‘robust’ are inserted here to make room for minimalist theories which offer deflationary accounts of truth, truth-aptness and propositions. Such theories will be discussed in more detail in section 4.1 below.) Moral predicates do not denote or express properties and predicative moral sentences do not therefore predicate properties of their subjects.

Do you know how to read the word "or"?

This is a rejection of the semantic thesis of realism: that moral sentences express propositions. They have no substantial truth conditions BECAUSE they are not expressing propositions.

When I am making a moral statement, I'm expressing a proposition. If you're a non-cognitivist, you're denying the fact that I'm expressing a proposition. Because you deny it's a proposition, OBVIOUSLY it would have no substantial truth conditions.

But the fact that you deny that I'm expressing a proposition is what makes you a mind-reading jerk. Get it?

If you're not pretending to read my mind and tell me what I mean to express, then you're not a non-cognitivist.

The second negative thesis can be called psychological non-cognitivism. This thesis denies that the states of mind conventionally expressed by moral utterances are beliefs or mental states which fall on the cognitive side of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide. Typically non-cognitivists accept both negative theses, though there are views which accept one and not the other.

So, I don't deny that you genuinely have a belief about what is morally right/wrong, I only state that that belief does not have a verifiable truth or false condition.

I don't know anything about non-cognitivists who accept the latter thesis but deny the former. I don't know if SEP was trying to say they exist, but you don't seem to be making that claim, so it's irrelevant.

You're making the semantic claim, and I'm trying to explain to you that the semantic claim is a denial that statements are expressing propositions. That's part of it.

If you don't deny that I'm trying to make a factual statement (a proposition) but you just deny that that statement could possibly be true (because there is no truth to moral claims), then you're an error theorist.

Now, you're saying something different here. "verifiable truth value"... that sounds like some kind of militant agnosticism rather than a confirmed error theorist. Like the statement *could* be true, but we just have no way of knowing. I don't know if there's any specific term for that.

A claim like "there's a teapot orbiting the sun" is still a fact claim with a truth value even if we don't know what that value is.
Maybe that's what you're confused about.

People: We are making statements about moral facts.
Error Theorists: We believe you're trying to make a statement about fact, but you are mistaken because there are no moral facts, thus all your claims are in error.

Yup. That's not what I think.

If you believe me when I say I'm trying to make a statement of moral fact (a proposition), then you deny the negative semantic thesis of non-cognitivism which requires that moral statements not be intended as propositions. And you already said the second thesis doesn't apply to you either.
That's a denial of non-cognitivism,

Here you've denied error theory.

Then you deny non-cognitivism AND error theory. That makes you a minimal-realist... or just an agnostic, provided those denials are not strong.

Take the claim: 5 = blue.

A non-cognitivist would say that's not in error, because it's not trying to express the *fact* that 5 is blue, but rather a personal feeling. Basically that it's true for you if you believe it because it's just a statement of feeling.

This example is really strange, because we are getting off the topic of moral propositions. 5 = blue very clearly has a value of false.

If this we're a moral proposition I wouldn't say you're not trying to express fact, I would say the truth or false value of your proposition can not be verified. I would say what you are actually expressing is simply a desire, or a belief, or a feeling, sure.

It's not a strange example at all.
See, I gave you the benefit of the doubt. I did not think you could possibly be this intellectually dishonest. You've surpassed the flat Earth thread, congratulations!

You have no idea how language works, do you? Or you ignore the whole idea because it might complicate your dogma.

I'll explain as clearly as I can:

Concept of the sender (the thing I'm trying to express) -> words -> interpretation by receiver (the thing that gets communicated)

If the expressed concept attempted equals that received, language was successful. If not, there's a failure there.

You claim you believe I'm trying to express fact: the concept is one of fact. That's what I'm trying to express. The idea is a proposition.

Where does it go from an intended expression of fact and become an "actual" expression of desire or feeling? Do the words magically change it from an attempted expression of fact into an actual expression of feeling? Because nothing in the definitions of moral terminology does that.

