Lay Vegan's "#NameTheTrait is a Terrible Argument for Veganism" - Response

[brimstoneSalad]

I was really trying hard to give as much charity as I could to your comment @brimstoneSalad , but when you say that my position is actually that of a moral realist it really threw me for such a loop that I don't think it's even possible for me to engage in a discussion with you. There's too vast a difference in our definition of terms that I don't want to spend hours coming to agreement on.

If you don't like the PV wiki article, I recommend you read the Wikipedia page on the topic, it's not very long and should clear you up in well under an hour:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_rea ... al_realism

Minimal realism is very minimal, it only means recognizing people are meaning to deal in factual statements, and that some statements are true or false. It's not a metaphysical heaven/hell situation. It does not in any sense mean the universe has an opinion.

Understanding terms is a large part of understanding a subject matter; we grasp concepts through language. If you take Isaac's stance of Humpty Dumptyism and define terms in your own way and refuse to understand that other people use those terms very differently (and perhaps more correctly than you do, since your usage is creating a false dichotomy), then you'll never be capable of opening your mind or correcting your mistakes.

The very wiki article you linked to me admits that moral universalism and and moral subjectivism are not mutually exclusive terms (though it does so in a condescending way)

There are some interesting exceptions and edge cases due to the weaknesses of the definitions, like calling the view of a deity subjective (relative to the subjective opinions of that deity) but also universal law. As an atheist that avenue isn't really open to you.

It's also a problem that what "subjective" means is a mess, and not the best way to explain anything as distinct from objective (because all of science can collapse into it if applied broadly).

I would at least refer you to read your own article before you call me out.

I'm not "calling you out" as a realist. I'm saying what you're describing is constructivism, and it fits in minimal realism. There is an optimal universal morality that we construct for functional reasons, and there are right and wrong statements to make in reference to that. There is a fact of that system and moral statements can be factually true or false in that context. And it's not just the opinion of a person: it's an emergent thing.

If you don't like it and you see that as some kind of insult, that's a personal problem. Try to be less sensitive.
If you think I'm in error, then explain why you believe your views don't fit with realism. Shouldn't be hard, but if you don't understand the terminology you'll have a hard time.
Isaac identified himself as an error theorist, is that also what you believe? Because your posts didn't indicate that.

[Human_Garbage]

As far as boxing myself into to a set of terms goes I'd identify as a non-cognitivist. I don't like how you're trying to associate me with Isaac just because I'm coming to the defense of NTT. This "minimal realist" term is completely new to me, and I find it to just be confusing and misleading. And you didn't just call me a minimalist realist. You said that I am a realist, and atleast a minimalist realist. That only offends me in so much as it's an inaccurate statement of my views, and I don't want to spend hours getting out of the weeds that puts me in with you. The defining quality that should differentiate a moral realist and moral anti-realist are their views on the metaphysical nature of morality, not the universal part. That is the much more controversial issue, and I hate for such a confusing label to be put on my views. The citations for the origin of this term are shotty at best on wikipedia, and if it doesn't come up in the first 5 pages of google I usually don't acknowledge it's existence. Sounds like some esoteric term no one uses anymore because it's terrible.

I haven't read enough to discern if I'm a constructivist, even after spending sometime reading the SEP page on it. But it's possible? There seems to be so many variants of it, though, so this is a confusing term too.

[Human_Garbage]

@Lay Vegan because I didn't @ you originally.

[Lay Vegan]

Gettings Human_Garbage, I see that you left a comment on my video, but I'll hold discussion here.

Hi Lay Vegan, Thanks for tackling a fairly esoteric topic in great detail. First of all, I think you're playing it up far too much when you say "NTT is one of the worst arguments on the youtube platform". Second, you never mention what ethical arguments you think are stronger than NTT (though I understand this is simply part 1).

NTT is one of the worst arguments for veganism because it is logically invalid and utterly confusing to most people (including vegans). This is why AY is so touchy about even other vegans using it in debates. In terms of better ethical argument, I'd propose NTT 2.0, Peter Singer's Argument from Marginal Cases, NameTheJustification, or Argument from Relevance. Ultimately I don't think ethical arguments are the most convincing for the average layman. It's probably the environmental/public health arguments, since people can better understand the harm.

