Philosophical Vegan Forum

Hey, we talked on twitter about this and you wanted me to bring it here, so here I am. I will just re-post what I said there here so you can respond.

I know this has already been explained to you extensively, but let me have a go at it. There is nothing arbitrary about name the trait, it's starting axiom is valuing human life, so unless you are going to tell me you either don't value human life or you think valuing human life is done for no particular reasons, this starting axiom is not arbitrary. Sure it's subjective, because valuing human life is subjective, but it's done for good reason because we are humans and we value our own lives and each other, so it's an objective fact that we subjectively value human life for reasons that are non-arbitrary.

From there we ask the question, what trait absent in animals, that if absent in a human would justify not valuing that human's life? This question is not only not arbitrary, the point of this question is to eliminate invalid or arbitrary traits that only cause contradictions. For example saying "animals are less intelligent" is invalid because we would not accept treating humans with intelligence equivalent of animals with no value, and saying "Humans are humans we don't need to care about the value of other species" is arbitrary because species is just an arbitrary line functionally no different than race or religion, and of course we would not accept our lives being treated as having no value on the basis that we are a different species.

Naming the trait is done to expose double standards and arbitrary justification in our treatment of animals through non-arbitrary logical consistency, the only two axioms it requires is believing human life has value and not accepting illogical contradictions. So unless you want to bite the bullet on this one and be a proud misanthropic hypocrite there is nothing arbitrary about #NameTheTrait.


In addition to that, reading your post here you make some very silly arguments against #NameTheTrait that to me demonstrate you don't really get it.

Divine command is only a valid argument if you can prove god exists and that is indeed his command but even that would create all sorts of questionable philosophical dilemmas, for example if god commanded you to be raped, would you accept god's command as legitimate? Personally I would not, I would not accept being raped even if it was a provable knowable command of a real god, so it is a contradiction to accept god's commands as valid in one context if I would reject in another. The fact that God is just made up fairytale bullshit just makes "Divine command" as a justification even more retarded.

Saying "I don't care about animals" would only be valid if you would accept me slaughtering and eating you with the justification "I don't care about you", but because we both know no one being intellectually honest would accept that, it is a contradiction to accept "I don't care" as a justification in one context and reject it in another.

Going down the "Moral subjectivism" and "Cultural moral relativism" road means you have to accept that Hitler in fact did nothing wrong because the value of human life is only subjective so it doesn't matter and Nazis just have a different equally valid cultural morality. However just because something is subjective, doesn't mean it's made up or just arbitrary or that you can't apply logic to it. I can explain to you why the Nazi's were contradicting themselves by gassing the Jews, because no Nazi would simply accept themselves being gassed on the basis of their race or religion. It's not arbitrary that what the Nazi's did was wrong, it was wrong because it was logically inconsistent with their subjective belief in the value of their own life.

I could keep going but basically, rape, slavery, genocide, they are not just wrong because I don't like them, I can explain why they are wrong logically because it would be a contradiction for any intellectually honest person to inflict those things on others when there is no trait absent in others that if absent in themselves would make them accept it being inflicted on themselves. On twitter you seemed to indicate that you could explain the flaw in my reasoning here, so I look forward to your response.

This is a response only to Grey Sloth, it is not to be construed as a response to Ask Yourself.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pm There is nothing arbitrary about name the trait,

The contention is not that it is arbitrary, but that the logic is flawed and it is a non sequitur.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmit's starting axiom is valuing human life [...] this starting axiom is not arbitrary. Sure it's subjective,

ar·bi·trar·y
ˈärbəˌtrerē/Submit
adjective
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system.
"his mealtimes were entirely arbitrary"

Google definition

Definition of arbitrary
1
a :existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and unreasonable act of will
- an arbitrary choice
- When a task is not seen in a meaningful context it is experienced as being arbitrary. —Nehemiah Jordan
b :based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something
- an arbitrary standard
- take any arbitrary positive number

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary

Arbitrary has slightly more of a "random" connotation, but it's also emotional whim; it is essentially anything not based on objective reason, which is the same for "subjective".
The two are nearly synonymous even in common usage. In this instance they mean the same thing. BUT this is not a problem.

It's fine for an premise to be arbitrary/subjective, that's why it's a premise. IF you agree with the premise, then for the purposes of the argument it is accepted as true.

The problem with #namethetrait is not the first premise. The problem is that the argument as a whole is a non sequitur.
I left the first premise in tact in my correction.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmbut it's done for good reason because we are humans and we value our own lives and each other, so it's an objective fact that we subjectively value human life for reasons that are non-arbitrary.

The reason is that we value our own lives and each other, but that value again is an emotional one. Why do we value our own lives and each other? Is there an objective and reason/logic based argument that we should or must do that?

Regardless, the contention is not the arbitrarity of the first premise, it's that with the second the conclusion does not follow.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmFrom there we ask the question, what trait absent in animals, that if absent in a human would justify not valuing that human's life?

There could be none if you like (I provided many examples before), but it doesn't matter because there is no objective reason provided or demanded for the assumption that we value ourselves and each other.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmwe are humans and we value our own lives and each other

Your own argument indicates we don't need a reason. We don't need a trait, because our value of each other is not explicitly based on a trait; it is arbitrary.

If instead you had said:
"we are humans and we value our own lives and each other because we possess certain traits that demand that value"
Then you'd be right. Then a #namethetrait argument would be relevant.

But not everybody is going to agree with that reasoning, so you need to add that as a premise. On its own the argument is a non sequitur.

Please see my correction to the #namethetrait argument, which I posted on twitter (this is an updated version with a couple small mistakes fixed):

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmThis question is not only not arbitrary, the point of this question is to eliminate invalid or arbitrary traits that only cause contradictions.

I understand the point of the question, but it doesn't do that. Logically it is only a non sequitur.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmFor example saying "animals are less intelligent" is invalid because we would not accept treating humans with intelligence equivalent of animals with no value,

You can agree that there are no such traits, and yet still disagree with the conclusion. The argument is a non sequitur.
You don't even have to answer the trait question, the conclusion just doesn't follow. But you can also answer the trait question arbitrarily if you want to, because the argument has no force.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmand saying "Humans are humans we don't need to care about the value of other species" is arbitrary because species is just an arbitrary line functionally no different than race or religion, and of course we would not accept our lives being treated as having no value on the basis that we are a different species.

I understand that, but because there is no premise present which demands an answer, much less a non-arbitrary answer, lacking one does not lead to the conclusion in the argument. There is no contradiction according to logic.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmNaming the trait is done to expose double standards and arbitrary justification in our treatment of animals

And that is excellent as an informal argument. Where it fails is at a formal level.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmthrough non-arbitrary logical consistency,

It tries to do that, but fails to do so. It is unfortunately a non sequitur.
A double standard is not in itself logically inconsistent. You can argue that having double standards is being an asshole, but unless you explicitly agree that double standards and arbitrary justifications are wrong you have not contradicted yourself in employing them.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmthe only two axioms it requires is believing human life has value and not accepting illogical contradictions.

No. Let me use an analogy:

Saying "It's OK for me to fart in the elevator, but it's wrong for Bob to fart in the elevator" is not logically inconsistent if your justification is "Because I said so". It is arbitrary, but it is logically consistent. You are declaring yourself the arbiter of propriety, whatever you say goes.

Would you like it if other people did that to you? Probably not. But if you're the arbiter, you can arbitrarily declare them wrong and you right. You aren't being logically inconsistent, you're just being an asshole.

Saying "It's OK for me to fart in the elevator, but it's wrong for Bob to fart in the elevator" is also not logically inconsistent if your justification is "Because my farts are quiet and don't stink and it doesn't bother anybody, and Bob's farts are loud and smell like death and bother people". Now it's not arbitrary, it's based on reasoning. If it were then demonstrated that your farts are in fact stinky and are not actually silent and that they do bother people, you would be expected to change your position on whether it is indeed OK for you to fart in the elevator, otherwise risk inconsistency.

