Lay Vegan's "#NameTheTrait is a Terrible Argument for Veganism" - Response

[Human_Garbage]

@brimstoneSalad

As far as boxing myself into to a set of terms goes I'd identify as a non-cognitivist.

That's the more intellectually dishonest of the options for rejecting realism, I'll explain why:

You call my stance intellectually dishonest (how do you know I'm not being honest?) and then claim I'm the one asserting things about the authenticity of your moral propositions? Let that irony sink in.

As a non-cognitivist, it must be your belief that when I say "Killing animals unnecessarily is wrong", that I am actually NOT trying to make a statement of moral fact. You are claiming to know better than I do (or better than what the vast majority of people do) what my intent in saying that is (or what people's intentions are generally).

Here is a definition of non-cognitivism straight from the SEP:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, non-cognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when people utter moral sentences they are not typically expressing states of mind which are beliefs or which are cognitive in the way that beliefs are. Rather they are expressing non-cognitive attitudes more similar to desires, approval or disapproval.

Therefore...

As a non-cognitivist, it is not my belief that you are not trying to make a statement of moral fact. It is my belief that there are no moral facts. I do not claim to know better than you do about your intent. I do not claim to know better than you do about morals. I claim that everyone is equally unable to ascertain moral truth.

You are claiming that instead I'm only trying to say "boo on killing animals unnecessarily" or telling people "don't kill animals unnecessarily".
I insist that I am saying neither of those things, and you say I don't even known my own mind. You know better because you're an omniscient psychic non-cognitivist.

You're disagreeing with other people when they say they ARE trying to express fact statements, and instead telling them that they're only trying to communicate their personal feelings or trying to tell others what to do.

This reads like you have me confused for an Emotivist. In fact, you literally took the same examples of moral propositions as the wikipedia insert about Emotivism. Do you agree that this is a strawman of my views as I have stated them (above)?

I don't like how you're trying to associate me with Isaac just because I'm coming to the defense of NTT.

I assumed you had learned from Isaac a little about metaethics (as much as he misunderstands it), and I gave you the benefit of the doubt in assuming you'd aligned with the more intellectually honest of the rejections of realism.

The only thing I've learned from Isaac is how not to behave in a discussion. Again you bring up that my view is not honest, but I don't know what else to tell you. I honestly hold this belief.

Error theory AT LEAST takes people at their words on what they're trying to express, but just says they're they're mistaken when they assume there's a fact in the matter of morality because (according to error theory) there isn't actually a fact of morality. Error theory claims such statements about morality are opinions that people *think* are facts and mistakenly express as facts.

You're probably actually an error theorist, based on what you've said.

More irony that you call me the "omniscient one who knows your intentions" and yet here you are, assuming what my theories on morality are, instead of listening to what I tell you.

Moral error theory can be summarized as follows:
(i) all moral claims are false
(ii) we have reason to believe that all moral claims are false.

The reason I'm not an error theorist is because I don't think it makes sense to talk about the trueness or falseness of moral statements.

This "minimal realist" term is completely new to me, and I find it to just be confusing and misleading.

I understand why you're confused, and you seem to be confused on a lot more than that. When you don't know basic terminology (and you pretend words don't exist if you don't know how to find their definitions or discussion on them) this stuff can be very confusing.

This is ad hominem. "Minimal realism" is not "basic" nor requisite terminology to engaging in a discussion about metaethics. It is fairly esoteric, and the reason I didn't want to consider it is because the citation for it was broken on Wikipedia. A simple search of "minimal realism" did not bring up substantial hits. It was only brought up in reference to another, more prominent term. I found it's definition, and I didn't like it because I feel it's confusing, I'd rather not use it. There's a lot of words in language that are that way. I shouldn't have said that I don't acknowledge it's existence, I was just totally unfamiliar with it at the time of your introduction of it.

And you didn't just call me a minimalist realist. You said that I am a realist, and at least a minimalist realist.

And? I said you're some kind of realist, and it seemed like you're probably a minimal realist. Based on what you said that was the reasonable conclusion (I can quote you if you need me to).

I'm not a moral realist, and I'm not even a minimal realist, by your own linked definition of the word. From the SEP page you showed me:

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist.

Here's my argument:

P1. To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist.
P2. I do not deny noncognitivism
C. I am not a minimal moral realist.

I'm a minimal realist, at least. The metaphysical/mind independence thesis is a little more complex and maybe meaningless.

I don't believe in mind/body independence, so this is a strawman.

Anybody with any sense is a minimal realist in the least. It's kind of a prerequisite for speaking honestly and sensibly about moral topics, but that also means being a minimal realist says almost nothing about your beliefs except that you're not a non-cognitivist or an error theorist. Perhaps you aren't interested in intellectual honesty, as evidenced by your presuming to know better than others what they're even trying to say (if you are indeed a non-cognitivist).

More strawmans and condescension. I don't presume I know better than you about your intentions.

That only offends me in so much as it's an inaccurate statement of my views,

It probably isn't inaccurate, you just don't understand it.

Condescending.

and I don't want to spend hours getting out of the weeds that puts me in with you.

You're in no weeds, you just need to learn what these terms mean and be more clear about what you believe. You've been contradicting yourself. You are currently in a state of fractal wrongness. You don't even understand well enough what you're talking about to be consistent enough to have an identifiable wrong position. It's a big problem. You can't be corrected if you aren't competent to engage in the discussion necessary to correct you.

This is all rude and conjecture.

The defining quality that should differentiate a moral realist and moral anti-realist are their views on the metaphysical nature of morality, not the universal part.

Well it isn't. Maybe you think it should be that way, but that's not how it works and you can't just redefine these terms the way you think they should be and throw everybody else under the bus.

This actually is how it works. From SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... aMorAntRea

Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner (in the relevant sense of “mind-independence”). On this view, moral anti-realism is the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist mind-independently.
Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.

However, also note:

there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better. Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.