You also mention tackling the health aspects of veganism in reaction to rationality rules comments. I think you should be careful how you do this, because it was clear from that snippet you showed that he merely said he saw some studies showing pescetarian diets to be better for health and longevity than vegan counter parts. This is a very different claim then him saying that veganism is "unhealthy" or "untenable", so please don't take that angle.

One of RR’s fans asked specifically if meat is morally defensible if it can be shown empirically that vegan diets are healthy. Sure, RR concedes that eating animals often is not morally defensible, but disagrees that eating a well-balanced vegan diet is “very healthy.” His fan wasn’t asking about the health of vegan diets relative to other diets, or whether vegan diets are optimal diets. Although Rationality Rules isn’t convinced, vegan diets are perfectly healthy if done appropriately and under the guidance of a trained dietitian. https://www.eatrightpro.org/~/media/eat ... -diet.ashx

I don't really understand why you spent 15 minutes criticizing NTT, only to introduce a third premises which you say fixes it. You should have steel-manned it first, and spent the video trying to criticize that.

I didn’t steel-man it avoid being accused of bad-faithing AY’s argument, or misunderstanding NTT. This is seems to be a common retort of those who criticize it.

Here's my problem, I feel like I can use your same criticizms of NTT 1.0 to "debunk" this NTT 2.0. You're missing a premise. There is no premise that says the trait that deems individuals of value is sentience, or that a being must be sentient to possess a trait that gives them value. You're presupposing that sentience is what gives us moral value. I could simply say, I don't believe sentience is what gives us moral value, and reject premise 3. Name the Justification falls in the same way... I can name any justification I want and call it morally relevant.

This affects the soundness of my argument, not the validity of it. i.e, the conclusion follows logically from the premises. Check out validity and soundness here. https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

The issue here is certainly determining whether something like sentience is sufficient to give humans and non-human animals non-trivial moral status, but this doesn’t harm the logical structure of my argument. If I can get my opponent to agree that sentience is morally relevant, then the conclusion would logically follow that sentient nonhuman animals also have non-trivial moral status. Again, you may not agree with the trait sentience being relevant, but the conclusion that sentience grants moral value is inferred from the premises.

If my opponent rejects the idea that sentience grants individuals moral value, and instead proposes another trait (brown eyes for example) and accepts P2, it would logically follow that humans who do not possess the trait brown eyes would be morally excluded, thus creating a moral system that most people would reject.

You can find my defense of p3 here, it’s called Argument from Relevance;

http://www.animal-ethics.org/argument-relevance/

"NTT 2.0" remains a Socratic method to have the respondent evaluate their own moral framework, instead of one that logically reaches a conclusion about what moral value is. It's only effective if they already agree sentience is the trait that gives us moral value. Furthermore, any argument that did try to reach a conclusion about what moral value is, still falls victim to moral subjectivity, because there is no proof for objective morality.

My argument is not NTT 2.0, but it is very similar. The actual 2.0 argument is here; wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait_2.0

Also, it is effective given that you can convince your opponent that sentience is the only morally relevant characteristic. As I explained my video, I have no problem with AY using NTT as a way to denote a step of the Socratic method.

Additionally premise 1 doesn't even define what kind of "value" we're talking about. Plenty of non-vegans think animals have value, that's why their flesh is sold for money in stores. This argument does not get you to reach veganism!

Correct; My argument should’ve said

(p1). There exists a trait which causes us to deem ourselves morally valuable

(p2). If humans have moral value if they possess x trait, then non human animals have moral value if they possess x trait

(P3). If an individual is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there is no trait absent in the individual, which if absent in a human, would deem the human morally valueless

(C)Therefore, nonhuman animals have moral value


Although even this doesn't necessarily reach veganism.

Furthermore, any argument that did try to reach a conclusion about what moral value is, still falls victim to moral subjectivity, because there is no proof for objective morality.

