"indirect rights" Deontology & Consequentialism

[carnap]

deontologically if you do not give rights to animals or mentally ill people you will not be able to say that killing them is bad, but rather conditionally bad. I think every time we talk I get to defend tautologies: you cannot say something is bad in itself if you don't say it's bad in itself.

When you use the phrase "is bad" you're importing common language notions of morality into the discussion but moral theories are an attempt to evaluate those notions. In any case, I'm not sure what you mean by "conditionally bad". In systems like Kant's you can claim its wrong to harm animals even when you're not granting them rights.

And there are certainly many philosophers that think this way. They think you can say "You should feed an animal", but that the meaning of that phrase is similar to "You should not leave a HCl solution out in the open". Descartes would be for example someone that thought this way, and I recently read a paper by a Christian moral philosopher that took

I'm not aware of any moral philosopher that argues that you're morally justified in treating animals like rocks. Descartes did not claim that you're morally justified in treating an animal like a rock. He argued that animals lacked consciousness, his reasoning was that since they don't exhibit any behaviors that seem to require consciousness then there was no reason to attribute it to them. But that doesn't mean he accept any treatment as justified.

Not sure which "Christian moral philosopher" you have in mind. But a religious ethical theories are a different sort of animal.

So there are certainly many philosophers that think you can torture an animal morally (at least conditionally), it is the obvious consequence of not holding that caring for animal interests is a moral duty.

I'm not aware of any, can you cite the specific work of a philosopher that argues that one is morally justified in torturing animals? Though at the moment its only deontic theories that are of concern. Descartes isn't such a philosopher, he never argued that one is morally justified in torturing animals. He just denied they had a mind (remember, for Descartes the mind was separate from the body). Though he did support testing on animals but that is different than arguing for animal torture. Also the discuss was about rights, one can deny rights to animals while also maintain that they should be protected from harm on some level. "Moral duty" would have to be defined in relation to some specific moral theory. Again you're importing moral notions here that seem rooted in a folk theory of ethics rather than the theories being discussed.

In any case, in part you seem to be trying to say that the protections for animals would be inherently different than the rights for people and that is true of some systems. For example, for Kant animals don't have rights and the only reason to protect them is in relation to how those actions effect human society. In his system you couldn't justify the example you brought up, moral laws for Kant need to be universalizable.

[Cirion Spellbinder]

Actually not at all, western legal systems are founded on rights. In the case of the US, reading the bill of rights makes it pretty clear.

I interpreted what @brimstoneSalad said to mean that law is put into place with hope that a given consequence will come about, but I’d agree that the western legal system isn’t based on consequentialism in the sense that you’ve explained.

[mkm]

I interpreted what @brimstoneSalad said to mean that law is put into place with hope that a given consequence will come about, but I’d agree that the western legal system isn’t based on consequentialism in the sense that you’ve explained.

I second that. Legal systems are usually clusterfucks of contradicting ideas and notions. Not saying it's a bad thing, and maybe we can't have it the other way, and compromise between rights in deontological sense and the consequentialism visible in the common sense approach when it comes to details is the way to go.

[brimstoneSalad]

That's a pretty extraordinary claim. That's on the level of Flat-Earthism.
Are you prepared to cite some sources for that?

I already did, the article I cited refers to research that shows evidence of conditioning in plants. Also your attempt to associate this hypothesis with "flat-earthism" is fallacious. Thankfully science isn't dogmatic and any hypothesis can be entertained.

No you did not.
Carnap, you do not know what operant conditioning means.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operant_conditioning

Although operant and classical conditioning both involve behaviors controlled by environmental stimuli, they differ in nature. In operant conditioning, stimuli present when a behavior is rewarded or punished come to control that behavior. For example, a child may learn to open a box to get the candy inside, or learn to avoid touching a hot stove; in operant terms, the box and the stove are "discriminative stimuli". However, in classical conditioning, stimuli that signal significant events produce reflexive behavior. For example, sight of candy may cause a child to salivate, or the sound of a door slam may signal an angry parent, causing a child to tremble. Salivation and trembling are not operants; they are not reinforced by their consequences.

If you do not understand the difference between simple classical conditioning for reflexive responses and actual operant conditioning you are welcome to start a thread on it and ask questions; somebody might be willing to explain it in the way you're explaining basic economics to LogicExplorer.

The "evidence" you think you provided does not qualify. Either provide a new link to a study which actually does show operant conditioning (and the words better be IN the study), or drop it. Do not make the assertion again in this or any other thread without providing more evidence.

Associative learning only requires that two or more variables can become associated with each other and this doesn't require intention or consciousness.

OBVIOUSLY. I explained this.

Simple associative learning can be hardwired, like a computer program that remembers your settings.