So actually, these terms are extremely ambiguous without context. You are displaying incredible irony once again when you tell me I am "redefining these terms" and "throwing everyone else under the bus" when that is exactly what you have done to me.

I'm sure you don't appreciate it when people redefine veganism to what they think it should mean, and in the process make veganism physically impossible/claim that vegans don't exist. That's what you're doing here to minimal realists with your extremist false dichotomy.

I actually don't care that much, some people really do have conceptions like veganism is only a diet. As long as we can come to an agreement on what the term means before we begin a debate, I'm fine. You and I have clearly shown an incompatibility to do so, which is why I wanted to avoid this discussion the moment it started. Again, you are ironically doing this very thing to me by defining realism however you want, and not acknowledging my definition of it.

Realism doesn't mean heaven, hell, and a god or sentient universe with an objective opinion. Not even robust realism always means that.
It CAN mean that, and that's a form of realism, but there are secular, atheistic, and materialistic forms of realism too. If you reject that, you're just promoting the same dishonest false dichotomy that Isaac and William Lane Craig are. You will not be welcome here if you intentionally misuse terms like that.

Strawman, I don't think it has to have anything to do with God. I know there are secular forms of realism, I just don't agree with them. I do reject that, and I am promoting the dichotomy William Lane Craig is (God that was a frustrating debate with Sam Harris, on both sides), but I'm not dishonest (again), and I don't believe I am false.

See the forum rules here:
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=2115
Note the first rule.

You're welcome to discuss the definitions, but if you won't even do that to understand why you're wrong that's going to be a problem. Most disagreements like this come down to people misunderstanding or using conflicting definitions.

In this case, your definitions are simply wrong because they create a false dichotomy and pretend that millions of non-theistic moral realists simply don't exist. It's not only a popular position, but seems to the the dominant position among philosophers, most of whom are neither error theorists nor non-cognitivists about ethics.

More condescending conjecture. I know that moral realism is actually a majority view among academic philosophers. I'm aware I am on what is a slightly less popular side. I'm okay with that. Veganism is the same way.

Sounds like some esoteric term no one uses anymore because it's terrible.

No. You just aren't very well read. It's a newer term (relatively speaking).

Ad hominem but I probably deserved it.

Looked at what came up on SEP and this was my first hit searching:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
You should have found that easily.

I didn't count it if it was simply embedded in the article somewhere deep. If I did I would have acknowledged the Wikipedia source I saw from the beginning.

Minimalism is mentioned several times. The big sticking point is typically what "mind dependence" or "mind independence" could even mean; and it may not have any real meaning at all. Thus: "creeping minimalism" (look it up, there's a lot more discussion on what the distinction is than on minimalism itself which can be summed up in a few words; it's just not having a position (or having a differing position) on the third thesis of robust realism).
As I said, mind dependence can either capture everything (including all science) or nothing at all.

I believe this is the false dichotomy. What proof do you have that we can arrive at scientific evidence of moral truth? What evidence is there for this dichotomy? "Everything" is a HUGE net you're casting. So is "nothing at all".

Psychology? Is that mind-dependent? What even is a mind? If it's not something magical, then does that mean anything at all? We're talking about physical things: electrochemical reactions and patterns of stored information. What a mind thinks or how it works is an objective fact.

The only supernatural presupposition here is you supposing there's something so magical about a mind that it makes the third premise of realism intelligible. Maybe there isn't any difference between minimal realism and robust realism at all, and if you're honest maybe the only question is whether you're an error theorist (and you said you were not a relativist) or not.

I don't propose to know everything about how the mind works, but again, I don't believe in mind/body independence, so this is a strawman.

The reason I didn't want to engage you to start out with is this. It took me about an hour to type this up. The places I believe you to be misunderstood about my views, condescending, and incorrect are so numerous that my kneejerk reaction is that it isn't worth the effort. I identify as a consequentialist, and the truth is, my time would be better spent arguing someone with which I had more to gain. I don't think you are responding to me charitably. If you truly believe me to be so unintelligent and unworthy of engaging in a discussion, then why would I engage in a discussion with you? I would rather go talk to a non-vegan, or someone who took what I had to say seriously. Unfortunately, I expect this to result in another several back and forth posts arguing about the definition of terms. Regardless, hopefully this post can reset the discussion and get us somewhere fruitful.

[Human_Garbage]

@brimstoneSalad to your first comment...

I'll only add that I think you're quite confused about what it is for something to be as a concept (and being understood to be a concept) vs. being (or supposing to be) physically real. "Unicorns" aren't meant to be limited to concepts, and the conceptual descriptions are also impossible (references to magic).

I wasn't arguing the existence of Unicorns as a concept. I was arguing the ontology of the existence of actual unicorns. Surely you acknowledge there's a difference?

As long as a concept is KNOWN to be a concept, and as long as it is consistent, then it is ontologically real as such (as an information structure; as real as software on a computer, for instance, but not physically out there with us).

Agreed, but not the argument I was making. Just because moral systems (and unicorns) can truly exist as information structures in the brain, does not mean they stand to purport moral truths.

It's also "ontologically" real morality in the universe as a concept (conceived of) that inevitably emerges from rational beings working things out among themselves... kind of like game theory, even mathematics, any system that has an inherent function to rational beings and exists as a conceptual framework. That's nothing like a unicorn which is supposed to be something physical that hasn't manifested and beyond that possesses impossible qualities so it can't manifest as it's supposed to.

Sure we can really conceptualize moral propositions and systems. That doesn't mean the truth value of those systems have an ontologically real basis. So it's exactly like a unicorn, which we can conceptualize sure, but it has no material, mind independent existence.

[Lay Vegan]

First, I would say that we're talking about humans who we're human, but have been robbed of the humanness trait for the sake of the thought experiment.

Now you're excluding essential properties of humanity. A former human (and a current conscious computer) who lacks human DNA is not a human. Your “conscious computer” hypothetical is irrelavent. You’re just needlessly arguing semantics and changing the definition of words like “human” to include other sentient beings who have similar properties.

