Am I actually an utilitarian?

[Sicnoo0]

I tend to believe I would be accurately described as a negative utilitarian, but when it comes to utilitarianism in general there's something that troubles me.
Some people argue that the distinction between rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism is actually a misconception and there really is only one kind of utilitarianism. In other words, they argue that rule utilitarianism actually collapses down into act utilitarianism.

I somewhat agree with this position, but for the sake of the argument let's say rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism are two different things.

In that case, one reason you should not be an act utilitarian is that the position asserts that it's okay to harvest living people for organs in order to save other peoples' lives.

I hesitate to accept that I should be a rule utilitarian, though. I feel like it's okay to make exceptions in situations where you have to in order to do the right thing. I find it a little ridiculous to say that an action was wrong simply because it would be a bad thing if everybody as a society considered it okay to do that in general.

I don't know what to make of the fact that I seem to be neither a rule utilitarian nor an act utilitarian.

In my day-to-day life I definitely feel like I'm some sort of act utilitarian, yet I'm not really sure if that's true.

If it's of any relevance, I also think I would be described as a moral anti-realist. I don't think any statement about what's moral can ever be truth apt. Nonetheless, the reason I consider myself a negative utilitarian is that I operate under the assumption that what we should ultimately value as a society is the prevention and minimization of harm.

[brimstoneSalad]

Some people argue that the distinction between rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism is actually a misconception and there really is only one kind of utilitarianism. In other words, they argue that rule utilitarianism actually collapses down into act utilitarianism.

This is the same distinction with rule consequentialism generally rather than utilitarianism specifically. Rule consequentialism derives its authority from consequentialism, it's not fundamentally a different thing. It's a question of practical application. This authority is simply interpreted in the context of limited human knowledge and ability to make decisions on the fly -- or even in specific cases that permit contemplation, because of biases. A rule consequentialist basically questions human decision making ability and so favors certain rules about behavior over any attempt to evaluate actions on a case by case basis, because those rules applied generally have better outcome than attempt of individual humans with limited knowledge and limited decision making ability and with evident bias to come to individual decisions on moral actions.

However, that's not to say that there are not exceptions to any given rule when the weight of evidence supports it.

I somewhat agree with this position, but for the sake of the argument let's say rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism are two different things.

We can pretend dogs are cats for the sake of conversation, but I don't know where that gets us in terms of any real world application.

Somebody who falls farter on the "act" side of the spectrum may have substantial disagreement with somebody who falls farther on the "rule" side of the spectrum about human competence and practical application of ethics, but they do not fundamentally disagree on any of the underlying moral facts when presented in isolated cases of hypotheticals with presumed perfect knowledge.

In that case, one reason you should not be an act utilitarian is that the position asserts that it's okay to harvest living people for organs in order to save other peoples' lives.

There's not a good reason to believe it does that. The prognosis of an organ donation recipient doesn't compare favorably to a healthy person with his or her own organs. The total happy life days given to recipients very likely is less in practice than those taken from somebody murdered for organs.
It's more true that of a group of potential recipients who have already been established as likely compatible by the thought experiment, for one currently lacking a viable organ and liable to die anyway (the one in the worst position out of the group), that person's organs should perhaps be taken for sake of the others -- not those of a random healthy person outside the group.
Thought experiments like this are remarkably shallow and short sighted, and in no way reflect reality.

I hesitate to accept that I should be a rule utilitarian, though. I feel like it's okay to make exceptions in situations where you have to in order to do the right thing. I find it a little ridiculous to say that an action was wrong simply because it would be a bad thing if everybody as a society considered it okay to do that in general.

All rule utilitarians can make exceptions, and there can be rules about when to make exceptions (the weight of evidence for consequences and consensus in the circumstance, for example, lack of biases in the decision making making the evaluation more credible, etc).
Everybody in society acts as such, with the exception of such and such.