I don’t know what this means. Any logically valid form of NTT requires some premise for moral objecvtivism (universalism) that rejects double standards.


I don't have the time or interest right now to get into the ontology of morality, but I think the others are more than willing to engage with you on that.

[Porphyry]

It feels like you're trying to point out there's no distinction when there clearly is one. Unicorns are not "real". Of course, we can still have a cognitive perception of unicorns, we can think about what one looks like, we can draw pictures of them, etc... But noone in their right mind would argue unicorns ontologically exist. That's the distinction I'm getting at.

So yes, things that only exist dependently on human thought are unreal.

Trees and chairs and people were all discovered via interfacing with reality. Taking measurements about the material world and assigning categories and names. We cannot take a measurement of an action like murder, and receive back any sort of data that suggests to us "murder is wrong". We only get things like: murder causes grief, murder is bloody, murder is the theft of someone's life, etc....

But nowhere will reality tell us "murder is wrong" in the moral sense, because reality does not make prescriptive statements about the wrongness of anything. Atleast not in a way we can discern.

Good Morning. I work full time and I don't often have leisure to follow up on comments right away. Apologies for the delay.

I'm not saying there is no distinction; I mentioned that the causal factors giving rise to moral systems and the causal factors giving rise to trees differ. So the distinction is one of the nature of the causes, but not that they are caused. From the perspective of causation, they are equivalent. They are equivalent in that they care caused and in that they function as causes. Trees are causes that, for example, generate fruit, lumber, housing for squirrels and birds, etc. Moral systems are causes in that they generate behaviors and systems of rewards and punishments in socieities and individuals that adhere to them.

You used the example of unicorns and argue that they do not ontologically exist. Perhaps we are using the words 'ontology' and 'ontological' differently. I wold say that unicorns exist from an ontological perspective, but that their function differs from that of material objects. Perhaps a contrast might help. Take a material chair and a dream chair. Given a material chair I can sit on it with my material body. I cannot sit on a dream chair with my material body. The dream chair and the material chair have different functions. But I don't think we should infer from this that the dream chair has no ontological status, if by ontology we mean instantiating a basic, irreducible, category of existence. The basic, irreducible, category of causation applies equally to a material chair and a dream chair, even though the function of the two differs. That's how I see it. Perhaps you use ontology to designate something other than such categories?

[brimstoneSalad]

As far as boxing myself into to a set of terms goes I'd identify as a non-cognitivist.

That's the more intellectually dishonest of the options for rejecting realism, I'll explain why:

As a non-cognitivist, it must be your belief that when I say "Killing animals unnecessarily is wrong", that I am actually NOT trying to make a statement of moral fact. You are claiming to know better than I do (or better than what the vast majority of people do) what my intent in saying that is (or what people's intentions are generally).

You are claiming that instead I'm only trying to say "boo on killing animals unnecessarily" or telling people "don't kill animals unnecessarily".
I insist that I am saying neither of those things, and you say I don't even known my own mind. You know better because you're an omniscient psychic non-cognitivist.

You're disagreeing with other people when they say they ARE trying to express fact statements, and instead telling them that they're only trying to communicate their personal feelings or trying to tell others what to do.

I don't like how you're trying to associate me with Isaac just because I'm coming to the defense of NTT.

I assumed you had learned from Isaac a little about metaethics (as much as he misunderstands it), and I gave you the benefit of the doubt in assuming you'd aligned with the more intellectually honest of the rejections of realism.

Error theory AT LEAST takes people at their words on what they're trying to express, but just says they're they're mistaken when they assume there's a fact in the matter of morality because (according to error theory) there isn't actually a fact of morality. Error theory claims such statements about morality are opinions that people *think* are facts and mistakenly express as facts.

You're probably actually an error theorist, based on what you've said.

This "minimal realist" term is completely new to me, and I find it to just be confusing and misleading.

I understand why you're confused, and you seem to be confused on a lot more than that. When you don't know basic terminology (and you pretend words don't exist if you don't know how to find their definitions or discussion on them) this stuff can be very confusing.

And you didn't just call me a minimalist realist. You said that I am a realist, and atleast a minimalist realist.