More importantly, this doesn’t address the problem of premise 2 being nonsensical, because the trait being or having ever been human, would produce a logical contradiction. As I said before, it would be impossible for a human who is not human, and who has never been human, to exist.

Second, NTT is a tool for evaluating the consistency of one's own moral position. It does not assert what is moral, it does not have to account for one's selection of "arbitrary traits", it only needs to get people to admit that their selection of traits is arbitrary. I believe it is logically consistent (for me reinforce later), though not "sound" because I don't believe moral propositions can ever be sound.

This is completely irrelevant to the quote you’re responding to. Did you mean to respond to another quote? I’m not letting you get away there, I need a coherent response to my point about p2 being self-contradictory. Your repeated assertions about NTT and morality doesn’t address this.

You said in your video that you appreciate the argument being used in this way, just that you didn't think that's how Ask Yourself, or most people use it. This is how I use it.

Then you’re wasting your time debating me on this. I’m not talking about using name the trait informally, as a “slogan” denoting a step of the Socratic method to draw out moral presumptions. My criticism is with Name the Trait, the FOMRAL argument put forth by Ask Yourself that attempts to reach veganism following the recognition of animal moral value. AND more particularly, his invalid syllogism. Your inability to recognize this is precisely why Ask Yourself is so hesitant to let his acolytes represent his argument.

I think you mean traits lacking in animals, which if lacking in humans would render us valueless.

Yes. (Also notice that I don’t mind correcting the error).

There's already semantic errors all over the place elsewhere.

Agreed. Some can be fixed fairly easily (like clarifying *non-human* animals rather than just *animals.*)

For example, it says "animals" instead of "non-human animals". You seemed to have given it the benefit of the doubt for this error, and assumed you knew what it meant. Just like I did with what you said.I would ask you do the same with the "human" and "ourselves" phrasing. Premise 2 implies that human is a collection of traits, if lacking the trait the animals lack that is proposed to make animals valueless, that new collection of traits (set of human traits - relevant trait) is what gets evaluated next ("ourselves").

Very clever, but no. You are You are conflating conclusive & informal statements with formal argumentative structure. Formal argument should not and cannot contain implicit premises, because they do not logically entail their conclusion via inference rules. “Human” can be implied to be either a collection of smaller counterparts OR the possession of essential properties that actually make humans “human.” If you’re talking about the former, then you should add an additional premise making this clear (something like identity of indescernables).

I agree, a subjectivist could grant humans moral value on a whim without naming a trait, but then they would be inconsistent if they didn't do the same thing for non-human animals.

The inconsistency is only present given that I am using a standard to grant moral value. If the “standard” is my own subjective opinion, then sure, it would be a double standard. But who cares? Double standards being “bad” is just your opinion. Any subjectivist ethical argument easily becomes meaningless.

Sure, they can say "I don't care about consistency", and they're welcome to do that, NTT makes the inconsistency obvious, allowing rational people who value consistency to reject that subjectivist's moral system.

Again, who cares? To a subjectivist, your aceptence of moral consistency is just as arbitrary as another’s rejection to it. Why should I even care about consistency?

[esquizofrenico]

I think that whether or not moral laws are exist ontologically is pretty irrelevant. For me the question is "can moral laws have the same character than physical laws?".

Let's say for example Newton's Second Law of Motion, the minus derivative of the potential energy function with respect position is equal to the mass multiplied by the second derivative of the position with respect time. Given that you don't look like a Platonist, I assume you think that functions, derivatives and first of all numbers do not exist in the ontological sense, so even less can exist a law that is composed by them. In fact, as you know Newton's Second Law is only an approximation of the Time Dependent Schroedinger Equation for heavy objects, so we could even argue that it is not really true. Still, I am sure you agree that it is not a social construct and to all effects we can say it is true, in the sense that it makes concrete predictions about the behaviour of the universe that can be trusted.

Moral laws are similar in this way, they also make predictions about what is right and wrong, but the problem is that we cannot see if something is right or wrong. And I agree with this, it is clear that for having any moral discussion, one needs to start with some presuppositions. But this is also true for physical sciences. Case in point: Solipsism.

When you look at Solipsism, you can see what a powerful and consistent idea it is. I only have access to my mind and my experiences, so I can only be sure that those exist, there is no reason to believe that those experiences are caused by any external world (neither to deny it). Descartes tried to scape Solipsism in his Meditations by taking from Saint Anselm the "God necessarily exists and must be perfectly good" nonsense. Not surprisingly, it failed. So either we make some assumptions, or every science book ever written could only say "Cogito ergo sum" a couple thousand times.

So in saying that a chair exists ontologically, you are already making an assumption. Is this assumption a social construct? Are we to say that it is equally valid to believe that your experiences are being caused by an external world that they are delusions similar to that of dreams. No. Assuming that the universe exists is not only very useful, but gives us a consistent system that explains a lot of different observations (most people see the same things I do, I don't perceive everything I wish I could perceive, etc). None of these invalidate Solipsism, but the burden of proof is in Solipsist to prove that the assumption is not true.

Moral relativism is much like Solipsism. It cannot be possibly falsified or verified. But that is not to say that it is just as logically valid. If one does not assume that moral consistency is valuable, we cannot say nothing about morality, I can say that something is good and not good at the same time. We make that assumption because it is useful. If saying that something is "good" or "bad" has no meaning, I would have no way to decide how to behave. So I make that assumption because it is useful. If moral relativists deny that, they are the ones that need to show problems in my argument. In the same way since I care about my interests and I see that other beings have interests similar to mine, it is logical to assume that interests are valuable. This leads to a consistent, useful and liveable world.

In other words, if moral objectivism is wrong, it is on the other side to prove it. You know, the one that proves with every single action in their lives that they don't really believe what they say they believe.