You can readily model associative learning in robots/computers systems that clearly have no intentions. Your position here would force you to accept that even basic robots have "basic level of consciousness".

I've said multiple times that some Synthetic Intelligence we have now has a basic level of consciousness.
Stop pretending this is something I've been resistant to when I have confirmed this at least twice already.

Many models of Operant condition in robots, for example:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4110879/

I am aware.

Please substantiate their basis in deontology.

I already did, when I first mentioned indirect rights I provided a link that gave further details. Here it is again: https://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/

Nothing in that seems to contradict anything I said. If you're talking about something specific, you'll need to quote the article.

It's about indirect duties to animals that derive NOT from their rights, but from the rights of and duties to humanity ONLY.

Not killing animals when they're somebody else's property (as I explained)
Not torturing wild animals (or those that belong to you) in public when it would upset somebody who saw it (as I explained)

The only thing I didn't mention was the virtue-ethics-like explanation, which is VERY weak coming from a deontologist.

So although we need not consider how our actions affect animals themselves, we do need to consider how our treatment of animals will affect our treatment of other human beings. If being cruel to an animal will make us more likely to be cruel to other human beings, we ought not be cruel to animals; if being grateful to animal will help us in being grateful to human beings then we ought to be grateful to animals.

The idea that being mean to animals will cause us to be (more likely to be) mean to humans, which is basically just undermining free will as an excuse to extend prohibitions beyond the actual acts OR WILLS that are wrong.
Being mean to animals does not force people to be mean to humans, the two are not always linked, it undermines the idea that a wrong act or will is what's wrong.
That's a consequentialist argument, not a deontological one.

You can absolutely build a consequentialist system in which harming animals has negative instrumental value, essentially some kind of virtue ethics derived from rule consequentialism. I'm not arguing that you can't do that. But attempting to do so in a deontological framework is transparently absurd even to deontologists who don't understand the foundational problems of deontology itself.

Indirect rights are an "objective basis", there is nothing subjective about them. To say it again, I brought up indirect-rights because they have been a key way of justifying protections for animals in deontic theories. But you seem to have an issue with people discussing deontological theories because apparently you're not fond of them.

I'm not fond of deontology, no, but that's not why I have a problem with what you're claiming.

You need to quote what you think is the basis for "indirect rights" from that article. The only thing I found in it I hadn't already mentioned was the "more likely to harm humans" argument, which is a strongly consequentialist one.

when you only think people that hold similar views as yourself are the ones with "good sense" you never have have a reason to think about and truly understand other ideas. This is why discussing ideas, rather than deriding them and asserting your opinion, is always a good idea.

I am motivated to understand other ideas. Without understanding them I can't really debunk them.
You need to hold up your end and explain/quote what you're talking about though: put the ideas on display so they can be discussed.
I'm open to argument, but you aren't making any, you're just arguing about how/why to argue.

Quote whatever you're referencing. I need to see the argument you're making. Do you really believe that argument that we shouldn't hurt animals because it will make us more likely to hurt humans in the future is a solid deontological argument?

Actually not at all, western legal systems are founded on rights. In the case of the US, reading the bill of rights makes it pretty clear.

They were obviously founded on rights based systems, but there's a lot of consequentialism in there too. Particularly in sentencing and civil law. Many rights and prohibitions (along with their exceptions) also have consequentialist rationales behind them (rule consequentialist, distinct from deontology).

Its also harmful when a lion attacks an animal and you've just got done suggesting that you can train animals to follow moral rules and that most people don't reason morally, so then most people should be treated just as other animals and vice verse. Therefore if one should "motivate change" in other people, then one should also motivate change in non-human omnivores and carnivores?

What's your point?

But perhaps why its more challenging is because humans, unlike dogs, can alter their behavior based on moral reasoning? That is, they have the ability for true moral reasoning...

Speculation, doesn't seem to be supported by evidence. It could be a spectrum, but that would only support deontological value with an arbitrary cutoff.

[carnap]

The "evidence" you think you provided does not qualify...

It doesn't "qualify" in your opinion but the issue here is that its not clear how you interpret classical or operant condition in the case of plants. What the research showed is that the plant was able to learn based on its experience, whether the learning properly represents classical of operant conditioning is pretty immaterial. After all, why would operant condition be important evidence of sentience (or other higher order cognitive function) but not classical conditioning?

Simple associative learning can be hardwired, like a computer program that remembers your settings.

Learned behavior is by definition not "hardwired". Your example is an example of memory, not learning. When you change a setting on your computer your computer didn't learn anything.

I've said multiple times that some Synthetic Intelligence we have now has a basic level of consciousness.
Stop pretending this is something I've been resistant to when I have confirmed this at least twice already.