Do you think I'm trying to express a fact, but people just hear that and understand it as a feeling?
And you think that's the correct way language is supposed to work?
If I'm trying to express a fact and people understand it as a feeling, that's a breakdown in communication.

And when people tell you that they also UNDERSTAND my moral expressions as fact statements, then you'll tell them that when they hear moral propositions they actually only interpret them as feelings and do not understand them as facts? Or what?

Or do you recognize that I'm attempting to express a fact, the definitions of moral terms does nothing to contradict that, and the recipients largely receive my communication and interpret it as my expressing what I believe to be a fact?

If you have a shred of intellectual honesty -- and let's be real here, actual honesty too -- that's the only thing you can admit. There's no room for an attempted expression of fact to magically transmute into an "actual" expression of feeling instead.

and my reason not to identify as an error theorist, like I've already said, is because I don't think it makes sense to declare moral facts false just because we can't declare them true.

You just don't understand how propositions work. I tried to explain this before, and you even agreed that a statement that wasn't obviously truth apt (about numbers having a color) was false. Thus your double standards.

You have no problem with "5 is red" or whatever being false, but you can't abide it for a moral claim.

I don't think it makes sense to declare them one way or the other. There is no such thing as moral falseness. There is no such thing as moral truthness. For either to exist moral facts would need to be ontologically verifiable, which they're not.

Then you are an error theorist. That's what error theorists believe.

I'll take another stab at explaining how propositions work, and what it means for one to be false.

Proposition: Murder is wrong.
This may or may not be truth apt depending on the semantics. When somebody is making a claim of fact, there's an implicit "it is true" tied to it.
Proposition: "It is true that murder is wrong"

An error theorist would say this is false, because there is no truth to moral matters.

Saying this proposition is false is NOT an indication of the opposite (That murder is right, or that it is true that murder is not wrong). It also doesn't say anything about moral statement even having to make sense.

Just as "5 is red" carries the claim that numbers have colors at all, so does a statement of moral fact carry the claim that morality has truth value. If that's not true, then the proposition (fully formed) is false.

Whereas a statement of feeling of command doesn't necessarily carry any such evaluable statement. E.g. "Boo murder" is not intended to mean or carry the claim "It is true that Boo murder", so it is not truth apt in the way that a statement of fact "murder is wrong" being "it is true that murder is wrong" does.

So yes, you could very well be an error theorist, you just don't understand what you're talking about.

Here's a stack exchange with people discussing it:
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/qu ... -and-false
See:

While your distinction between falsehood and non-sense is overall correct, the second example you gave is dubious, since one might use logical atomism to show that is actually false: you can break down "2 + 2 > red" into (a) ^ (b) ^ (c) into (a) "2+2 is a number", (b) "red is a number" and (c) "The number from (a) > the number (b)". Since (b) is false, (a)^(b)^(c) is false as well. – Alexander S King Oct 20 '16 at 17:47

If you have NO PROBLEM with that with respect to numbers and colors, you should have no problem with it with respect to moral claims either.
It is on that basis that error theorists are saying moral claims are false; because they purport to represent a truth that they do not believe actually exists. The intention IS expressing fact, error theorists recognize that, and just disagree that there IS a fact there to express.

I think there's very good reason to care if it's mind dependent or not. Sure, concepts are technically ontologically "real", but they are not verifiably real.

You only need to stop at technically real. Verifiability doesn't matter. You can be a militant agnostic realist if you want. E.g. there are moral truths but just no way to determine what they are.

It means something very different to be real as a concept and real independent of mind.

No it doesn't, they both affect the world.

Is evolution real?

Delusions, hallucinations, and illusions are all "real", but we wouldn't give them equal truth value as say, "The sky is blue".

This is your argument?
No, we don't, but that's because the person suffering doesn't necessarily understand that they're just in his or her mind.

Again, like the unicorn thing: if we're representing it as a physical animal, no it's not real. If we're representing it only as a concept then it's real.
The problem is that when we talk about unicorns being real, we're trying to evaluate whether they are physical creatures, not concepts.

All concepts, provided they are internally consistent, are real as long as we understand them to be concepts. The mistake only comes when it makes the jump from concept to a physical thing.