[Porphyry]

Human_Garbage:
"No worries, I work full time too, and overtime much of the time.

When I speak of ontology I'm talking about the nature of *real* existence. A dream chair does not ontologically exist either. Something that ontologically exists exists even without you realizing it, conceiving it, or observing it."

I use 'ontology' in the way that the classical tradition of philosophy uses it, starting with Aristotle's 'Categories'. That is to say I see the task of ontology as illuminating the irreducible categories of existing things. This is usually structured to highlight the basic nature of existing things in the sense that if something exists it must fall into one of the ontological categories. Looking at it from your perspective, ontology asks what it means to be 'real'. There is a long and complex discussion about what these irreducible categories are; e.g. there is a long critique of Aristotle's categories in the sixth Ennead of Plotinus. In spite of this, Aristotle's categories have retained a strong influence on ontology down to the present day.

I think I would approach your disagreement with asking you if you think that non-sensory objects exist? For example, do you think that numbers exist? And are you claiming that dream objects are non-existent? What about relations such as 'between' or 'to the left of'? It seems to me that you are asserting that only sensory objects are 'real', though I might have misunderstood you. But if there are non-sensory objects that exist (e.g. numbers), then why wouldn't non-sensory objects such as dream objects, interior emotions, and desires, also exist; that is to say why wouldn't they be real? And if those are real, why wouldn't moral systems also be real?

[Lay Vegan]

Great comments @Porphyry and @esquizofrenico , but be sure to mention @Human_Garbage so he doesn’t miss them.

[Lay Vegan]

By the way, Isaac nor myself even accepts p1, because neither of us think humanness is the trait by which we deem moral value. So I wouldn't say humans are of moral value because not all humans are.

Ask Yourself has consistently stated that Name The Trait requires only agreement with logical consistency and a personal belief in human moral value. It’s clear that he accepts premise 1. Of course if we steel-man his argument, premise 1 is really saying that sentient humans are of moral value, but this doesn’t save his argument from internal contradictions regarding sentient humans lacking the trait being or ever having been a sentient human.

And yet, here I am in defense of NTT because I think it is an excellent litmus test for moral consistency.

You are doing a pretty terrible job of defending NameTheTrait. You can’t seem to counter anything I say, so you constantly double back and claim that NTT is only a “logical consistency litmus test.” You try to engage with my criticism regarding the syllogistic format of Name the Trait (pointing out that it contains smuggled axioms & internal contradictions) but rather than conceding that it contains gaping holes in logic, you weasel your way out of this by claiming that NametheTrait isn’t a formal even argument to begin with. Which, by the way, is something that AskYourself disagrees with. You are being incredibly dishonest and your ignorance about this topic is beginning to show here.

NTT cannot be used in itself to express that veganism is the only consistent moral position. In fact, it’s not even a strong argument for rational veganism. Part 2 is attempting to reach veganism by establishing that anything short of non-exploitation isn’t an adequate expression of respect for animal moral value, but it only leads to contradictory conclusions that backfire on vegans (such as deontological commitment to non-exploitation). Your claim that it's "just a consistency test" is shadowed by its syllogistic goal to prove moral worth within animals (and establishing that exploiting them produces a “contradiction”) but it alone cannot represent animal moral worth accurately. This topic requires a much larger conversation about metaethics (why suffering is objectively harmful) then discussion regarding the importance of sentience and moral consideration. Something that 1 singular argument cannot adequately cover. Sure, people have used NTT as a collection of reductio ad absurdum points, or as a helpful retort denoting a step of the Socratic method, but none of these correlate well within the formal logical framework of NTT.

If you concede that NTT (the formal argument) is invalid, then you're wasting your time discussing with me. If you think that NTT is not a formal argument, that is is a response to present a trait that does not succumb to absurdity, then it sounds like you have your work cut-out for you clearing that up with Isaac.

[brimstoneSalad]

Philo can't be judged as calm, civil, or collected when he refuses to even enter the discussion, just like I am doing. There are certain characters of people who are not worth discussing with because they won't engage you honestly.

Like Red said, it's a requirement on this forum that both sides adhere to certain standards in answering argument.
A Philo/Isaac(Ask Yourself) debate could be productive on the forum if the rules were followed; each party has to answer the questions of the other here.

However, I can give it another shot. [...] Then, I will wait for his response telling me I'm simply not well read, that i'm confused, factually wrong, and not intellectual enough to have this discussion because I like a character from undertale, and I will proceed to add a tally to my log of wasted evenings.

Thank you. I've skimmed your response and it will take a while to reply to. I appreciate that you're engaging with the argument.

[brimstoneSalad]

You call my stance intellectually dishonest (how do you know I'm not being honest?) and then claim I'm the one asserting things about the authenticity of your moral propositions? Let that irony sink in.

Non-cognitivism is intellectually dishonest (which doesn't mean the same thing as old fashioned dishonesty).
This is a pretty good discussion of the difference: http://wiki.c2.com/?IntellectualDishonesty

Non-Cognitivism is intellectually dishonest because it presumes to reject other people's explanations of their own intentions, and doing so makes rational discourse on such an unfalsifiable position impossible.

It's very similar to the Theist who says of Atheists that the latter actually believe in God but just hate him so they pretend not to believe.

You're telling other people what they believe and intend to express.

Look at the SEP definition:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

Non-cognitivists agree with error theorists that there are no moral properties or moral facts. But rather than thinking that this makes moral statements false, non-cognitivists claim that moral statements are not in the business of predicating properties or making statements which could be true or false in any substantial sense. Roughly put, non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions. Furthermore, according to non-cognitivists, when people utter moral sentences they are not typically expressing states of mind which are beliefs or which are cognitive in the way that beliefs are. Rather they are expressing non-cognitive attitudes more similar to desires, approval or disapproval.

That's what I said.

People: We are making statements about moral facts.
Error Theorists: We believe you're trying to make a statement about fact, but you are mistaken because there are no moral facts, thus all your claims are in error.