I've not pretended any such thing. But then do you also think that it is morally problematic to destroy such systems? Let's suppose I installed a AI with ample learning abilities on your computer that didn't save its state when your system was powered off, would it then become morally problematic to turn off your computer? Is then research in AI where the culling of such systems is the norm just as problematic as the culling of animals?

It's about indirect duties to animals that derive NOT from their rights, but from the rights of and duties to humanity ONLY.

Right....and that is what is meant by "indirect rights". Indirect rights are a way of explaining protections for entities that have no rights in deontological systems. The broader point is that there are clear ways of arguing for protections for entities that you don't deem as moral agents in deontological systems, deontologists are by no means obligated to accept "anything goes" treatment non-moral agents (or non-rights holders).

That's a consequentialist argument, not a deontological one.

Its not, making implications about the result of some moral rule doesn't make it a consequentialist argument. Deontological ethics is a broad class of ethical theories, in fact, the term was first used well after most "deontological" systems were developed so its more fruitful to refer to the specific theories rather than trying to reason about a broad and loosely defined group of ethical theories. Kant, for example, by no means ignores the consequences of moral laws he just doesn't define the morality of an action based solely on its consequences.

You need to hold up your end and explain/quote what you're talking about though: put the ideas on display so they can be discussed.

I have been doing such that and I'd be happy to answer any specific questions. But addressing a general hostility towards a broad category of ethical theories isn't something I can really address.

Do you really believe that argument that we shouldn't hurt animals because it will make us more likely to hurt humans in the future is a solid deontological argument?

As I mentioned earlier in the discussion, I'm not discussing my beliefs here I'm discussing deontological theories because I was responding to someone asking them them. But now you seem to be insisting that I argue as if they are my beliefs when my intent was only to provide information about what some ethical theorists have argued.

They were obviously founded on rights based systems, but there's a lot of consequentialism in there too. Particularly in sentencing and civil law. Many rights and prohibitions (along with their exceptions) also have consequentialist rationales behind them (rule consequentialist, distinct from deontology).

I would agree, there is some consequentialism as well but I think this hints at something that you don't seem to want to acknowledge. Both deontological and consequenctialist systems of ethics have problems, that is, they both have cases where their application seems to counter our moral intuitions. So any practical application of ethics, like a legal system, tends to be a mixed of various moral thinking.

Personally I don't have a big interest in grand moral theories, I'm more interested in applied ethics (e.g., casuistry) . As such for me, the big debates between deontology vs consequentism are much ado about nothing. But I'll try to represent the sides of the debate the best I can.

[brimstoneSalad]

It doesn't "qualify" in your opinion but the issue here is that its not clear how you interpret classical or operant condition in the case of plants.

If you're confused about that, then bring it up as a point of discussion. DO NOT LIE, and claim something is operant conditioning when there's no indication of that because you don't agree that there's a difference between the two.

I think you owe Lay Vegan an apology on that point.

In terms of what it is and what differentiates it:
Whether in plants or animals, you're typically looking for some response that would provide benefit in the controlled environment where it would not do so in nature; this tells us there's no reason for it to be "hardwired" by evolution as a mere reflex.

For example, if the plant grew *away* from the light source, the light could become stronger rather than weaker. This wouldn't make sense in nature, and it might be operant conditioning for the plant to actually learn to control the light be growing away from it.
Or the light could get stronger when the plant grew in a clockwise spiral or a counter-clockwise spiral, regardless of the direction it came from (that might be a stronger case).
This is how operant conditioning has been demonstrated in some insects with specific antenna movement which wouldn't make any sense as a source of reward in nature.

What the research showed is that the plant was able to learn based on its experience, whether the learning properly represents classical of operant conditioning is pretty immaterial.

NO it is not. If you thought so, then you should have said that instead of lying. Lay Vegan (and I) have been specifically talking about operant conditioning, he explicitly asked you about it (not classical Pavlovian conditioning), and you said yes and then linked to something that DID NOT show that.

Again, I think you owe him an apology. If you thought it was irrelevant then you should have said that instead of lying about it.

If you do not understand the difference, and you mistakenly believed the terms were perfectly interchangeable, that would exonerate you, but I don't think you're *that* confused on the issue. I think you know people consider them different things, and you knew what he was asking for.

But either way, it isn't an excuse anymore now that you know it IS material to us.

If you want to argue that the distinction isn't important then that's a different topic.

As to what the research showed: nothing. It had the worst granularity possible (only two states, left and right) and a very small sample. Even without outright fraud, all they would have had to do is do a few variations on the same experiment (excusing it to themselves as controlling for more variables or something, since it didn't work because X) to get the results by chance. Maybe they didn't get the results the first time, and decided the breeze wasn't strong enough or the light wasn't bright enough or it was too bright? OK, rinse and repeat with small tweaks until you get the P value you want.

Absolute garbage.

After all, why would operant condition be important evidence of sentience (or other higher order cognitive function) but not classical conditioning?