In either case, it depends on both your "ontology" and your "epistemology" in making those claims.

In order to make #namethetrait logically valid, you have to add premises that specify we are looking for the latter kind of reasoning, and that explicitly exclude the former arbitrary reasoning.
The second premise doesn't do that on its own. You can not "feed" arbitrary back into it and get an answer, the argument is not magically self correcting, it's a non sequitur. Saying that it does that is using circular reasoning. It *would* do that if you already provided that premise that excluded arbitrary answers so that it was a valid argument.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmIn addition to that, reading your post here you make some very silly arguments against #NameTheTrait that to me demonstrate you don't really get it.

Can't you see how fine the silks are on the Emperor's new clothes?

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmDivine command is only a valid argument if you can prove god exists[...]

Divine command has more problems than that. But if you accept arbitrary assertions, it answers the question of the trait.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmSaying "I don't care about animals" would only be valid if you would accept me slaughtering and eating you with the justification

Not if you assert arbitrary values. It is a double standard, and it makes you an asshole to do that, but that doesn't make you logically contradictory.
Again, a double standard does not necessarily equal a logical contradiction.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmGoing down the "Moral subjectivism" and "Cultural moral relativism" road means you have to accept that Hitler in fact did nothing wrong[...]

Nothing objectively wrong. Again, I specified he would be wrong according to YOUR culture, but right according to his Nazi culture.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmHowever just because something is subjective, doesn't mean it's made up or just arbitrary or that you can't apply logic to it.

I covered this.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmIt's not arbitrary that what the Nazi's did was wrong,

No, it's not arbitrary. But that's because morality is objective and based on reason. What the nazis did was wrong because it was harmful.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Thu Sep 28, 2017 4:51 pmit was wrong because it was logically inconsistent with their subjective belief in the value of their own life.

Nope. That may make them assholes for holding such standards, but again that's not logically inconsistent.

People tend to think logical contradiction applies to a lot of things that it doesn't apply to.

Please read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
You're conflating two different definitions of "contradiction", one being in formal logic, and the other being a casual and informal use which is not actually logically contradictory.

When you perceive a contradiction between "I can fart in the elevator" and "Bob can't fart in the elevator", you assume those statements are based on some kind of reasoning (some trait), because what kind of asshole would just make that fiat like that without any kind of rationale? But they are not by logical necessity based on any kind of reasoning. The response can simply be "Because I said so", or nothing at all. Again, that is a double standard, but it's not a logical contradiction; it makes you an asshole if you do it, but it doesn't make you logically inconsistent.

Arbitrary has slightly more of a "random" connotation, but it's also emotional whim; it is essentially anything not based on objective reason, which is the same for "subjective".

The reason is that we value our own lives and each other, but that value again is an emotional one. Why do we value our own lives and each other? Is there an objective and reason/logic based argument that we should or must do that?

So it seems like we both accept the first premise, but I will still say that valuing human life is not merely done on an emotional whim, we could get into the objective biological reasons why humans subjectively value their own lives if you'd like but the long and the short of it is that me not wanting to be stabbed to death is not the same subjective emotional desire as whether I want chocolate or vanilla ice cream for dessert.

Also even if you continue to insist that the value of human life is merely subjective and arbitrary, the only way to get out of the logical conclusions of human life having value is to hold honestly that your life has no value, but if you can't do that because you in fact do value your own life there really is no point in debating about the "realness" of the value of human life, it's real enough for you to object to being stabbed to death unnecessarily and that's all we need to move on the the next points of name the trait.

There could be none if you like (I provided many examples before), but it doesn't matter because there is no objective reason provided or demanded for the assumption that we value ourselves and each other.

Would you accept "there is no objective reason provided or demanded for me not to stab you to death, all you have is subjective and arbitrary emotional whims" as a satisfactory justification for me to stab you to death? I am going to assume honestly you would not so this line of reasoning is contradictory or simply useless to humans regardless of the "realness" of human value.

Your own argument indicates we don't need a reason. We don't need a trait, because our value of each other is not explicitly based on a trait; it is arbitrary.

No, the trait is valuing your own life, that is the trait which grants life value, because at the moment I no longer or am incapable of valuing my own life is the moment I no longer need any right to life or would care if I was killed. Again we could talk about the underlying biological reasons why I value my own life, but all we need is the FACT that I value my own life subjectively, then merely remain consistent in my treatment of other beings who value their own lives subjectively.

If instead you had said:
"we are humans and we value our own lives and each other because we possess certain traits that demand that value"
Then you'd be right. Then a #namethetrait argument would be relevant.

But not everybody is going to agree with that reasoning, so you need to add that as a premise. On its own the argument is a non sequitur.

That isn't necessary because valuing your own life is the trait necessary that demands that value, and by the way that logic isn't circular it is a priori, in the same way "all bachelors are unmarried" "Having value for your own life gives your life value". If I say "My life has value to me", then it is a fact that my life has value, to me subjectively.

Secondly it's not a non-sequitur, it follows logically that because my life subjectively has value to me I don't want to be stabbed to death, so it is a contradiction to stab another sentient being who values their own life to death for reasons I would not accept if deployed to justify stabbing me to death.

I understand the point of the question, but it doesn't do that. Logically it is only a non sequitur.

You value your life

Animals value their lives

You don't want to be stabbed to death

Animals don't want to be stabbed to death

What is the difference between you and animals that if true of you would justify stabbing you to death?

How is this a non-sequitur?

You can agree that there are no such traits, and yet still disagree with the conclusion. The argument is a non sequitur.
You don't even have to answer the trait question, the conclusion just doesn't follow. But you can also answer the trait question arbitrarily if you want to, because the argument has no force.

You can only agree there is no such trait and disagree with the conclusion if you accept contradictions and are a proud hypocrite. Sure you can plug any arbitrary trait in but you will very likely only get a contradiction out of it, that's the point, it exposes illogical double standards.

I understand that, but because there is no premise present which demands an answer, much less a non-arbitrary answer, lacking one does not lead to the conclusion in the argument. There is no contradiction according to logic.

Would you accept this as an argument from a KKK member currently lynching a black person? That what they are doing isn't wrong because there is no premise present which demands an answer, much less a non-arbitrary answer why lynching black people is wrong? That's the thing, for the average every day person there is no need to go into this deep meta-ethics, when we are talking about racism, pedophilia, etc. nobody asks "what even is morality, isn't it all just subjective and arbitrary anyway?"

We just accept that we value our own lives so therefore our lives have value, and we would not accept being discriminated or harmed in certain ways for certain reasons, and specifically we would not accept being treated like we treat animals no matter the reasons we purport to treat animals that way. So yes, it is a contradiction according to logic to stab animals to death unnecessarily for reasons we would not accept ourselves being stabbed to death unnecessarily. It's really that simple, name the trait is designed specifically to be very simple and easy to understand, it doesn't need to be over-complicated nor does over-complicating it make it better.

And that is excellent as an informal argument. Where it fails is at a formal level.

How does it fail on a formal level? Can you prove that or is that just an emotional whim?

It tries to do that, but fails to do so. It is unfortunately a non sequitur.
A double standard is not in itself logically inconsistent. You can argue that having double standards is being an asshole, but unless you explicitly agree that double standards and arbitrary justifications are wrong you have not contradicted yourself in employing them.