People: We are making statements about moral facts.
Non-Cognitivists: Actually you're not even trying to make statements about fact, we know better than you do what you're trying to say, you're just trying to express a feeling.

Non-Cognitivists can f*ck right off with that shit. It's intellectually dishonest. No less intellectually dishonest than a Fundamentalist Theist who claims all Atheists actually believe in God and hate him and worship the devil instead, no matter what atheists say about their own beliefs.

As a non-cognitivist, it is not my belief that you are not trying to make a statement of moral fact.

That is what non-cognitivists believe. So, if you do not believe that, then you are not a non-cognitivist.

It is my belief that there are no moral facts.

That's what error theorists believe.

Let me use an analogy to help you understand.

Take the claim: 5 = blue.

A non-cognitivist would say that's not in error, because it's not trying to express the *fact* that 5 is blue, but rather a personal feeling. Basically that it's true for you if you believe it because it's just a statement of feeling.

An error theorist would say that claim is in error (false, which does NOT mean the opposite is true), because numbers have no color value.

I do not claim to know better than you do about your intent.

If you are a non-cognitivist then you do.

When I say "killing animals unnecessarily is wrong" it is my intent to express a factual claim about morality.

Non-cognitivists reject my own words about my intention, and claim that in fact I only intent to express a feeling which is neither true nor false.
Error theorists believe me when I say I'm trying to express a factual claim, but just say I'm wrong because there is no fact in the matter.

I do not claim to know better than you do about morals. I claim that everyone is equally unable to ascertain moral truth.

Non-cognitivists do not claim to know better than people about morals, but rather they claim to know better than people about their semantic intentions of expressing fact statements about morals.

This sentence above reveals that you are an error theorist. You're still thinking in fact terms.

An error theorist would say everybody is equally unable to ascertain moral truth, because there is nothing there to ascertain.
A non-cognitivist would say that everybody is equally ABLE to ascertain moral feeling, because morality is a feeling and has no truth value as a fact (or that everybody is equally able to make commands, etc.).

You are claiming that instead I'm only trying to say "boo on killing animals unnecessarily" or telling people "don't kill animals unnecessarily".
I insist that I am saying neither of those things, and you say I don't even known my own mind. You know better because you're an omniscient psychic non-cognitivist.

You're disagreeing with other people when they say they ARE trying to express fact statements, and instead telling them that they're only trying to communicate their personal feelings or trying to tell others what to do.

This reads like you have me confused for an Emotivist. In fact, you literally took the same examples of moral propositions as the wikipedia insert about Emotivism. Do you agree that this is a strawman of my views as I have stated them (above)?

I couldn't possibly straw man your views, they're too confused to do so. You still think you're a non-cognitivist, and are deeply confused about what non-cognitivism is.

Emotivism is one form of non-cognitivism. If you read more carefully, I gave a couple possible examples of how you might interpret "X is wrong" if you're a non-cognitivist.

If when somebody says "X is wrong" if you do not hear "boo on X" (an expression of feeling) or "don't do X" (as a command), then you aren't a non-cognitivist (at least not either of those common forms).

I don't know how I can make this any more clear.

Non-cognitivists reject that people are even TRYING to express moral facts. They re-interpret the expressions as feelings or commands, etc.
That's why it's inherently intellectually dishonest. You take what I SAY I'm trying to express, and you re-interpret it for me into something else.

You complain about straw manning (I'm not), but non-cognitivism is just a form of career straw manning of an entire population of people making moral claims which the non-cognitivists twist into expressions of feelings or commands instead.

Again you bring up that my view is not honest, but I don't know what else to tell you. I honestly hold this belief.

Intellectually dishonest. I believe that you believe that you're a non-cognitivist. If you are, though, you hold an intellectually dishonest belief. More likely you simply misunderstand the definition, since you keep contradicting it and everything you say (at least in this last post) is compatible with error theory.

More irony that you call me the "omniscient one who knows your intentions" and yet here you are, assuming what my theories on morality are, instead of listening to what I tell you.

I am listening to what you're telling me. I'm telling you based on what you are literally saying and how you're contradicting non-cognitivism, you're either an error theorist or some kind of minimal realist.

You are misunderstanding the definitions of pretty much everything here.

The reason I'm not an error theorist is because I don't think it makes sense to talk about the trueness or falseness of moral statements.

Maybe you're just confused about what statements are.

"5 = blue" is a false statement. Five is not blue. That doesn't mean that five is green or red or yellow or ANY color.
What you've done is confused falsity of a claim with the notion that there must BE a true answer. That's not what error theorists claim or believe.

So, since you clearly are not a non-cognitivist and you now have no reason not to identify as an error theorist, can we now confirm that you are indeed an error theorist and put this conversation to rest so we can move on?

I shouldn't have said that I don't acknowledge it's existence, I was just totally unfamiliar with it at the time of your introduction of it.

Thank you.

I'm not a moral realist, and I'm not even a minimal realist, by your own linked definition of the word. From the SEP page you showed me:

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist.

Here's my argument:

P1. To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist.
P2. I do not deny noncognitivism
C. I am not a minimal moral realist.

I think we've established that you're not a non-cognitivist, since at numerous points you've denied a key belief required for non-cognitivism.

However, if you're an error theorist (and I would believe that you are since what you've said recently is compatible with error theory) then you aren't a realist (minimal or otherwise).

I'm a minimal realist, at least. The metaphysical/mind independence thesis is a little more complex and maybe meaningless.

I don't believe in mind/body independence, so this is a strawman.

I don't think you followed what I was saying. I'm not talking about mind/body independence.

If you accept that the mind is a physical thing, though, then you must accept there's no reason to care if something is "mind dependent" or not, because it's still real in the sense of a physical information system.

This actually is how it works. From SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... aMorAntRea

I hope you will read that section carefully. You skipped over a part explaining non-cognitivism and error theory very well.