Because Pavlovian conditioning can be entirely unconscious; it can be a programmed variable by evolution that just needs to be ticked by some kind of hormone to change gene expression. As I said, like a computer program remembering your settings.

That's distinct from a conscious interest where the organism learns something for a reason.

Simple associative learning can be hardwired, like a computer program that remembers your settings.

Learned behavior is by definition not "hardwired".

Should I put "learning" in quotes for you? That's fine if we're talking about true learning, but that's a more complex discussion.

Here we're talking about sensitizing a variables of gene expression.
X happens, by reflex in response to X a chemical Y is produced, when that chemical reaches a certain level Z then gene expression changes which changes behavior from A to B.

It's not conscious. There's no neural network controlling this.

Your example is an example of memory, not learning. When you change a setting on your computer your computer didn't learn anything.

That depends on your definition of learning, I assumed you were using it in the most absurd broad sense, because you seem to want to claim that plants exhibit it. In the same way, computer programs "learn" your preferences.

If we're talking about "true learning", no, plants do not exhibit it in any way and neither does Microsoft Word. Even IF that "experiment" wasn't outright fraud or dumb luck (which was promoted as a credible result by the people behind it because they're insane), it still doesn't demonstrate true learning.

Both plants and simple computer programs can have variables changed in their settings which creates a learning-like behavior when not sufficiently tested. We know this from higher quality data on damage causing higher production of toxins.

The way we tell the difference is by testing operant conditioning, anything else may be a hardwired reflex of some kind. Neither plants nor Microsoft Word can respond to operant conditioning.

Insects can, though (although only barely, and probably not all of them).

But then do you also think that it is morally problematic to destroy such systems? Let's suppose I installed a AI with ample learning abilities on your computer that didn't save its state when your system was powered off, would it then become morally problematic to turn off your computer? Is then research in AI where the culling of such systems is the norm just as problematic as the culling of animals?

It might be. Of course animals tend to have an interest in self preservation which the AI might not, but even without that we are costing the AI potential experiences. Margaret and I discussed this in another thread with respect to the harms of death.

That said, most AI are probably around insect level, so if it benefits humanity it's probably worth it (as with animal experimentation for medical purposes). I wouldn't promote their use as entertainment, though.

If video games start having more advanced AI that are spawned, harmed, and killed for mere entertainment that may become a substantial moral issue in the next decade.

Right....and that is what is meant by "indirect rights".

OK. There's probably a better way to phrase that, I didn't see "indirect rights" anywhere in the article.

deontologists are by no means obligated to accept "anything goes" treatment non-moral agents (or non-rights holders).

Yet they are after you address a couple caveats (which were explained already): the non-moral agent can not be owned by a moral agent (in which case it has indirect protection as property IF the owner wills it), and if you consider offending people's aesthetics by doing visually objectionable things in front of them arbitrarily wrong, then you need to do whatever terrible things you want to do to the non-moral agent in private.

Caveats:
1. Doesn't belong to anybody else.
2. Done in private.

Then anything goes.

Its not, making implications about the result of some moral rule doesn't make it a consequentialist argument.

I think you're confused here. An act being wrong because of its consequences makes it a consequentialist argument.

Some people like to mix and match.
Kant made it pretty clear he didn't care about consequences at all; only that it wasn't a contradiction of will or however he put it.

That doesn't mean deontology makes any sense or that it doesn't decay into consequentialism when you try to correct its problems.
Deontology is not consistent, so we shouldn't expect it to really mean anything at all when examined rigorously.

Deontological ethics is a broad class of ethical theories, in fact, the term was first used well after most "deontological" systems were developed so its more fruitful to refer to the specific theories rather than trying to reason about a broad and loosely defined group of ethical theories.

Maybe, but that broad group is loosely defined in opposition to consequentialism. So unless you want to start breaking it down, that's all we have to work with here.

I don't make recommendations based on deontology because it doesn't make any sense. It's like advising people how to best draw a square circle.

I would agree, there is some consequentialism as well but I think this hints at something that you don't seem to want to acknowledge. Both deontological and consequenctialist systems of ethics have problems, that is, they both have cases where their application seems to counter our moral intuitions. So any practical application of ethics, like a legal system, tends to be a mixed of various moral thinking.

What do you think I don't want to "acknowledge"?
Being against intuition isn't a "problem", it usually means intuition is wrong.

Or do you deny the validity of all counter-intuitive statistics, quantum mechanics, etc? Probably not.

You're just begging the question here with regards to your subjectivism again. If you categorically reject moral realism, and even logic (as seen in the other thread) as reality this isn't a discussion that can be had.

Obviously I know WHY there are deontological aspects to law. People are stupid and the law didn't originate from the most rational place (a lot of it came out of religion even).