And? I said you're some kind of realist, and it seemed like you're probably a minimal realist. Based on what you said that was the reasonable conclusion (I can quote you if you need me to).

I'm a minimal realist, at least. The metaphysical/mind independence thesis is a little more complex and maybe meaningless. Anybody with any sense is a minimal realist in the least. It's kind of a prerequisite for speaking honestly and sensibly about moral topics, but that also means being a minimal realist says almost nothing about your beliefs except that you're not a non-cognitivist or an error theorist. Perhaps you aren't interested in intellectual honesty, as evidenced by your presuming to know better than others what they're even trying to say (if you are indeed a non-cognitivist).

That only offends me in so much as it's an inaccurate statement of my views,

It probably isn't inaccurate, you just don't understand it.

and I don't want to spend hours getting out of the weeds that puts me in with you.

You're in no weeds, you just need to learn what these terms mean and be more clear about what you believe. You've been contradicting yourself. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you.

The defining quality that should differentiate a moral realist and moral anti-realist are their views on the metaphysical nature of morality, not the universal part.

Well it isn't. Maybe you think it should be that way, but that's not how it works and you can't just redefine these terms the way you think they should be and throw everybody else under the bus.

I'm sure you don't appreciate it when people redefine veganism to what they think it should mean, and in the process make veganism physically impossible/claim that vegans don't exist. That's what you're doing here to minimal realists with your extremist false dichotomy.

Realism doesn't mean heaven, hell, and a god or sentient universe with an objective opinion. Not even robust realism always means that.
It CAN mean that, and that's a form of realism, but there are secular, atheistic, and materialistic forms of realism too. If you reject that, you're just promoting the same dishonest false dichotomy that Isaac and William Lane Craig are. You will not be welcome here if you intentionally misuse terms like that.

See the forum rules here:
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=2115
Note the first rule.

You're welcome to discuss the definitions, but if you won't even do that to understand why you're wrong that's going to be a problem. Most disagreements like this come down to people misunderstanding or using conflicting definitions.

In this case, your definitions are simply wrong because they create a false dichotomy and pretend that millions of non-theistic moral realists simply don't exist. It's not only a popular position, but seems to the the dominant position among philosophers, most of whom are neither error theorists nor non-cognitivists about ethics.

Sounds like some esoteric term no one uses anymore because it's terrible.

No. You just aren't very well read. It's a newer term (relatively speaking).

Looked at what came up on SEP and this was my first hit searching:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
You should have found that easily.

Minimalism is mentioned several times. The big sticking point is typically what "mind dependence" or "mind independence" could even mean; and it may not have any real meaning at all. Thus: "creeping minimalism" (look it up, there's a lot more discussion on what the distinction is than on minimalism itself which can be summed up in a few words; it's just not having a position (or having a differing position) on the third thesis of robust realism).
As I said, mind dependence can either capture everything (including all science) or nothing at all. Psychology? Is that mind-dependent? What even is a mind? If it's not something magical, then does that mean anything at all? We're talking about physical things: electrochemical reactions and patterns of stored information. What a mind thinks or how it works is an objective fact.

The only supernatural presupposition here is you supposing there's something so magical about a mind that it makes the third premise of realism intelligible. Maybe there isn't any difference between minimal realism and robust realism at all, and if you're honest maybe the only question is whether you're an error theorist (and you said you were not a relativist) or not.

[Human_Garbage]

As far as boxing myself into to a set of terms goes I'd identify as a non-cognitivist.

That's the more intellectually dishonest of the options for rejecting realism, I'll explain why:

As a non-cognitivist, it must be your belief that when I say "Killing animals unnecessarily is wrong", that I am actually NOT trying to make a statement of moral fact. You are claiming to know better than I do (or better than what the vast majority of people do) what my intent in saying that is (or what people's intentions are generally).

You are claiming that instead I'm only trying to say "boo on killing animals unnecessarily" or telling people "don't kill animals unnecessarily".
I insist that I am saying neither of those things, and you say I don't even known my own mind. You know better because you're an omniscient psychic non-cognitivist.