That (mind independence) is how one differentiates robust moral realism, but not minimal realism.
The trouble is that metaphysical differentiation of mind-independence has no clear meaning, as I think you've caught onto.

The only concrete things we have to grasp as exemptions from realism of any kind are non-cognitivism and error theory. These are clear and unambiguous. I don't know how you got them so mixed up, but if you understand the correct definitions now that's fine.

there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better. Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.

Which is why the distinctions of one of these three are all that make much sense:

• Non-cognitivist
• Error theorist
• Minimal realist (neither of the above)

It's not clear what it is to go beyond minimal realism and into robust realism, and the distinction there is subject to a lot of confusion and debate.

So actually, these terms are extremely ambiguous without context.

Not those above. Only the distinction between minimal and robust realism is ambiguous, because of that tricky metaphysical thesis of "mind independence" which may very well be meaningless. I discussed this previously, but SEP echos what I've already said (and what is in the Philo Vegan Wiki article I linked you to):

Of course, the notion of “mind-independence” is problematically indeterminate: Something may be mind-independent in one sense and mind-dependent in another. Cars, for example, are designed and constructed by creatures with minds, and yet in another sense cars are clearly concrete, non-subjective entities. Much careful disambiguation is needed before we know how to circumscribe non-objectivism, and different philosophers disambiguate differently. Many philosophers question whether the “non-objectivism clause” is a useful component of moral anti-realism at all. Many advocate views according to which moral properties are significantly mind-dependent but which they are loath to characterize as versions of moral anti-realism. There is a concern that including the non-objectivism clause threatens to make moral anti-realism trivially true, since there is little room for doubting that the moral status of actions usually (if not always) depends in some manner on mental phenomena such as the intentions with which the action was performed or the episodes or pleasure and pain that ensue from it. The issue will be discussed below, with no pretense made of settling the matter one way or the other.

You are displaying incredible irony once again when you tell me I am "redefining these terms" and "throwing everyone else under the bus" when that is exactly what you have done to me.

To the contrary, I'm trying to help you understand and correct a mistake you have made.

Again, you are ironically doing this very thing to me by defining realism however you want, and not acknowledging my definition of it.

Your definitions are wrong. The reason they are wrong and not merely another take is that they create a conceptual false dichotomy; it limits your thinking and defines genuine positions out of existence for no justifiable reason.

I hope that by now you've come to understand why you are wrong, if not you won't make it very far in ANY discussion in metaethics.

Strawman, I don't think it has to have anything to do with God. I know there are secular forms of realism, I just don't agree with them.

That's fine that you don't agree with them, but you may not then proceed to redefine realism in a way that excludes those secular forms.

I do reject that, and I am promoting the dichotomy William Lane Craig is (God that was a frustrating debate with Sam Harris, on both sides), but I'm not dishonest (again), and I don't believe I am false.

By promoting a false dichotomy (and you recognize it as one because you just said you know there are secular forms of realism!!!!) you ARE being intellectually dishonest.
Even if you do not agree with the third option, you can not just redefine the terms to exclude the possibility of secular realism. If you recognize that people hold that position, your terminology needs to take that into account. If your personal definition does not allow for secular relists to exist (when they clearly do, and are even the majority among philosophers) then your definition is WRONG, and it's intellectually dishonest to use that definition.

It's like if you didn't like pitbulls, so you redefined "dog" specifically to exclude them from being dogs. What the hell?

William Lane Craig does that because he has an Apologetic agenda, and he wants to force people who are moral realists to believe in God with his twisted definitions. Yes, that is intellectually dishonest. You're doing the same kind of thing he is by using his intellectually dishonest definition.

I know that moral realism is actually a majority view among academic philosophers. I'm aware I am on what is a slightly less popular side. I'm okay with that.

That's fine. You don't have to BE a moral realist. Being an error theorist doesn't make you intellectually dishonest (just mistaken). It's your twisting of definitions that does that. To redefine the terms of realism to special false dichotomy producing definitions created by the likes of William Lane Craig in order to exclude the POSSIBILITY of secular realists (who are the majority among philosophers as you have noted) because you don't agree with the position is very much intellectually dishonest.

Veganism is the same way.

Not really. The ethics of veganism are supported by a majority of philosophers, they just don't necessarily practice it due to laziness, complacency, or whatever personal difficulty/imperfection.

I believe this is the false dichotomy. What proof do you have that we can arrive at scientific evidence of moral truth? What evidence is there for this dichotomy? "Everything" is a HUGE net you're casting. So is "nothing at all".

In order for some things to be fundamentally mind dependent and others to not be, there would have to be something magical about the mind (some kind of supernatural dualism would have to be true).

I recognize that not everybody will see the issue as ambiguous; theists who believe in souls and free will have a very easy thing to point to in establishing what mind dependency is. I didn't touch on that here, though, because it's not relevant to anybody's beliefs in this thread (AFAIK).

Like the SEP entry discusses (and I have discussed already here) everything around us influences and is influenced in various ways by minds; what it means to be dependent or independent is not clear, it would probably require drawing some arbitrary or subjective line, and because (and if) minds are physical things with no independence from the body, the mind itself isn't even a thing independent of physical laws making the whole exercise pointless when it comes to deterministic evaluation.

Minimal realism is something that makes sense and is easy to parse. Robust realism and the metaphysical thesis is trivial: either trivially true or trivially false, depending on how you interpret it. It's not a meaningful distinction.

This ties back into the discussion on ontology, actually. There's no magical distinction between a thought (which is also physically real as a pattern in material) and a conventional physical object like a tree. So ontological being applies equally to both.

I don't propose to know everything about how the mind works, but again, I don't believe in mind/body independence, so this is a strawman.

If you don't believe in it, then everything is "mind independent" because minds aren't magical things, but just part of reality which is the only underlying and ultimate dependency.
That is, you shouldn't care about the metaphysical question.

The only issue should be non-cognitivism vs. error theory vs. minimal (at least) realism.