No, a double standard produces contradictions when you both accept and reject a given justification for death stabbing at the same time. When a lack of intelligence is given to justify animal death stabbing, the fact that we don't death stab humans for lacking intelligence exposes a double standard, demonstrating that in practice intelligence isn't being applied consistently to justify death stabbings so we are both accepting lack of intelligence as a justification for death stabbing for animals, but rejecting lack of intelligence as a justification for death stabbing for humans. Accepting and rejecting something at the same time is a contradiction.

Saying "It's OK for me to fart in the elevator, but it's wrong for Bob to fart in the elevator" is not logically inconsistent if your justification is "Because I said so". It is arbitrary, but it is logically consistent. You are declaring yourself the arbiter of propriety, whatever you say goes.

Wow, this is brutally retarded. No, if that statement is all I am given to work with, it is a contradiction, the speaker has no authority to declare who can or can not fart in said elevator so "Because I said so" has no validity, so by accepting he can fart but Bob can't because he said so, but not accepting him not being allowed to fart but Bob being allowed to on the basis that Bob says so, he is both accepting and rejecting saying so as a justification. If the speaker was the actual recognized owner of the elevator, then sure he can forbid bob from farting and equally Bob can forbid the speaker from farting on Bob's elevator and if the speaker accepted that then there is no contradiction, nor is it arbitrary because the trait justifying the differance that everyone is in agreement with is one is the owner and one isn't.

Would you like it if other people did that to you? Probably not. But if you're the arbiter, you can arbitrarily declare them wrong and you right. You aren't being logically inconsistent, you're just being an asshole.

No, it is logically inconsistent to accept something as justified when you are doing it to another being, but not accept something as justified if you were exactly like that being and it was being done to you. Being an "arbiter" and declaring assertions doesn't make them true or logically consistent.

Saying "It's OK for me to fart in the elevator, but it's wrong for Bob to fart in the elevator" is also not logically inconsistent if your justification is "Because my farts are quiet and don't stink and it doesn't bother anybody, and Bob's farts are loud and smell like death and bother people". Now it's not arbitrary, it's based on reasoning. If it were then demonstrated that your farts are in fact stinky and are not actually silent and that they do bother people, you would be expected to change your position on whether it is indeed OK for you to fart in the elevator, otherwise risk inconsistency.

All you have demonstrated here is name the trait in action, and this works just fine with name the trait as is without over-complications.

You don't like loud smelly farts (Subjective, but it is a non-arbitrary objective fact that you subjectively don't like them)

Name the trait different in my farts that if different in your farts would justify you farting around me unnecessarily.

If your answer is your farts are neither loud or smelly, and that's factually true, you have done it and named the trait. Otherwise it is a contradiction to accept you freely gassing people with your smelly farts but to reject others gassing you with their smelly farts.

It's that simple, and you have shown me you are capable of grasping name the trait in principle and so have proven yourself wrong or have demonstrated that your disagreement with name the trait has been done erroneously.

In order to make #namethetrait logically valid, you have to add premises that specify we are looking for the latter kind of reasoning, and that explicitly exclude the former arbitrary reasoning.
The second premise doesn't do that on its own. You can not "feed" arbitrary back into it and get an answer, the argument is not magically self correcting, it's a non sequitur. Saying that it does that is using circular reasoning. It *would* do that if you already provided that premise that excluded arbitrary answers so that it was a valid argument.

No, you don't have to do any of that, arbitrary traits either result in contradiction or successfully logically justifies carnism, the fact that no trait can be found to achieve the latter is the point of naming the trait and proving carnism isn't logically justified.

Can't you see how fine the silks are on the Emperor's new clothes?

Could you explain what you mean by this in more detail? I see the logic of your arguments is flawed and I explain how they are flawed, how is this equivalent to pretending to believe something that is obviously not true?

Divine command has more problems than that. But if you accept arbitrary assertions, it answers the question of the trait.

I clearly stated why I would not accept arbitrary assertions, even by an all powerful god, so it's interesting you seemed to just ignore that and the rest of what I said for some reason.

Not if you assert arbitrary values. It is a double standard, and it makes you an asshole to do that, but that doesn't make you logically contradictory.
Again, a double standard does not necessarily equal a logical contradiction.

So in the case of FriendED, he loves to say that group membership is where beings get their value, and sure if you actually believe that group membership is arbitrary. FriendED thinks it's okay to death stab other beings that share the same group membership as him, but FriendED would not honestly accept being death stabbed on the basis that he does not share someone's group membership, this double standard of accepting and rejecting group membership as a justification for death stabbing is a contradiction, and demonstrates that the arbitrary trait of group membership is not a valid trait for denying value.

Nothing objectively wrong. Again, I specified he would be wrong according to YOUR culture, but right according to his Nazi culture.

No, it's not arbitrary. But that's because morality is objective and based on reason. What the nazis did was wrong because it was harmful.

The Nazis doing something harmful is not what makes it immoral, hurricanes Harvey and Irma did some pretty harmful things, but hurricanes aren't immoral. Hurricanes are not capable of moral agency, hurricanes don't have values so it is not a logical contradiction to kill people, destroy property, and generally cause harm. But the fact is Nazis are capable of moral agency, they have values, particularly for their own life, so it IS a logical contradiction to take the life of Jews when they would not want their life taken if they were a jew.

What has value only exists subjectively in the mind of an agent, but from there you can apply objectively true logic to determine how consistently standard treatments are being applied, and where there is a double standard there is a logical contradiction.

Nope. That may make them assholes for holding such standards, but again that's not logically inconsistent.

People tend to think logical contradiction applies to a lot of things that it doesn't apply to.

Please read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
You're conflating two different definitions of "contradiction", one being in formal logic, and the other being a casual and informal use which is not actually logically contradictory.

I feel like I have sufficiently explained what I mean by contradiction and how it logically and correctly applies. If you accept and reject a given justification for something based on who it's being applied to for no other given logically consistent and valid reason, you are contradicting yourself.

X justifies Y

and

X does not justify Y

Is a logical contradiction, and the above contradiction is what name the trait demonstrates in our treatment of animals.

When you perceive a contradiction between "I can fart in the elevator" and "Bob can't fart in the elevator", you assume those statements are based on some kind of reasoning (some trait), because what kind of asshole would just make that fiat like that without any kind of rationale? But they are not by logical necessity based on any kind of reasoning. The response can simply be "Because I said so", or nothing at all. Again, that is a double standard, but it's not a logical contradiction; it makes you an asshole if you do it, but it doesn't make you logically inconsistent.

All of what you are saying here can be dismissed unless you are willing to accept me slitting your throat and barbecuing your flesh on the basis of "Because I said so", or nothing at all. If not, it is a contradiction to ever expect "Because I said so" to be valid but to simultaneously reject "Because I said so" as valid for me death stabbing you. See only Harvey and Irma can use the "nothing at all" reasoning and remain consistent, because they don't value their own existences, there is no contradiction in their actions, but humans pretty much universally value their own life, so for veganism we can just start with the FACT that humans value their own life and the logical consequences of that, making it inconsistent to take the life of another being unnecessarily for justification you would not accept if imposed on you.

Final thoughts, generally when someone has been backed into the corner of defending the validity of "Because I said so" as a justification for anything, it's an indication that they have lost the argument.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am Final thoughts, generally when someone has been backed into the corner of defending the validity of "Because I said so" as a justification for anything, it's an indication that they have lost the argument.

This sums up your misunderstanding.

Saying "because I said so" is not a good way to win an argument, because it's not very convincing. BUT they don't have to convince anybody. They're already doing it, it's you who have to convince them.

People are very amicable to their own "because I said so" reasons. Some will happily claim that morality is subjective and relative to hold onto them.
If you want to convince them that they need reasons to believe something about moral value, then you need to talk them out of subjectivism.