You're disagreeing with other people when they say they ARE trying to express fact statements, and instead telling them that they're only trying to communicate their personal feelings or trying to tell others what to do.

I don't like how you're trying to associate me with Isaac just because I'm coming to the defense of NTT.

I assumed you had learned from Isaac a little about metaethics (as much as he misunderstands it), and I gave you the benefit of the doubt in assuming you'd aligned with the more intellectually honest of the rejections of realism.

Error theory AT LEAST takes people at their words on what they're trying to express, but just says they're they're mistaken when they assume there's a fact in the matter of morality because (according to error theory) there isn't actually a fact of morality. Error theory claims such statements about morality are opinions that people *think* are facts and mistakenly express as facts.

You're probably actually an error theorist, based on what you've said.

This "minimal realist" term is completely new to me, and I find it to just be confusing and misleading.

I understand why you're confused, and you seem to be confused on a lot more than that. When you don't know basic terminology (and you pretend words don't exist if you don't know how to find their definitions or discussion on them) this stuff can be very confusing.

And you didn't just call me a minimalist realist. You said that I am a realist, and atleast a minimalist realist.

And? I said you're some kind of realist, and it seemed like you're probably a minimal realist. Based on what you said that was the reasonable conclusion (I can quote you if you need me to).

I'm a minimal realist, at least. The metaphysical/mind independence thesis is a little more complex and maybe meaningless. Anybody with any sense is a minimal realist in the least. It's kind of a prerequisite for speaking honestly and sensibly about moral topics, but that also means being a minimal realist says almost nothing about your beliefs except that you're not a non-cognitivist or an error theorist. Perhaps you aren't interested in intellectual honesty, as evidenced by your presuming to know better than others what they're even trying to say (if you are indeed a non-cognitivist).

That only offends me in so much as it's an inaccurate statement of my views,

It probably isn't inaccurate, you just don't understand it.

and I don't want to spend hours getting out of the weeds that puts me in with you.

You're in no weeds, you just need to learn what these terms mean and be more clear about what you believe. You've been contradicting yourself. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you.

The defining quality that should differentiate a moral realist and moral anti-realist are their views on the metaphysical nature of morality, not the universal part.

Well it isn't. Maybe you think it should be that way, but that's not how it works and you can't just redefine these terms the way you think they should be and throw everybody else under the bus.

I'm sure you don't appreciate it when people redefine veganism to what they think it should mean, and in the process make veganism physically impossible/claim that vegans don't exist. That's what you're doing here to minimal realists with your extremist false dichotomy.

Realism doesn't mean heaven, hell, and a god or sentient universe with an objective opinion. Not even robust realism always means that.
It CAN mean that, and that's a form of realism, but there are secular, atheistic, and materialistic forms of realism too. If you reject that, you're just promoting the same dishonest false dichotomy that Isaac and William Lane Craig are. You will not be welcome here if you intentionally misuse terms like that.

See the forum rules here:
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=2115
Note the first rule.

You're welcome to discuss the definitions, but if you won't even do that to understand why you're wrong that's going to be a problem. Most disagreements like this come down to people misunderstanding or using conflicting definitions.

In this case, your definitions are simply wrong because they create a false dichotomy and pretend that millions of non-theistic moral realists simply don't exist. It's not only a popular position, but seems to the the dominant position among philosophers, most of whom are neither error theorists nor non-cognitivists about ethics.

Sounds like some esoteric term no one uses anymore because it's terrible.

No. You just aren't very well read. It's a newer term (relatively speaking).

Looked at what came up on SEP and this was my first hit searching:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
You should have found that easily.

Minimalism is mentioned several times. The big sticking point is typically what "mind dependence" or "mind independence" could even mean; and it may not have any real meaning at all. Thus: "creeping minimalism" (look it up, there's a lot more discussion on what the distinction is than on minimalism itself which can be summed up in a few words; it's just not having a position (or having a differing position) on the third thesis of robust realism).
As I said, mind dependence can either capture everything (including all science) or nothing at all. Psychology? Is that mind-dependent? What even is a mind? If it's not something magical, then does that mean anything at all? We're talking about physical things: electrochemical reactions and patterns of stored information. What a mind thinks or how it works is an objective fact.