I identify as a consequentialist, and the truth is, my time would be better spent arguing someone with which I had more to gain.

Because you are mistaken (or at least were mistaken) on several important definitions, you actually have quite a bit to gain here by being corrected IF you're open minded enough to accept that correction. You have to start by being open to the possibility that you may have misunderstood some of these terms, though.

You're clearly intelligent, you just got the wrong idea of what these terms mean somehow. There are a lot of people conveying very twisted definitions of all of this (like the Philo Vegan Wiki explains). The "skeptic community" is as notorious for twisting definitions as are the worst apologists. People make mistakes, it happens, and there's no shame in correcting your word usage.
If you are able to learn from this, you'll become a much more effective and less confusing force for veganism. That's a very good thing.

Sometimes a little work on the foundation of your arguments pays off much better in the long run. It may seem tedious and painful when you think you could just be getting out there and arguing with non-vegans, but it's essential to be able to convey the best arguments possible and ultimately make your activism more effective and less prone to recidivism (which happens when people find holes in bad logic later).

[Human_Garbage]

@brimstoneSalad

You call my stance intellectually dishonest (how do you know I'm not being honest?) and then claim I'm the one asserting things about the authenticity of your moral propositions? Let that irony sink in.

Non-cognitivism is intellectually dishonest (which doesn't mean the same thing as old fashioned dishonesty).
This is a pretty good discussion of the difference: http://wiki.c2.com/?IntellectualDishonesty

Already we've reached another term you're trying to raise disagreement on. Obviously intellectual dishonesty refers to a particular kind of dishonesty, but to say it is not related to honesty at all is just absurd. I have not said a single dishonest thing in my time talking to you in an attempt to win an argument. The fact that you think you know my intentions is again, incredibly ironic.

Non-Cognitivism is intellectually dishonest because it presumes to reject other people's explanations of their own intentions, and doing so makes rational discourse on such an unfalsifiable position impossible.

It's very similar to the Theist who says of Atheists that the latter actually believe in God but just hate him so they pretend not to believe.

You're telling other people what they believe and intend to express.

Look at the SEP definition:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/

As I predicted, you're just spitting the same arguments back at me, even after I clearly defined the reasons why I'm a non-cognitivist. I don't know why you're re-linking this definition again, because it's the same one I just linked to you.

Time for you to do some more reading, SEP gives a more specific definition further down the page that elaborates on the point you're stuck on. I didn't think I'd need to bring this up, because the original definition very clearly states: "Roughly put, non-cognitivists think that moral statements have no substantial truth conditions." (Which is what I think).

The second negative thesis can be called psychological non-cognitivism. This thesis denies that the states of mind conventionally expressed by moral utterances are beliefs or mental states which fall on the cognitive side of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide. Typically non-cognitivists accept both negative theses, though there are views which accept one and not the other.

So, I don't deny that you genuinely have a belief about what is morally right/wrong, I only state that that belief does not have a verifiable truth or false condition.

People: We are making statements about moral facts.
Error Theorists: We believe you're trying to make a statement about fact, but you are mistaken because there are no moral facts, thus all your claims are in error.

Yup. That's not what I think.

People: We are making statements about moral facts.
Non-Cognitivists: Actually you're not even trying to make statements about fact, we know better than you do what you're trying to say, you're just trying to express a feeling.

Non-Cognitivists can f*ck right off with that shit. It's intellectually dishonest. No less intellectually dishonest than a Fundamentalist Theist who claims all Atheists actually believe in God and hate him and worship the devil instead, no matter what atheists say about their own beliefs.

Clearly you heard some version of non-cognivitism at some point that made you very angry. I'd urge you to stop discussing with such emotion because I don't think you're thinking clearly.

As a non-cognitivist, it is not my belief that you are not trying to make a statement of moral fact.

That is what non-cognitivists believe. So, if you do not believe that, then you are not a non-cognitivist.

This is simply getting redundant...

It is my belief that there are no moral facts.

That's what error theorists believe.

Let me use an analogy to help you understand.

Take the claim: 5 = blue.

A non-cognitivist would say that's not in error, because it's not trying to express the *fact* that 5 is blue, but rather a personal feeling. Basically that it's true for you if you believe it because it's just a statement of feeling.

This example is really strange, because we are getting off the topic of moral propositions. 5 = blue very clearly has a value of false.

If this we're a moral proposition I wouldn't say you're not trying to express fact, I would say the truth or false value of your proposition can not be verified. I would say what you are actually expressing is simply a desire, or a belief, or a feeling, sure.

I do not claim to know better than you do about your intent.

If you are a non-cognitivist then you do.

When I say "killing animals unnecessarily is wrong" it is my intent to express a factual claim about morality.

Non-cognitivists reject my own words about my intention, and claim that in fact I only intent to express a feeling which is neither true nor false.
Error theorists believe me when I say I'm trying to express a factual claim, but just say I'm wrong because there is no fact in the matter.

Redundant. Already addressed.

I do not claim to know better than you do about morals. I claim that everyone is equally unable to ascertain moral truth.

Non-cognitivists do not claim to know better than people about morals, but rather they claim to know better than people about their semantic intentions of expressing fact statements about morals.

This sentence above reveals that you are an error theorist. You're still thinking in fact terms.

An error theorist would say everybody is equally unable to ascertain moral truth, because there is nothing there to ascertain.
A non-cognitivist would say that everybody is equally ABLE to ascertain moral feeling, because morality is a feeling and has no truth value as a fact (or that everybody is equally able to make commands, etc.).

Redundant. Already addressed.

I couldn't possibly straw man your views, they're too confused to do so. You still think you're a non-cognitivist, and are deeply confused about what non-cognitivism is.

Emotivism is one form of non-cognitivism. If you read more carefully, I gave a couple possible examples of how you might interpret "X is wrong" if you're a non-cognitivist.