God is real in the sense of being an idea that people have; but people don't stop there, they imagine God as a thing that has acted directly on reality (and not just through man).

This is an important differentiation because so much of science focuses on mind-independent reality. If we lose track of that, we can fall victim things like "fake news" proclamations from insane people.

Nice slippery slope fallacy there. There's absolutely no problem with understanding concepts and FORCES (like evolution) as real things even when they're just emergent or act within certain parameters.

Not sure what you mean, I definitely recognize there are people who define as secular moral realists. I just don't think their positions are intelligible given the definition of moral realism.

Given the definition you and the William Lane Craigs out there have, in your intellectual dishonesty, forced upon the discourse.

No, you're not going to keep doing this here. See the forum rules. You know the correct definition, stop misusing words.

If you don't think objective truth exists that's fine, but you don't get to use incorrect definitions that create a false dichotomy in attempt to hijack discourse on the subject.
You need to recognize minimal realism is a thing even if you don't agree with it, and you need to recognize that ontologically concepts CAN BE and ARE real in a meaningful sense.

Whether there is a one and only concept of objective morality that defeats all contenders is a reasonable subject to disagree on. Such a morality would need rational or empirical support in some semantically meaningful way.

Maybe one day people will find a way to extract objective moral truth value from .. anything. Or they already have and I'm ignorant.

It's about deducing it using logic. Much like Name The Trait attempts to do but fails at for semantic reasons, and for missing a couple important premises.
You eliminate contenders for morality by demonstrating them inconsistent, and narrow down the remaining options. If we end up at one or only a few options which have common ground, there we go: objective morality.

Do you have stats on this? I'm curious if that's true.

There was a survey not long ago.
I think this is it:
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2 ... sults.html

Ontological being applies to both, sure, but moral claims are not verifiable.

It doesn't matter if it's verifiable, that doesn't make it not a proposition. You don't seem to understand how any of this works.

Yes, the fact that someone believes in a moral system is true, but whether that moral system is the true one or the false one, we can never verify.

Then you're not a non-cognitivist or an error theorist.

You may be a militant agnostic moral realist who believes there IS a truth but we can't possibly know it, or just a plain agnostic or militant agnostic who doesn't know if there's truth or not or doesn't know and believes nobody can know.

It sounds like you're just agnostic.

Something being unknown or even unknowable doesn't make it not truth apt/not a proposition.

You're making philosophy extremely pedantic and uninteresting if you stop caring about mind-independence once you realize that the mind is not physically independent.

To the contrary, getting bogged down in that despite knowing it doesn't matter is quite intellectually dishonest.
Why not move on to more interesting topics? Unless you just don't realize there are any.

[esquizofrenico]

@Human_Garbage

Sorry, I forgot to say that A) is the treatment of a non cognitivist and B) of an error theorist.

Well, with this we would enter in the epistemological topic of whether someone that holds a true belief but due to wrong reasons is wrong or right. In my opinion someone that says: "The earth is round because it cannot be other way" is wrong.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but it appears to me that you belief that all moral systems are rationalizations born from the personal desires. The problem I have with that it's that that belief is not falsifiable, because one cannot show intentions. I can show you examples of people that their moral theories has led them to conclusions with which they are not personally comfortable with (for example Peter Singer and his idea that infanticide is justified in some cases). But in that case you will say: "His desire for the existence of an objective moral system overrides his desire for infanticide to be immoral". Your position cannot be attacked in any way because it talks about the internal states of people that are inaccessible.

As I said earlier, moral systems are based on some presuppositions which cannot be shown to be either truth or false, but in my opinion that does not mean that it is equally logical either to belief then or disbelief them, just as I don't think it's logical to belief that I am talking to myself when writing this, even though I cannot prove I am not.

[Frank Quasar]

When you speak of things objectively you do so in respect to the moral system, but even if there were no sentient beings around to give credence to these things, the concepts of that moral systems still exists objectively in principle within an ontological sense, right?

And the concepts for these moral systems is logical consistency + non-arbitrariness, correct?