It's not hard to talk most people out of subjectivism.
Ask them if they think that objectively their morality is not better than that of Nazis. Most people won't be excited to agree with that.
Then you can talk about how moral values can't be arbitrary.
You can talk them into moral objectivism, because the only non-arbitrary basis for morality is consideration of the interests of others. With logic alone you can narrow it down to one general moral principle.

You don't even need to ask them to name the trait, just explain that non-human animals have interests too, and there's no reason not to consider them.

If you want to use a name the trait argument, you can stop at getting them to disagree with moral subjectivism and agreeing moral values can't be arbitrary. Once you do that you can ask them to name the trait.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amwe could get into the objective biological reasons why humans subjectively value their own lives if you'd like

That would be an appeal to nature fallacy.
The reasons why people behave in certain ways dont speak to whether they should or should not do that.

The penis evolved for rape. Not an excuse to use it for that purpose.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amme not wanting to be stabbed to death is not the same subjective emotional desire as whether I want chocolate or vanilla ice cream for dessert.

One is usually stronger, but preferences of any kind are fundamentally of the same type, just to varying degrees.
They're all morally arbitrary. An appeal to nature doesn't help there.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amAlso even if you continue to insist that the value of human life is merely subjective and arbitrary, the only way to get out of the logical conclusions of human life having value is to hold honestly that your life has no value,

That logic ONLY holds in a moral objectivist framework. In that framework it holds up well, but if you try to apply to to a subjectivist framework it falls apart.
As I explained, you can get out of it with any arbitrary excuse.

Maybe we should start with that; I would be happy to talk you into moral objectivism if you're a subjectivist.

The namethetrait argument is not bad (informally) as long as you only use it on moral objectivists, because they will already assume the kinds of premises that are missing. Where it fails is where you attempt to apply it to everybody.

It's like this:
I can make an argument for utilitarians that's really convincing, but then if I try to take that argument and use on deontologists it won't be convincing at all. You have to choose the right argument for the audience you're dealing with. If you try to make a one-size-fits-all argument, it's going to be terrible for everybody. And that's Isaac's version of #namethetrait. It's just not logically valid. He broke it by trying to avoid necessary premises and make it applicable to more people.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am Would you accept "there is no objective reason provided or demanded for me not to stab you to death, all you have is subjective and arbitrary emotional whims" as a satisfactory justification for me to stab you to death?

I wouldn't because I'm a moral objectivist. I would explain to the stabby person, if I had time, that morality is objective and on those grounds they should abstain from stabbing.

A subjectivist wouldn't accept that argument either, because according to his or her arbitrary morality, the stabbing of him or her is wrong. However, he or she won't be able to make a very compelling argument, it would basically just be "That's wrong because I said so", or "According to your morality it might be right, but that's not the morality I arbitrarily subscribe to. According to my personal morality that's wrong, so I will oppose your actions".

Do you see the difference there?

Subjectivists make unconvincing arguments to support their arbitrary values, but that doesn't make them logically contradictory.
They would only be logically contradictory if they said something like "That's wrong according to objective universal morality so it's wrong" on one hand, and then used "There is no objective morality, it's OK with my personal morality so it's OK" on the other, switching teams based on the issue.

In practice subjectivists often do this. But you have to catch them at it to call them out.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am That isn't necessary because valuing your own life is the trait necessary that demands that value,

This is more fun than I thought it would be, it took me a minute to solve this word puzzle.
Very tricky wording; you've tied yourself into a logical knot. Let's untie you.

The trait of valuing your own life does demand that you valued your own life in that instant. That's a tautology. Mind the tense.

Valuing your own life does not demand that you value your own life (future tense) from this moment forward. It does not demand that you continue to do so; it is not prescriptive. We're talking about a descriptive requirement following a very limited instantaneous time-frame as defined by the tautology I stated. Obviously you can stop valuing your own life; having valued it at one point does nothing to force you to indefinitely value it, and there's nothing in that on its own that prescriptively compels you as a moral ought to value it.

So, no, valuing your own life is not a trait that compels you (as a prescriptive moral ought) to value your own life. It is only tautologically descriptive of what has been the case up until this moment and may change at any time.

Anyway, a moral objectivist can argue something like this (but prescriptive) based on a definition of morality. You would just assert, as a non-arbitrary claim, that value gives value.
Such an argument doesn't work in a moral subjectivist framework, though, where that can just be rejected and substituted with an arbitrary claim.

Again, once you eliminate arbitrary from the options, you have a very strong argument for an objective moral basis. There are many ways to make that argument, but without eliminating arbitrarity FIRST there will always be a way to defeat the argument.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am and by the way that logic isn't circular it is a priori, in the same way "all bachelors are unmarried" "Having value for your own life gives your life value". If I say "My life has value to me", then it is a fact that my life has value, to me subjectively.

It's an ambiguously phrased tautology. Again, descriptive by nature, not prescriptive.

The only way you change "value is value" from descriptive to prescriptive is to switch from a subjectivist to a moral objectivist framework.

If you change the framework of this discussion, your arguments are all pretty good (at least informally). Again, I'll remind you I am a moral objectivist.
But if you try to maintain a subjectivist framework, then they're all logically fallacious.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am Secondly it's not a non-sequitur, it follows logically that because my life subjectively has value to me I don't want to be stabbed to death,

That part follows. It's a good description, but it's not a prescription that you should not be stabbed to death UNLESS you're talking to an objectivist.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am so it is a contradiction to stab another sentient being who values their own life to death for reasons I would not accept if deployed to justify stabbing me to death.

It's only a contradiction in a moral objectivist framework where arbitrary value claims are rejected. Otherwise, a subjectivist can just reject your prescriptive value system and substitute anything he or she wants.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am What is the difference between you and animals that if true of you would justify stabbing you to death?

How is this a non-sequitur?

Because there doesn't have to be a difference. For a subjectivist, their "morality" can be based on "because I say so".
All you have to do is add in that premise and change from a subjectivist to an objectivist, then your arguments work.

Why don't you want to do that?

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am You can only agree there is no such trait and disagree with the conclusion if you accept contradictions and are a proud hypocrite.

Arbitrarity is not a contradiction, nor does it produce hypocrisy.
It probably will involve some double standards, but that's not contradictory if it's openly based on fiat.
And as long as they don't say something like "Nazis are objectively wrong" or criticize others for the arbitrarity of their moral systems, they're not hypocrites.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am Sure you can plug any arbitrary trait in but you will very likely only get a contradiction out of it, that's the point, it exposes illogical double standards.

Again, a double standard is not the same as a contradiction. They don't even have to plug anything in, they can just agree that there is no such trait and they can say it doesn't matter because their morality is arbitrary.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am Would you accept this as an argument from a KKK member currently lynching a black person?

I would not, because I'm a moral objectivist.
FriendEd would have trouble answering that. All he could say is "It's wrong according to FriendEd morality, but it's OK according to KKK morality. They're following their morals, and violating mine."

Again, Subjectivists make bad arguments, but that's not the same as being logically contradictory.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amThat what they are doing isn't wrong because there is no premise present which demands an answer, much less a non-arbitrary answer why lynching black people is wrong? That's the thing, for the average every day person there is no need to go into this deep meta-ethics, when we are talking about racism, pedophilia, etc. nobody asks "what even is morality, isn't it all just subjective and arbitrary anyway?"

Which is why I said as an informal argument it's usually fine. But #namethetrait was made into a formal argument, and that is where it is missing premises -- because of that, it is logically invalid.

Why don't you just add in the premises so the argument works?

When you're using it informally you can leave them off and just make a casual argument based on the golden rule, but if you show somebody the formal argument it needs to be logically valid. If you're only talking to very ignorant people who don't know any logic you might get away with it, but as soon as you meet an informed subjectivist who understands a little logic your argument will be revealed. If you go around promoting this, and hiding these premises, it will look dishonest.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amSo yes, it is a contradiction according to logic to stab animals to death unnecessarily for reasons we would not accept ourselves being stabbed to death unnecessarily. It's really that simple, name the trait is designed specifically to be very simple and easy to understand, it doesn't need to be over-complicated nor does over-complicating it make it better.