You may be confusing rule utilitarianism with deontology. Deontology doesn't have the capacity of exceptions based on consequence because by definition it doesn't account for consequence.

If it's of any relevance, I also think I would be described as a moral anti-realist. I don't think any statement about what's moral can ever be truth apt.

It certainly is truth apt once we have a coherent definition of morality. Just as much as 2+2=4 can be truth apt.

Nonetheless, the reason I consider myself a negative utilitarian is that I operate under the assumption that what we should ultimately value as a society is the prevention and minimization of harm.

I don't agree with the buffet approach to morality where you pick and choose based on what you personally fancy.
The utility of moral discourse doesn't amount to providing people a label for the act of yelling feelings at each other. The utility of moral discourse is reasoning about what is right without the imposition of biases when people disagree on feelings.

[Sicnoo0]

2+2=4 is truth apt before choosing a coherent definition of the mathematical symbols involved. The symbols represent a mathematical fact that is true regardless of the existence of people to create symbols to describe it. Statements of morality are not truth apt before choosing a coherent definition of morality.

In Mathematics, Euclid's fifth axiom (the parallel postulate) is only true within the framework of Euclidean geometry.
However, a modified statement similar to Euclid's fifth axiom is true in all three types of geometry (Euclidean, Spherical, Hyperbolic).
The modified statement is as follows: The number of lines through a point parallel to a given line is either 1, 0 or diverges to infinity.
It seems to me that some statements are simply true, regardless of framework, whereas other statements are only true within a framework.

This obviously touches on the issue of whether mathematics is invented or discovered, but I'd like to set that aside. I strongly believe that it only makes sense to believe that mathematical facts are facts regardless of the existence of anyone to learn the facts. To suppose that morality is likewise some sort of undiscovered law of nature seems very unintuitive to me.

I can agree that the fact that Alice would suffer if Bob were to stab her would be true regardless of whether Alice and Bob even exist. In other words, I can agree that descriptive statements about hypothetical situations can be true or false. However, to say that it would be immoral for Bob to stab Alice is different.

[brimstoneSalad]

2+2=4 is truth apt before choosing a coherent definition of the mathematical symbols involved. The symbols represent a mathematical fact that is true regardless of the existence of people to create symbols to describe it. Statements of morality are not truth apt before choosing a coherent definition of morality.

Are you kidding me?
Before defining the symbols and operators, 2+2=4 is squiggly lines.

The abstract conceptual mathematical facts they map to are true, yes, but so are conceptual moral facts. You don't have to choose such a definition, you can deduce it.

I strongly believe that it only makes sense to believe that mathematical facts are facts regardless of the existence of anyone to learn the facts. To suppose that morality is likewise some sort of undiscovered law of nature seems very unintuitive to me.

Whether it is intuitive or not to you is kind of irrelevant, I'm not sure if that's meant to be an argument.

Consider game theory as a bridge between mathematics and moral evaluations. There are certain truths that can be known about rational actors in defined situations. We can then understand an actor is behaving irrationally. We can then say the same about moral actors. And in understanding what a moral actor does, we can determine what behavior is immoral.

I can agree that the fact that Alice would suffer if Bob were to stab her would be true regardless of whether Alice and Bob even exist. In other words, I can agree that descriptive statements about hypothetical situations can be true or false. However, to say that it would be immoral for Bob to stab Alice is different.

That it is immoral is also a descriptive statement; it doesn't align with the actions of a moral agent.

What you may be getting at is an "is" vs "ought" distinction. Just because we can descriptively understand something as immoral, does not necessarily imply that somebody ought not do it on its own. We would have to understand the person's goals as being moral ones first in order to do that. This is something that may be possible to claim as a necessity of rationality, but it's a more complicated argument.

What if Bob's goal is to be as immoral as possible? Then shouldn't he do immoral things in accordance with that?

The argument that such a goal is irrational is harder to make, but not necessary to establish the truth apt nature of descriptive moral claims.