cufflink wrote:It's a fact of human nature that people care more about what's closest to them--close in both the geographic and the emotional sense.
Absolutely. And that makes it understandable as part of human nature- but no less illogical when it's used as an
appeal to nature fallacy.
The guy in the other thread is doing something like that- arguing that because he feels something, it is therefore moral.
I think we can point out the logical fallacy, without failing to appreciate the human nature that lends itself to it.
cufflink wrote:So in the burning-building scenario, with a scientist on the brink of finding the cure for cancer at one end of the building and your father at the other, most people (at least I think so) would choose to rescue their father.
Certainly. And in the same sense, most would choose themselves over the scientist. Or even kill 'innocent' people to survive. This is innate to human nature, and that makes it understandable, and maybe even forgivable, but I don't think it makes it moral.
Morality is something ideological, aside from material nature, which must by
its own philosophical nature be equitable, even when our natural inclinations are not to be. Although being equitable doesn't mean it's not proportional.
cufflink wrote:I think there are good reasons for considering it wrong to kill both dogs and chickens, but also that the two acts are not equivalent. There is a hierarchy of value of life, if you will, with dogs and primates at a higher point on the scale than chickens, which are in turn higher than shrimp and sea scallops. That's a personal assessment--because all value judgments are ultimately personal--and reasonable people can disagree about it.
Chickens and dogs are almost certainly not equivalent - even two individuals within chicken or dog kind wouldn't likely be perfectly equal - but it may not be so straight forward to determine which is of higher moral value.
Leaving these matters entirely to personal opinion pretty much negates their utility -- what if somebody decides that shrimp are of higher value than humans? Clearly there is a limit to what is reasonable, and in that sense, there is also an empirical basis that determines what is or is not reasonable; and if there is, then this is a matter of lack of information, not opinion.
In that case, I should think reasonable people would simply agree on that uncertainty.
Lack of information should properly be viewed as lack of precision, or uncertainty of accuracy. In other words, some provisional value, contained within error bars.
If it is not clear whether dogs or chickens are of higher value, that lack of clarity is proportional to the extent of overlap of those error bars.
The error bars of dogs and shrimp, however, do not seem to overlap. Dogs are more valuable than shrimp, and it would be difficult for reasonable people to disagree on that.
When we're dealing with things in the same order of magnitude, it's not quite as clear.
cufflink wrote:
My point, though, is that if we're going to develop more vegans, the way to do it is not to tell meat-eaters, "You know how you feel about eating dogs and cats? You should feel exactly the same way about eating cows and chickens!" They don't feel that way, and telling them that they should is going to drive them away.
You ask them why they eat chickens, cows, and pigs, but not dogs and cats.
If they say they just don't like the taste, that's one thing, and you can't argue against that. You can ask them why they don't eat babies, and if they say it's because babies aren't available to eat at restaurants, then you give up.
But usually, they will make a series of logical fallacies instead, to try to qualify a fundamental difference between the different animals, and assert its moral relevance.
You don't have to tell them they should feel exactly the same way, you just have to show that it's the same general sort of thing, and there's no categorical excuse for any of it.
cufflink wrote:
Help them see that the lives of pigs and cows and chickens also deserve respect and protection, without claiming that all animal lives are equivalent. That, it seems to me, is the more workable strategic approach.
I don't think I've ever said all animals are equivalent. If I have, I misspoke. I don't believe that, and never have.
I just debunk the assertions of fundamental categorical differences between types, as they are used to excuse binary moral judgments.