I don't know how to explain this any more clearly.
For the average person, who is a moral objectivist, you won't have much trouble because they already reject arbitrary morality on some level and generally agree with the golden rule intuitively.
But when you call this logically contradictory based on that argument, you're just wrong. And if you call yourself a moral subjectivist, you're contradicting yourself because you're using an argument that only works at all (even informally) for moral objectivism.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amHow does it fail on a formal level? Can you prove that or is that just an emotional whim?

I did prove it.
Please clarify what you don't understand and I'll try to come at it from another angle.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amNo, a double standard produces contradictions when you both accept and reject a given justification for death stabbing at the same time.

It literally does not produce a contradiction.
A logical contradiction is ONLY a direct negation of exactly the same proposition.

p1 - It is not moral to kill me with a knife
p2 - It is moral to kill me with a knife.
This IS a true contradiction.

p1 - It is not moral to kill me with a knife
p2 - it is moral to kill Bob with a knife.
This is NOT a contradiction.

You do not understand the definition of contradiction. Would you please read the page I linked you to? This is really important for you to understand if you want to grasp logic. The law of non-contradiction is key, and seeing contradictions where there are none is as bad as ignoring contradictions where they exist.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction

Wikipedia wrote:In classical logic, a contradiction consists of a logical incompatibility between two or more propositions. It occurs when the propositions, taken together, yield two conclusions which form the logical, usually opposite inversions of each other. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotle's law of noncontradiction states that "One cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time."

By extension, outside of classical logic, one can speak of contradictions between actions when one presumes that their motives contradict each other.

When you assert contradiction informally, you are making presumptions about people's motives.

Wikipedia wrote:Outside formal logic
Colloquial usage can label actions or statements as contradicting each other when due (or perceived as due) to presuppositions which are contradictory in the logical sense.

1. This is only OUTSIDE formal logic. Inside formal logic you can not assume presuppositions, you must state them clearly as premises.
2. Colloquially, people can be mistaken, and language is imprecise (which is why we are precise with formal logic).

Also read:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presupposition

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amWhen a lack of intelligence is given to justify animal death stabbing, the fact that we don't death stab humans for lacking intelligence exposes a double standard, demonstrating that in practice intelligence isn't being applied consistently to justify death stabbings so we are both accepting lack of intelligence as a justification for death stabbing for animals, but rejecting lack of intelligence as a justification for death stabbing for humans. Accepting and rejecting something at the same time is a contradiction.

Informally that is fine. You are identifying a position you assume your opponent holds and showing it is contradicting another position you assume your opponent holds.
You could be wrong, but you have a good chance of being right.

However, none of this applies in formal logic. That kind of practice is unacceptable, and in this case has resulted in a fallacious argument. You must state your premises, you can not assume people hold them. In so far as you are talking to average people they probably do hold them, but there are people (subjectivists) who do not. That's why this stuff isn't permitted in formal logic.

You're violating the rules of formal logic by hiding those premises.
Why not just write them in?

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amWow, this is brutally retarded. No, if that statement is all I am given to work with, it is a contradiction, the speaker has no authority to declare who can or can not fart in said elevator

Subjectivists declare themselves the authority on their own personal morality. "Because I said so" is a valid justification in a subjectivist context.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amby accepting he can fart but Bob can't because he said so, but not accepting him not being allowed to fart but Bob being allowed to on the basis that Bob says so, he is both accepting and rejecting saying so as a justification.

Again, you do not understand the meaning of contradiction in logic.

He is accepting himself saying so, but rejecting Bob doing it.

p1 - "because I say so" is a good argument for me
p2 - "because I say so" is not a good argument for me
True logical contradiction.

p1 - "because I say so" is a good argument for me
p2 - "because I say so" is not a good argument for other people
No logical contradiction. (Only an informal colloquial "contradiction", NOT a contradiction in formal logic)

Contradiction is the most basic part of logic, and you need to understand how it is defined before you make mistakes like this. Why didn't you read the link I gave you? Did you assume you already understood it so you didn't need to follow up for more information?

And you have so much confidence in your absolute knowledge that you think it's OK to say I am (or what I'm saying is) "brutally retarded" without even checking the definition of a contradiction?

Come on. I'm trying to be nice and patient here and teach you this stuff, and you jump to insults.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amIf the speaker was the actual recognized owner of the elevator, then sure he can forbid bob from farting and equally Bob can forbid the speaker from farting on Bob's elevator and if the speaker accepted that then there is no contradiction, nor is it arbitrary because the trait justifying the differance that everyone is in agreement with is one is the owner and one isn't.

1. In subjectivism, each person IS considered the owner of and authority on his/her own personal morality.
2. In the elevator example it's still arbitrary to make that rule (even if it's your own elevator) if the rule has no basis in reason.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am

Saying "It's OK for me to fart in the elevator, but it's wrong for Bob to fart in the elevator" is also not logically inconsistent if your justification is "Because my farts are quiet and don't stink and it doesn't bother anybody, and Bob's farts are loud and smell like death and bother people". Now it's not arbitrary, it's based on reasoning. If it were then demonstrated that your farts are in fact stinky and are not actually silent and that they do bother people, you would be expected to change your position on whether it is indeed OK for you to fart in the elevator, otherwise risk inconsistency.

All you have demonstrated here is name the trait in action, and this works just fine with name the trait as is without over-complications.

I was demonstrating both sides. The subjectivist side ("because I said so"), and the objectivist side (using reasoning).
Yes, the objectivist side is compatible with the informal namethetrait argument, because it's an objectivist argument. I'm not sure if you thought I would be surprised by this?
The only reason it works here is because we're dealing with a person who uses rational justifications rather than fiat.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am It's that simple, and you have shown me you are capable of grasping name the trait in principle and so have proven yourself wrong or have demonstrated that your disagreement with name the trait has been done erroneously.

I have indicated understanding of how and when #namethetrait informally "works" all along. The fact is that there are cases where it doesn't work and where the conclusion can be rejected, and you only have to find ONE example of where it does not work to prove an argument is not valid. The fact that it happens to work in some situations where those assumptions are already made does not absolve it of logical invalidity.

p1 - All Dogs are mammals.
p2 - Lassie is a mammal.
C - therefore Lassie is a dog.

Lassie might damn well be a dog, but that logic is STILL invalid even if it happens to sometimes be right on accident.

I see I'm going to have to quote more basic logic at you, because you won't read what I link to.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity

Wikipedia wrote:In logic, an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.[1] It is not required that a valid argument have premises that are actually true,[2] but to have premises that, if they were true, would guarantee the truth of the argument's conclusion. A formula is valid if and only if it is true under every interpretation, and an argument form (or schema) is valid if and only if every argument of that logical form is valid.

It only has to be possible for the premises to both be accepted and the conclusion rejected. It is: by Subjectivists who use fiat based personal arbitrary morality.

For a subjectivist, this is easily done:

1. Humans are of moral value - check!
2. There is no trait - Check! (Subjectivist: "so what, my morality is arbitrary, not based on rational deduction from traits")
3. Contradiction? - Wrong! (Again, you need to understand the definition of a logical contradiction)

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am

Can't you see how fine the silks are on the Emperor's new clothes?

Could you explain what you mean by this in more detail? I see the logic of your arguments is flawed and I explain how they are flawed, how is this equivalent to pretending to believe something that is obviously not true?

