Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[Margaret Hayek]

Based on what you said, yes, I think we should. Maybe it should be called "Name The Justification" to conserve the convention

Here's the bare-bones phil vegan wiki on NameTheJustification:

wiki/index.php/NameTheJustification

I haven't yet added sections on defending the premises or presenting it in practice as we have on the wiki for NTT 2.0 [wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait_2.0].

In presenting NTJ I stuck to versions that had the same logical form (which was capture entirely by propositional logic, and for which the proof of validity was the extremely simple 3 liner / 6 liner when you count the premises).

Best,
Margaret

[brimstoneSalad]

Do you think we should have a quick discussion of it - in addition to NTT 2.0 - in the NTT wiki?

I think that would be good. Keeping both in the NTT wiki makes sense (I don't know which one is better), maybe comparing them and mentioning pros and cons of each.
It might make sense to shorten the explanation of NTT 2.0 in the NTT wiki if there's any obvious way to do that, leaving the details to the NTT 2.0 page.

You mentioned before how it could also be useful to add a bit of discussion to the "invalid generalizations" section, and how that can be resolved?

Unrelated, but also, I was wondering if we should have a short section on syllogisms and the fallacy of four terms?
Of course an argument doesn't need to be a syllogism to be valid, but Isaac seems to think NTT is one (his comparison to the Socrates is Mortal syllogism), so it might be worth explaining that briefly. What do you think?
I've had people ask me for a very specific fallacy that sums up the issue, and that one seems to be something people can easily grasp.

[Margaret Hayek]

Do you think we should have a quick discussion of it - in addition to NTT 2.0 - in the NTT wiki?

You mentioned before how it could also be useful to add a bit of discussion to the "invalid generalizations" section, and how that can be resolved?

Yes, this is the same as the material I was thinking that we should have on the speciesism page. Jeff McMahan has a comprehensive discussion of these issues - I e-mailed you a selection from his book. I could also e-mail you some power point slides on McMahan's discussion. It's just a matter of one of us having time to work on this.

Unrelated, but also, I was wondering if we should have a short section on syllogisms and the fallacy of four terms?
Of course an argument doesn't need to be a syllogism to be valid, but Isaac seems to think NTT is one (his comparison to the Socrates is Mortal syllogism), so it might be worth explaining that briefly. What do you think?
I've had people ask me for a very specific fallacy that sums up the issue, and that one seems to be something people can easily grasp.

I don't think that it's technically correct to put any issues with NTT's validity as having to do with the fallacy of four terms, because that fallacy applies to syllogisms in Aristotelian logic (which have a major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, and which premises are of the form "all As are B", "No As are B", "some As are B" and "some As are not B"), and NTT is not a syllogism in Aristotelian logic (you can get P1 to have the right form, but not P2). [I'm not sure what Isaac has said about NTT and something about Socrates being mortal, but I don't see how it would be relevant].

I do think that some kind of equivocation is a commonality between (i) what might mask the question-begging nature of the alternative version of NTT (that appeals to the bundle theory / identity of indiscernibles) and (ii) what is sometimes responsible for the fallacy of four terms in Aristotelian logic.

Beyond that I'm not sure what the similarity between what explains NTT's invalidity and the fallacy of the four terms could be. If you're just looking at what categories get mentioned in the original presentation of NTT I don't see anything that guarantees invalidity: in NTT P1 speaks of humans and moral value; P2 speaks of humans, non-human animals, traits, and moral value; and C speaks of non-human animals and moral value. It's true that in NTT C doesn't follow from the logical form of P1, P2, and C, but one could have an argument with only two premises and a conclusion that mention exactly the same categories as NTT's premises and conclusion but which was valid (although I think that the work done by traits in P2 would have to be pretty forced and unnatural). Note that the following argument is valid:

P1 humans have moral value
P2 if humans have moral value then non-human animals have moral value
C non-human animals have moral value

Now all you'd have to do to have an argument that mentions humans & moral value in P1; humans, animals, traits, & moral value in p2; and non-human animals & moral value in in C would be to mention traits in a redundant way in P2. For instance the following is valid:

P1 humans have moral value
P2 if humans have moral value, then non-human animals have moral value and all traits are traits
C non-human animals have moral value.