The only supernatural presupposition here is you supposing there's something so magical about a mind that it makes the third premise of realism intelligible. Maybe there isn't any difference between minimal realism and robust realism at all, and if you're honest maybe the only question is whether you're an error theorist (and you said you were not a relativist) or not.

You've been contradicting yourself. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you. Goodbye.

[Human_Garbage]

As far as boxing myself into to a set of terms goes I'd identify as a non-cognitivist.

That's the more intellectually dishonest of the options for rejecting realism, I'll explain why:

As a non-cognitivist, it must be your belief that when I say "Killing animals unnecessarily is wrong", that I am actually NOT trying to make a statement of moral fact. You are claiming to know better than I do (or better than what the vast majority of people do) what my intent in saying that is (or what people's intentions are generally).

You are claiming that instead I'm only trying to say "boo on killing animals unnecessarily" or telling people "don't kill animals unnecessarily".
I insist that I am saying neither of those things, and you say I don't even known my own mind. You know better because you're an omniscient psychic non-cognitivist.

You're disagreeing with other people when they say they ARE trying to express fact statements, and instead telling them that they're only trying to communicate their personal feelings or trying to tell others what to do.

I don't like how you're trying to associate me with Isaac just because I'm coming to the defense of NTT.

I assumed you had learned from Isaac a little about metaethics (as much as he misunderstands it), and I gave you the benefit of the doubt in assuming you'd aligned with the more intellectually honest of the rejections of realism.

Error theory AT LEAST takes people at their words on what they're trying to express, but just says they're they're mistaken when they assume there's a fact in the matter of morality because (according to error theory) there isn't actually a fact of morality. Error theory claims such statements about morality are opinions that people *think* are facts and mistakenly express as facts.

You're probably actually an error theorist, based on what you've said.

This "minimal realist" term is completely new to me, and I find it to just be confusing and misleading.

I understand why you're confused, and you seem to be confused on a lot more than that. When you don't know basic terminology (and you pretend words don't exist if you don't know how to find their definitions or discussion on them) this stuff can be very confusing.

And you didn't just call me a minimalist realist. You said that I am a realist, and atleast a minimalist realist.

And? I said you're some kind of realist, and it seemed like you're probably a minimal realist. Based on what you said that was the reasonable conclusion (I can quote you if you need me to).

I'm a minimal realist, at least. The metaphysical/mind independence thesis is a little more complex and maybe meaningless. Anybody with any sense is a minimal realist in the least. It's kind of a prerequisite for speaking honestly and sensibly about moral topics, but that also means being a minimal realist says almost nothing about your beliefs except that you're not a non-cognitivist or an error theorist. Perhaps you aren't interested in intellectual honesty, as evidenced by your presuming to know better than others what they're even trying to say (if you are indeed a non-cognitivist).

That only offends me in so much as it's an inaccurate statement of my views,

It probably isn't inaccurate, you just don't understand it.

and I don't want to spend hours getting out of the weeds that puts me in with you.

You're in no weeds, you just need to learn what these terms mean and be more clear about what you believe. You've been contradicting yourself. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you.

The defining quality that should differentiate a moral realist and moral anti-realist are their views on the metaphysical nature of morality, not the universal part.

Well it isn't. Maybe you think it should be that way, but that's not how it works and you can't just redefine these terms the way you think they should be and throw everybody else under the bus.

I'm sure you don't appreciate it when people redefine veganism to what they think it should mean, and in the process make veganism physically impossible/claim that vegans don't exist. That's what you're doing here to minimal realists with your extremist false dichotomy.

Realism doesn't mean heaven, hell, and a god or sentient universe with an objective opinion. Not even robust realism always means that.
It CAN mean that, and that's a form of realism, but there are secular, atheistic, and materialistic forms of realism too. If you reject that, you're just promoting the same dishonest false dichotomy that Isaac and William Lane Craig are. You will not be welcome here if you intentionally misuse terms like that.