It's very obvious to anybody who has very basic knowledge of logic: to somebody who understands what a logical contradiction is (vs. the colloquial usage based on assumptions), to somebody who understands what logical validity is and that one case of an argument's conclusion being true (Lassie is a dog) does not indicate the argument is logically valid, to somebody who understands what a tautology is and the difference between descriptivism and prescriptivism and the problem with linguistic ambiguity, to somebody who understands that in formal logic you have to state ALL of your premises which are not part of the basic principles of logic or risk appearing dishonest.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am

Divine command has more problems than that. But if you accept arbitrary assertions, it answers the question of the trait.

I clearly stated why I would not accept arbitrary assertions, even by an all powerful god, so it's interesting you seemed to just ignore that and the rest of what I said for some reason.

Would you like me to go back to that? Do you really think you said something different there than in the other examples? It didn't look like it.
I will if you want.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am The Nazis doing something harmful is not what makes it immoral, hurricanes Harvey and Irma did some pretty harmful things, but hurricanes aren't immoral.

Obviously they chose to do something harmful based on a twisted system of pseudo-morality.

If you can understand what contradictions etc. mean (as you didn't in this original paragraph) we can talk more about this.
Moral culpability is a very interesting discussion.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am What has value only exists subjectively in the mind of an agent,

Do you think there's a magical property of the mind, like a "soul" that makes it non-physical?
Every value that presently exists exists physically as a chemical configuration; an information system.

We can speak as objectively of values as we can of mass or any other property.
If you don't agree, you're probably a dualist who is verging on supernatural belief.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am I feel like I have sufficiently explained what I mean by contradiction and how it logically and correctly applies.

I know you feel that way. But you're trying to have a conversation about philosophy here and you can't bring in your informal definitions of "contradiction" and impose them on formal systems and demand philosophers recognize your argument as valid on the basis of you rewriting the rules of formal logic (or never understanding them in the first place).

If you want to play chess, you can't just decide all of your pawns are queens. We follow rules in formal logic for a good reason. You are breaking those rules, and I'm trying to help you understand what the rules are so you can follow them.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am If you accept and reject a given justification for something based on who it's being applied to for no other given logically consistent and valid reason, you are contradicting yourself.

No, because you're changing who it applies to. AGAIN you do not understand logical contradiction.

X ALWAYS justifies Y
X does not ALWAYS justify Y
contradiction.

X justifies Y for me
X does not justify Y for you
Not a logical contradiction. (Maybe an informal colloquial assumed "contradiction", but not one in formal logic)

I understand why you think this is a logical contradiction, but you don't understand how rigorously these terms are used in philosophy.
If you would take time to read a little bit about formal logic, you would see how you are mistaken.

If you don't want to do formal logic, then don't play at doing formal logic. Stick to informal arguments, that's fine.
If you claim to do formal logic, you will be held to those standards.

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 am All of what you are saying here can be dismissed unless you are willing to accept me slitting your throat and barbecuing your flesh on the basis of "Because I said so", or nothing at all.

AGAIN. I am a moral objectivist. This is not a problem for me. I reject the proposition of throat slitting as moral because it's objectively morally wrong to cause harm like that without good reason.

AGAIN. A subjectivist could reject that based on "That's right according to your morality, so you will try to do it. It's wrong according to my morality, so I will try to stop you".

Gray Sloth wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 12:44 amSee only Harvey and Irma can use the "nothing at all" reasoning and remain consistent, because they don't value their own existences, there is no contradiction in their actions, but humans pretty much universally value their own life, so for veganism we can just start with the FACT that humans value their own life and the logical consequences of that, making it inconsistent to take the life of another being unnecessarily for justification you would not accept if imposed on you.

There isn't a contradiction for a Subjectivist either, who does not claim to require non-arbitrary objective reasons. The contradiction only arises for a moral objectivst.

You're usually talking to moral objectivists when you use this argument. But just because Lassie happens to actually be a dog sometimes doesn't make that argument valid.

Your correction also missed changing all occurances of the word 'humans' to 'sentient humans' in the premises.
The eventual conclusion of name the trait is that sentience is the trait that would cause ourselves to deem us valueless, contradicting the premises P1 that (ALL) humans (thus sentient and nonsentient) are of moral value and some others.
And a logical argument that has a conclusion that contradicts with its premises is obviously a nonvalid argument. Is pretty much literally the textbook definition of 'validity' of an argument in logic.

That would be an appeal to nature fallacy.
The reasons why people behave in certain ways done speak to whether they should or should not do that.

When I say humans value their own life for biological reasons, I am just stating a fact those reasons exist making it non-arbitrary, the same way the reasons the penis has evolved for rape or the reasons there are only two genders are factual statements making those non-arbitrary adaptations. Valuing one's life is not done merely on a whim, neither is raping or being male or female, there are biological reasons which isn't to say whether or not they are right or wrong. There is no prescriptive judgment in those statements to whether those things are desirable or undesirable, only that they are. For example to share a bit about myself, I am personally suicidal, I don't value my own life and wish to end it, so obviously I don't view valuing one's own life as necessarily good or desirable.

Humans generally value their own lives, there are biological reasons for that and we could get into antinatalism on whether those reasons are valid or justified, but it being a fact means veganism logically and non-arbitrarily follows from it as name the trait demonstrates.

One is usually stronger, but preferences of any kind are fundamentally of the same type, just to varying degrees.
They're all morally arbitrary. An appeal to nature doesn't help there.

As I have said before, and will apply to a lot of what you say later, calling someone's value for their own life arbitrary doesn't make it any less real to them, nor does it change the logical consequences of it.

The namethetrait argument is not bad as long as you only use it on moral objectivists, because they will already assume the kinds of premises that are missing. Where it fails is where you attempt to apply it to everybody.

Not to anyone who is intellectually honest, even if they view morality as subjective they can be shown that stabbing another being to death for reasons they would not accept themselves being stabbed to death all things being equal is a contradiction. Once we subjectively determine are values, we can apply objective logic to them.

Even an extreme exception like myself, who doesn't value their own life, can see that it would still be a contradiction for me to stab another being who wanted to live to death, because all things being equal, if I wanted to live I wouldn't accept being stabbed to death on the basis that my stabber was suicidal. Through my subjective moral agency alone I can come to this logical conclusion, and it does not require I view morality as objective, only that I recognize the subjective values of others.

I can make an argument for utilitarians that's really convincing, but then if I try to take that argument and use on deontologists it won't be convincing at all. You have to choose the right argument for the audience you're dealing with.

I find this to be a pretty strange thing for a moral objectivist to say. It just seems surprisingly pragmatic for someone who thinks morality exists independent of subjective experiences.

A subjectivist wouldn't accept that argument either, because according to his or her arbitrary morality, the stabbing of him or her is wrong. However, he or she won't be able to make a very compelling argument, it would basically just be "That's wrong because I said so", or "According to your morality it might be right, but that's not the morality I arbitrarily subscribe to. According to my personal morality that's wrong, so I will oppose your actions".

That's one of the outcomes of name the trait, it forces people to admit to this sort of willful double standard and I have experienced people try it first hand many times, but it is an intellectually dishonest argument that people don't actually believe on a day to day basis, there is a reason racism, sexism, etc. are so disdainful these days, these sort of relativistic or solipsistic morals are rejected lest one accept that how Islam treats woman as perfectly valid for example. Objectivism is not necessary, merely having consistency with how you would subjectively accept being treated for any given reason and how you treat other beings for those given reasons.

Subjectivists make unconvincing arguments to support their arbitrary values, but that doesn't make them logically contradictory.
They would only be logically contradictory if they said something like "That's wrong according to objective universal morality so it's wrong" on one hand, and then used "There is no objective morality, it's OK with my personal morality so it's OK" on the other, switching teams based on the issue.