[brimstoneSalad]

Yes, this is the same as the material I was thinking that we should have on the speciesism page. Jeff McMahan has a comprehensive discussion of these issues - I e-mailed you a selection from his book. I could also e-mail you some power point slides on McMahan's discussion. It's just a matter of one of us having time to work on this.

Shall we go ahead and link to the Speciesism page there with a couple sentences explaining that in brief, and then fill out the Speciesism page later with more details?

[I'm not sure what Isaac has said about NTT and something about Socrates being mortal, but I don't see how it would be relevant].

He seems to think he's created a simple syllogism, but I don't think he know what he's saying.
Although it's not that clear from his claims what being valid "in the same way" means.

I do think that some kind of equivocation is a commonality between (i) what might mask the question-begging nature of the alternative version of NTT (that appeals to the bundle theory / identity of indiscernibles) and (ii) what is sometimes responsible for the fallacy of four terms in Aristotelian logic.

There's probably no easy way to explain that. I was just thinking people might benefit from understanding what a syllogism is, and why it's so easy to prove one, and what Isaac has made which isn't evidently valid in the same way (as he suggests) because if it is meant to be a syllogism it has failed.
Not that non-syllogisms aren't valid, of course.

I'm not sure where his quote was, I think he's said it a few times. Maybe @NonZeroSum knows.

[HybridPhoenix]

I think I would also like to add that some people apart of a philosophy discord server have picked up on this. They belong to Krillism, they debated Ask Yourself's server and the members within.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ah6JTPn1ojA

^ Here's part one (of a four part series) of the exchange between the servers.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mn3gy0opwZQ

^ In here some dude named The Realistic Nihilist capitalizes on the non-sequitur point and actually calls it out.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ktgcvZhMFj0

^ Here's some of the common debaters from the Ask Yourself server going at it with them.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XIMsCmxJmMc

^ And recently they clashed once again, but this time Ask Yourself was called out and he unmuted to have an exchange. Skip to 5:18 for that moment.

During these series of videos, and many more, people call out the argument in their own way, so I would like to know what you guys think of it.

[Irrationalogic]

During these series of videos, and many more, people call out the argument in their own way, so I would like to know what you guys think of it.

I think :

• NameTheTrait is an argument that can work as a pre-thinking process. Making someone be concerned about the veganism lifestyle.

• Some Advocate of NTT try to make it seems it is an irrefutable logical argument when it's not

• It easily breaks down in a natural deduction system with a handful of axioms

• Some advocate ( in the video link you posted ) have minimal to non existant training in formal logic

• It is sad to listen to people using words like " fallacy ", "non sequitur", " contradiction " trying to display knowledge they obviously don't have

[brimstoneSalad]

@HybridPhoenix what kind of server is Krillism? I've heard them mentioned, aren't they anti-vegan?

[Margaret Hayek]

During these series of videos, and many more, people call out the argument in their own way, so I would like to know what you guys think of it.

Thanks for posting this, HybridPhoenix. I looked through just a bit of this very briefly and one thing that I noticed was that there seems to be some confusion among the interlocutors about which traits are supposed to be necessary as opposed to sufficient for moral value / non-trivial moral status / being such that it isn't OK to inflict massive suffering / death on one for relatively trivial benefits like taste pleasure. E.g. when some of the anti-NTT side suggest that being human is sufficient for moral status, some on the pro-NTT side misunderstand this as a claim about what is necessary for moral status.

Put in these terms, P1 of NTT asserts that humans have moral value and P2 of NTT asserts that non-human animals do not lack any traits that are necessary for moral status in humans. What can sometimes be confusing is that one might think that several specific traits are sufficient for moral status in humans without being necessary (so that the only "trait" that is necessary is the disjunctive one of having one of several possible more specific traits). One way to try to clarify things here is to understand 'traits' broadly to include disjunctive traits like this and to consider not only what is necessary but also sufficient for moral status (as well as to fix up the first premise and add a third premise), which is the line we took in our current fix-up of NTT, NTT 2.0 [wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait#Correction; wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait_2.0]

But one thing that has always bothered me about this fix-up, as @brimstoneSalad and @DrSinger may recall, is that the move to talking about traits like this and what is both necessary and sufficient for moral status seems (i) way too committal for this argument (which should remain as neutral as possible about such issues as the full explanation of moral status) and (ii) awfully forced and potentially confusing too.