See the forum rules here:
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=2115
Note the first rule.

You're welcome to discuss the definitions, but if you won't even do that to understand why you're wrong that's going to be a problem. Most disagreements like this come down to people misunderstanding or using conflicting definitions.

In this case, your definitions are simply wrong because they create a false dichotomy and pretend that millions of non-theistic moral realists simply don't exist. It's not only a popular position, but seems to the the dominant position among philosophers, most of whom are neither error theorists nor non-cognitivists about ethics.

Sounds like some esoteric term no one uses anymore because it's terrible.

No. You just aren't very well read. It's a newer term (relatively speaking).

Looked at what came up on SEP and this was my first hit searching:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
You should have found that easily.

Minimalism is mentioned several times. The big sticking point is typically what "mind dependence" or "mind independence" could even mean; and it may not have any real meaning at all. Thus: "creeping minimalism" (look it up, there's a lot more discussion on what the distinction is than on minimalism itself which can be summed up in a few words; it's just not having a position (or having a differing position) on the third thesis of robust realism).
As I said, mind dependence can either capture everything (including all science) or nothing at all. Psychology? Is that mind-dependent? What even is a mind? If it's not something magical, then does that mean anything at all? We're talking about physical things: electrochemical reactions and patterns of stored information. What a mind thinks or how it works is an objective fact.

The only supernatural presupposition here is you supposing there's something so magical about a mind that it makes the third premise of realism intelligible. Maybe there isn't any difference between minimal realism and robust realism at all, and if you're honest maybe the only question is whether you're an error theorist (and you said you were not a relativist) or not.

You say I'm using words incorrectly, I say that you are. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you.

[Human_Garbage]

It feels like you're trying to point out there's no distinction when there clearly is one. Unicorns are not "real". Of course, we can still have a cognitive perception of unicorns, we can think about what one looks like, we can draw pictures of them, etc... But noone in their right mind would argue unicorns ontologically exist. That's the distinction I'm getting at.

So yes, things that only exist dependently on human thought are unreal.

Trees and chairs and people were all discovered via interfacing with reality. Taking measurements about the material world and assigning categories and names. We cannot take a measurement of an action like murder, and receive back any sort of data that suggests to us "murder is wrong". We only get things like: murder causes grief, murder is bloody, murder is the theft of someone's life, etc....

But nowhere will reality tell us "murder is wrong" in the moral sense, because reality does not make prescriptive statements about the wrongness of anything. Atleast not in a way we can discern.

Good Morning. I work full time and I don't often have leisure to follow up on comments right away. Apologies for the delay.

I'm not saying there is no distinction; I mentioned that the causal factors giving rise to moral systems and the causal factors giving rise to trees differ. So the distinction is one of the nature of the causes, but not that they are caused. From the perspective of causation, they are equivalent. They are equivalent in that they care caused and in that they function as causes. Trees are causes that, for example, generate fruit, lumber, housing for squirrels and birds, etc. Moral systems are causes in that they generate behaviors and systems of rewards and punishments in socieities and individuals that adhere to them.

You used the example of unicorns and argue that they do not ontologically exist. Perhaps we are using the words 'ontology' and 'ontological' differently. I wold say that unicorns exist from an ontological perspective, but that their function differs from that of material objects. Perhaps a contrast might help. Take a material chair and a dream chair. Given a material chair I can sit on it with my material body. I cannot sit on a dream chair with my material body. The dream chair and the material chair have different functions. But I don't think we should infer from this that the dream chair has no ontological status, if by ontology we mean instantiating a basic, irreducible, category of existence. The basic, irreducible, category of causation applies equally to a material chair and a dream chair, even though the function of the two differs. That's how I see it. Perhaps you use ontology to designate something other than such categories?

No worries, I work full time too, and overtime much of the time.

When I speak of ontology I'm talking about the nature of *real* existence. A dream chair does not ontologically exist either. Something that ontologically exists exists even without you realizing it, conceiving it, or observing it.

[Frank Quasar]

I think you should define the terms for him so he's on board with what you're saying clearly if there is indeed confusion.