Like I have said, valuing ones own life is not done arbitrarily, there are reasons for it, however fallacious those reasons are, and regardless there are logical consequences of subjectively holding this non-arbitrary value. Someone can contradict themselves simply by accepting and rejecting the same justification without necessarily jumping from one moral framework to another, but you are correct in how surprisingly often people mix and match their morality when confronted by veganism.

The trait of valuing your own life does demand that you valued your own life. That's a tautology. Mind the tense.

No, what I am saying is you valuing your life is what demands other with moral agency to recognize it's value.

Valuing your own life does not demand that you value your own life (future tense) from this moment forward. It does not demand that you continue to do so; it is not prescriptive.

This is true, people who value their own life, are permitted treating their own life as though it has no value, we see this all the time, smoking, drinking, drugs, general unhealthy life styles. I support people's freedom to slowly kill themselves as much as they like, I don't argue for the moral imperative to be as healthy as you can be, live as long as you can live, etc. Others however can't inflict unhealthy conditions on you unconsensually up to and including death stabbing, since they would not want them inflicted on them if they did not want them inflicted on them and all else being equal.

Obviously you can stop valuing your own life; having valued it at one point does nothing to force you to indefinitely value it, and there's nothing in that on its own that prescriptively compels you as a moral ought to value it.

Sure, like myself, and I unsurprisingly support the right to die and for people to be consensually killed or given the tools to willingly kill themselves in the most painless and effective way if they desire it so. I have written about the benefits of such a system here if you are interested: https://redd.it/602dz0

So, no, valuing your own life is not a trait that compels you (as a prescriptive moral ought) to value your own life. It is only tautologically descriptive of what has been the case up until this moment and may change at any time.

Well this was just a misunderstanding, what I was saying was "valuing your own life is a trait that compels OTHERS (as a prescriptive moral ought) to value your life", hopefully this has cleared that up.

Again, once you eliminate arbitrary from the options, you have a very strong argument for an objective moral basis. There are many ways to make that argument, but without eliminating arbitrarity FIRST there will always be a way to defeat the argument.

Arbitrary options don't have to be eliminated, they eliminate themselves by being contradictions that produce absurdities that no one would honestly accept. Sure someone could acknowledge the contradiction of accepting animals being death stabbed, but rejecting themselves being death stabbed without being able to name a trait justifying the difference and simply claiming "I don't care about contradictions", but they surrender any intellectual defense against being death stabbed by someone who doesn't care about contradictions. Very few are going to bite the bullet on that one, and the ones that do like Destiny are laughed at for it because it's absurd in it's blatant intellectual dishonesty.

The only way you change "value is value" from descriptive to prescriptive is to switch from a subjectivist to a moral objectivist framework.

Just be clear, what I am saying is someone's subjective value for their own life, generated non-arbitrarily from biological imperatives, converts to others with moral agency recognizing and respecting that subjective value in the same way they would want their life's value recognized and respected by such a moral agent if the roles were reversed and things being equal.

If you change the framework of this discussion, your arguments are all pretty good. Again, I'll remind you I am a moral objectivist.
But if you try to maintain a subjectivist framework, then they're all logically fallacious.

I just don't see the requirement of believing moral value as independent of subjective agents as necessary. All you need for my arguments to work is to recognize subjective moral value, use objective logic to determine the consistency of treatment based on that subjective value, and reject inconsistency. You don't have to convert someone to a objectivist to make this work, you just have to convince them not to be a hypocrite.

Otherwise, a subjectivist can just reject your prescriptive value system and substitute anything he or she wants.

Sure, but people doing that has thus for only produced contradictions or people claiming to be willing to be death stabbed because someone else can just decided they can do anything the want because morals are merely subjective. In other words nothing an intellectually honest person can support.

Because there doesn't have to be a difference. For a subjectivist, their "morality" can be based on "because I say so".

And that person has to bite the bullet on being death stabbed by someone else because "morality" can be based on "because I said so", objectivism isn't necessary to demonstrate how this is functionally useless and intellectually bankrupt, you can understand that moral value only exist subjectively and recognize pragmatically how this line of reasoning is not in the best interest of your subjective moral value.

All you have to do is add in that premise and change from a subjectivist to an objectivist, then your arguments work.

Why don't you want to do that?

Because it's not true in any provable or falsifiable way, it's like arguing moral value from god, it will just be dismissed because god isn't real, and moral value does not exist objectively. But all you need to do is recognize moral value subjectively and then you can apply objective logic to it to demonstrate what actions would mathematically produce the most good, whatever subjective good that is.

Arbitrarity is not a contradiction, nor does it produce hypocrisy.

This statement in and of itself isn't incorrect, but you consistently use arbitrary inappropriately, and you have repeatably failed to recognize contradictions as such, so the usefulness of you saying this to me is approaching zero.

It probably will involve some double standards, but that's not contradictory if it's based on fiat.

Double standards will produce contradictions because they will involve accepting and rejecting the same thing for no valid reason. Fiat isn't a valid reason because if you accept fiat as a justification for anything you also have to accept rejecting fiat as a justification by fiat, so this has moved past simple contradiction and into fucking paradox territory. But we don't even have to bother exploring that cluster fuck because would anyone accept fiat as a justification for being death stabbed, no so it's a contradiction to accept and reject fiat so it's useless and into the garbage it goes.

And as long as they don't say something like "Nazis are objectively wrong" or criticize others for the arbitrarity of their moral systems, they're not hypocrites.

So people don't need to say Nazis are objectively wrong, to criticize Nazis for their moral system, so right there, that is all you need a non-relativistic moral system but not necessarily an objective one to recognize subjective moral value and apply objective logic to achieve consistent treatment.

Again, a double standard is not the same as a contradiction. They don't even have to plug anything in, they can just agree that there is no such trait and they can say it doesn't matter because their morality is arbitrary.

And they have to bite the bullet that I can death stab them because morality is arbitrary. (It's very not arbitrary btw) Because they won't honestly do that, they are contradicting themselves by accepting and rejecting morality being arbitrary as a justification for death stabbing.

I would not, because I'm a moral objectivist.
FriendEd would have trouble answering that. All he could say is "It's wrong according to FriendEd morality, but it's OK according to KKK morality. They're following their morals, and violating mine."

Well that's because FriendEd is just retarded, but I can explain how that KKK member is contradicting himself by subjectively valuing his own life and rejecting being lynched on the basis of his race, but lynching someone else who subjectively values their life on the basis of their race. Accepting and rejecting race to justify lynching is a contradiction.

Why don't you just add in the premises so the argument works?

Because they are redundant and unnecessary to present a cohesive argument for veganism, and because moral objectivism isn't true, at least any more true than god, so strapping moral objectivism to it is only dead weight.

If you're only talking to very ignorant people who don't know any logic you might get away with it, but as soon as you meet an informed subjectivist who understands a little logic your argument will be revealed.

And they will say something profoundly retarded like "there is no such trait and it doesn't matter because my morality is arbitrary." or "Lynching blacks is wrong according to me, but right according to the KKK and both are equally valid and logically consistent perspectives" and will be laughed at and roundly mocked even by other carnists.

But when you call this logically contradictory based on that argument, you're just wrong. And if you call yourself a moral subjectivist, you're contradicting yourself because you're using an argument that only works for moral objectivism.

No, the argument works perfectly fine without believing moral value exist objectively as long as someone rejects being death stabbed on the basis that morality is subjective, it's a contradiction to death stab others on the basis that morality is subjective.

I did prove it.
Please clarify what you don't understand and I'll try to come at it from another angle.

I am going to be honest with you bro, at this point I don't even understand what I don't understand, I hope that helps.

p1 - It is not moral to kill me with a knife
p2 - it is moral to kill Bob with a knife.
This is NOT a contradiction.