As such, I took another look back and I think that there is actually a valid, 2 premise revision of NTT that speaks only of sufficient conditions for moral status / moral value. In English it runs:

(P1) If a trait is sufficient for moral value in humans, then it is sufficient for moral value in any being that has the trait.
(P2) Sentient non-human animals have a trait that is sufficient for moral value in humans.
Therefore
(C) Sentient non-human animals have moral value.

The logical form of this argument in first order logic is:
(P1) ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxt ⇒ Mx ) ) ) ⇒ ∀z ( Pzt ⇒ Mz) )
(P2) ∀y( SNAy ⇒ ∃t ( Tt ∧ Pyt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxt ⇒ Mx ) ) ) )
Therefore
(C) ∀x ( SNAx ⇒ Mx )

Where
T(x) means 'x is a trait'
H(x) means 'x is a human'
P(x,y) means 'x has y'
M(x) means 'x has moral value'
SNA(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal'

Or, directly translated from FOL into English:
(P1) For all t, if t is a trait; and for all x, if x is human then if x has t then x has moral value; then for all z, if z has t then z has moral value
(P2) For all y, if y is a sentient non-human animal then there exists t such that t is a trait and y has t and for all x, if x is human then if x has t then x has moral value
Therefore
(C) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal then x has moral value.

Here is a natural deduction proof of the validity of this argument:
(1) ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxt ⇒ Mx ) ) ) ⇒ ∀z ( Pzt ⇒ Mz) ) ; P1
(2) ∀y( SNAy ⇒ ∃t ( Tt ∧ Pyt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxt ⇒ Mx ) ) ) ); P2
(3) SNAc ⇒ ∃t ( Tt ∧ Pct ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxt ⇒ Mx ) ) ); 2, universal elimination
(4) SNAc ⇒ Ts ∧ Pcs ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxs ⇒ Mx ) ); existential elimination

• (5) SNAc; assumption
  (6) Ts ∧ Pcs ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxs ⇒ Mx ) ); 4, 5, MP / conditional elimination
  (7) Pcs; 6; conditional elimination
  (8) Ts ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxs ⇒ Mx ) ); 6; conditional elimination
  (9) (Ts ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Pxs ⇒ Mx ) ) ) ⇒ ∀z ( Pzs ⇒ Mz); 1; universal instantiation
  (10) ∀z ( Pzs ⇒ Mz); 8, 9, MP / conditional elimination
  (11) Pcs ⇒ Mc; 10, universal instantiation
  (12) Mc; 7, 11, MP / conditional elimination

(13) SNAc ⇒ Mc; 5-12, conditional introduction
(14) ∀x ( SNAx ⇒ Mx ); 13, universal introduction


Would others think that this is a better fix-up of NTT than our current NTT 2.0? In some ways it takes greater liberties with the existing logical form, although I think that it is much simpler & less confusing in the ways described above.

That said, one way to stick closer to NTT's original formulation in terms of necessary rather than sufficient conditions for moral value might be the following 2 premise argument:

(P1) If a being doesn't lack any of the traits necessary for moral value in humans, then it has moral value.
(P2) Non-human animals don't lack any of the traits necessary for moral value in humans.
Therefore
(C) Sentient non-human animals have moral value.

[HybridPhoenix]

Krillism is a discord server that focuses on discussions in regards to philosophy for the most part as I understand. And yes, they are mostly anti-vegan, at least some of the bigger individuals within that server.

They've been aware of NTT 2.0, it was recommended to them by somebody and they're in agreement that it's logically valid, however some of them believe that a couple of the premises may be "dubious". I believe this is mentioned in one of the videos that I linked, but I'm not sure about the exact time stamp.

Thanks for the feedback, appreciate it.

[Irrationalogic]

(P1) If a trait is sufficient for moral value in humans, then it is sufficient for moral value in any being that has the trait.

I think it is too easy to reject this Proposition. We can value a trait to be sufficient for human moral value but not for other animals.

Would others think that this is a better fix-up of NTT than our current NTT 2.0?

I do not know the current NTT 2.0 but as a whole I think starting with irrefutable axioms is the way to go. People can and will always reject the axioms first if they can and remain consistent to not have to go through consistency tests.