If when somebody says "X is wrong" if you do not hear "boo on X" (an expression of feeling) or "don't do X" (as a command), then you aren't a non-cognitivist (at least not either of those common forms).

I don't know how I can make this any more clear.

You can't be more clear. I hear you loud and clear, you're just wrong in your definition. Or, at least the definition you're applying to my views.

Non-cognitivists reject that people are even TRYING to express moral facts. They re-interpret the expressions as feelings or commands, etc.
That's why it's inherently intellectually dishonest. You take what I SAY I'm trying to express, and you re-interpret it for me into something else.

You complain about straw manning (I'm not), but non-cognitivism is just a form of career straw manning of an entire population of people making moral claims which the non-cognitivists twist into expressions of feelings or commands instead.

Redundant. Already addressed. Skipping around because you're doing this a lot and it's boring.

So, since you clearly are not a non-cognitivist and you now have no reason not to identify as an error theorist, can we now confirm that you are indeed an error theorist and put this conversation to rest so we can move on?

I am a non-cognivist, and my reason not to identify as an error theorist, like I've already said, is because I don't think it makes sense to declare moral facts false just because we can't declare them true. I don't think it makes sense to declare them one way or the other. There is no such thing as moral falseness. There is no such thing as moral truthness. For either to exist moral facts would need to be ontologically verifiable, which they're not.

I don't think you followed what I was saying. I'm not talking about mind/body independence.

If you accept that the mind is a physical thing, though, then you must accept there's no reason to care if something is "mind dependent" or not, because it's still real in the sense of a physical information system.

I think there's very good reason to care if it's mind dependent or not. Sure, concepts are technically ontologically "real", but they are not verifiably real. It means something very different to be real as a concept and real independent of mind. Delusions, hallucinations, and illusions are all "real", but we wouldn't give them equal truth value as say, "The sky is blue". This is an important differentiation because so much of science focuses on mind-independent reality. If we lose track of that, we can fall victim things like "fake news" proclamations from insane people.

This actually is how it works. From SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mora ... aMorAntRea

I hope you will read that section carefully. You skipped over a part explaining non-cognitivism and error theory very well.

Yup, I'm well aware that section is congruent with my beliefs.

I hope that by now you've come to understand why you are wrong, if not you won't make it very far in ANY discussion in metaethics.

Same.

I do reject that, and I am promoting the dichotomy William Lane Craig is (God that was a frustrating debate with Sam Harris, on both sides), but I'm not dishonest (again), and I don't believe I am false.

By promoting a false dichotomy (and you recognize it as one because you just said you know there are secular forms of realism!!!!) you ARE being intellectually dishonest.
Even if you do not agree with the third option, you can not just redefine the terms to exclude the possibility of secular realism. If you recognize that people hold that position, your terminology needs to take that into account. If your personal definition does not allow for secular relists to exist (when they clearly do, and are even the majority among philosophers) then your definition is WRONG, and it's intellectually dishonest to use that definition.

Not sure what you mean, I definitely recognize there are people who define as secular moral realists. I just don't think their positions are intelligible given the definition of moral realism. There's always a chance I'm wrong, of course. Maybe one day people will find a way to extract objective moral truth value from .. anything. Or they already have and I'm ignorant. These are all possibilities, so that's the room I provide for a secular realist to exist.

Veganism is the same way.

Not really. The ethics of veganism are supported by a majority of philosophers, they just don't necessarily practice it due to laziness, complacency, or whatever personal difficulty/imperfection.

Do you have stats on this? I'm curious if that's true.

I believe this is the false dichotomy. What proof do you have that we can arrive at scientific evidence of moral truth? What evidence is there for this dichotomy? "Everything" is a HUGE net you're casting. So is "nothing at all".

In order for some things to be fundamentally mind dependent and others to not be, there would have to be something magical about the mind (some kind of supernatural dualism would have to be true).

I recognize that not everybody will see the issue as ambiguous; theists who believe in souls and free will have a very easy thing to point to in establishing what mind dependency is. I didn't touch on that here, though, because it's not relevant to anybody's beliefs in this thread (AFAIK).

Like the SEP entry discusses (and I have discussed already here) everything around us influences and is influenced in various ways by minds; what it means to be dependent or independent is not clear, it would probably require drawing some arbitrary or subjective line, and because (and if) minds are physical things with no independence from the body, the mind itself isn't even a thing independent of physical laws making the whole exercise pointless when it comes to deterministic evaluation.

Minimal realism is something that makes sense and is easy to parse. Robust realism and the metaphysical thesis is trivial: either trivially true or trivially false, depending on how you interpret it. It's not a meaningful distinction.

This ties back into the discussion on ontology, actually. There's no magical distinction between a thought (which is also physically real as a pattern in material) and a conventional physical object like a tree. So ontological being applies equally to both.

Ontological being applies to both, sure, but moral claims are not verifiable. If I called 911 to say "There's a monster in my closet". They would come to my door, verify that there is indeed not a monster in my closet, and take me to an insane asylum. Yes, I really had the belief there's a monster in my closet. However, that belief can be verified to be false. Moral claims do not have this same benefit. Yes, the fact that someone believes in a moral system is true, but whether that moral system is the true one or the false one, we can never verify.

I don't propose to know everything about how the mind works, but again, I don't believe in mind/body independence, so this is a strawman.

If you don't believe in it, then everything is "mind independent" because minds aren't magical things, but just part of reality which is the only underlying and ultimate dependency.
That is, you shouldn't care about the metaphysical question.

You're making philosophy extremely pedantic and uninteresting if you stop caring about mind-independence once you realize that the mind is not physically independent. There are very important pragmatic reasons for going into these differences, as I've already discussed.

Because you are mistaken (or at least were mistaken) on several important definitions, you actually have quite a bit to gain here by being corrected IF you're open minded enough to accept that correction. You have to start by being open to the possibility that you may have misunderstood some of these terms, though.

Same, but I predict you won't accept any of my corrections, again.