So in this logic I am given no reason for the stabbing and not stabbing, so that's what I am going to go with. The speaker here accepts and rejects stabbing for no reason, that is a contradiction. If you want to give the reason that Bob is Bob and the speaker isn't Bob, that is just arbitrary, there is no mechanistic reason why Bob should be stabbed to death and the speaker should not be, Bob is just Bob and the speaker has arbitrarily deiced to stab Bob to death but not himself. Would the speaker accept being arbitrarily stabbed to death on the basis he is the speaker, if not and I am going to assume that is the case given P1, the speaker is contradicting himself by accepting and rejecting arbitrary reasons as a justification for death stabbing. Now if the speaker could name a trait absent in Bob that if absent in himself would justify himself being stabbed to death he could remain logically consistent, otherwise this double standard produces contradictions.

Subjectivists declare themselves the authority on their own personal morality. "Because I said so" is a valid justification in a subjectivist context.

And accepting me death stabbing them "Because I said so" is necessary for them to maintain that position.

p1 - "because I say so" is a good argument for me
p2 - "because I say so" is not a good argument for other people

This is just blatant hypocrisy, I think both adults and children would recognize anyone attempting to deploy this logic as a blithering retard. And again it is a contradiction as Aristotle said "One cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time." thus one can not say "because I said so" is and "because I said so" is not in the same respect and at the same time. So unless you can name the trait absent in others that if absent in you would make "Because I said so" not a good argument for you and vice versa, you are just full of shit mate.

In the elevator example it's still arbitrary to make that rule (even if it's your own elevator) if the rule has no basis in reason.

No, the reason is the owner doesn't like the smell of farts, that is a non-arbitrary biological reason. Also if you try to go back to the killing Bob example from earlier and say that the reason is because the speaker doesn't like Bob, sure then it's not arbitrary but the speaker would not accept being killed on the basis someone doesn't like him so it's a contradiction to accept and reject dislike as a justification for death stabbing.

I was demonstrating both sides. The subjectivist side ("because I said so"), and the objectivist side (using reasoning).

Wow, a strawman dressed up as a false dichotomy, I am just impressed by your boldness honestly.

I'm not sure if you thought I would be surprised by this.
The only reason it works is because we're dealing with a person who uses rational justifications rather than fiat.

Sure anyone who believes morality is just done by fiat is retarded, like FreindEd, but you don't have to believe moral value exists independent of subjective agents to one recognize moral fiat as retarded and two recognize logical consistency and reject inconsistency.

you only have to find ONE example of where it does not work to prove an argument is not valid.

That's exactly the challenge name the trait is presenting, please I beg you find even one trait absent in animals that if absent in a human would justify death stabbing and eating that human and you have defeated name the trait and have a valid argument for carnism.

Lassie might damn well be a dog, but that logic is STILL invalid even if it happens to sometimes be right on accident.

Sure I see what you are saying, the problem is so far nothing has passed name the trait, so until something ever does and demonstrates name the trait is insufficient it is a sufficient argument for veganism without everything you are trying to stitch to it.

I see I'm going to have to quote more basic logic at you, because you won't read what I link to.

I get it, when I say valid what I am saying is a non-arbitrary argument that logically applies mechanistically and people would honestly accept. For example sending criminals to jail is valid treatment because it's not arbitrary, it's done for the reason of removing them from society to protect people and rehabilitate them, and we do this to criminals but not to innocent people is because criminals have committed a crime and if a innocent person commits a crime and became a criminal that is the trait that justifies the different treatment. I and most people find this arrangement acceptable, and would accept a system where we would be jailed if we commit a crime.

Now you might have anarchist types who totally reject laws and prisons and that could be a valid position to hold in and of itself, but if that person accepts others being jailed for crimes committed against them but rejects being jailed themselves for having committed crimes against others, that person is contradicting themselves by accepting and rejecting jailing criminals rendering their position no longer valid.

Feel free to try to demonstrate how my premises are not in line with their conclusions, but I am pretty sure I know how valid works.

1. Humans are of moral value - check!
2. There is no trait - Check! (so what, my morality is arbitrary, not based on rational deduction from traits)

So they don't actually live long enough to get to number 3 because I have already death stabbed them arbitrarily as they have no logical argument against it.

Do you think there's a magical property of the mind, like a "soul" that makes it non-physical?
Every value that presently exists exists physically as a chemical configuration; an information system.

We can speak as objectively of values as we can of mass or any other property.
If you don't agree, you're probably a dualist who is verging on supernatural belief.

No, this is what I mean when I say things like subjective moral value exists as a fact. I say this in the same way I would say Goku is a real fictional character. Which is to say that drawings of Goku exists, animations of Goku exist, Internet articles describing Goku and his life (and many deaths) exists, and Goku as an abstract concept physically exists on people's brain, but Goku doesn't objectively independent of subjective agents to imagine his existence, it is a fact that Goku exists as a fictional character but without agents to look at those drawings, watch those animations, read those articles, and generate an imagination of Goku from them, they are all rendered meaningless lines and Goku ceases to exists as a fictional character even if the drawings and animations persist.

In the same way, there is no soul, dualism is wrong, the human mind is generated solely from physical processes in an entirely deterministic fashion and subjectively moral value exists physically in the brain but is rendered meaningless without a moral agent to interpret it.

No, because you're changing who it applies to. AGAIN you do not understand logical contradiction.

And what trait absent in one person or group if absent in the other person or group would justify treating the other person or group like the first person or group? If you can't name the trait than you have a double standard, and if you would not accept treating the second person or group like the first even though you haven't demonstrated a meaningful non-arbitrary difference, both persons or groups are functionally equal, so it is a contradiction to accept and reject the same treatment for equal reason simultaneously.

X justifies Y for me
X does not justify Y for you

We are straight up going to do this again just so I make it clear, what trait absent in me that if absent in you would justify treating you like me? If you can't name the trait than you have a double standard, and if you would not accept being treated like I am being treated even though you haven't demonstrated a meaningful non-arbitrary difference, you and I are functionally equal, so it is a contradiction to accept and reject the same treatment for equal reason simultaneously.

Do you understand it yet? In this scenario you and me have to be different meaningfully, some differing trait that mechanistically justifies the different treatment, and that if the trait was reversed would also reverse the application of treatment. Otherwise you are the one just making shit up arbitrarily, and if making shit up arbitrarily is what you call "Formal Logic" have fun, but here in peasant land with are informal logic we call that bullshit.

AGAIN. A subjectivist could reject that based on "That's right according to your morality, so you will try to do it. It's wrong according to my morality, so I will try to stop you".

And I point out how it is a contradiction to accept and reject "subjective morality" as a justification simultaneously and that they are being hypocritical. Rational people will recognize this moral solipsism as fucking useless and if actually held honestly and popularly would result in a social collapse and chaos as everyone just did whatever the fuck they wanted to do. When people deploy this argument they are either doing it dishonestly, they know they don't actually believe it or accept it's logical consequences, or they are fucking nut jobs like Milk Jar who people just make fun of.

There isn't a contradiction for a Subjectivist either, who does not claim to require non-arbitrary objective reasons. The contradiction only arrises for a moral objectivst.

One last time, it is a contradiction to accept death stabbing others for no good reason, but reject being death stabbed yourself for no good reason, where no different trait is named between you and others to justify the difference and if the trait was reversed would also reverse the justification for the treatment. Believing morality exists independent of subjective agents is not necessary to understand this.

You're usually talking to moral objectivists when you use this argument. But just because Lassie happens to actually be a dog sometimes doesn't make that argument valid.

It's actually the opposite, I have only ever found myself arguing for veganism with people who usually end up being forced to take the vacuous moral solipsism route, that you erroneously call moral subjectivism, demonstrating their retardation for all to see, you are the first moral objectivist that I have had this discussion with and only the second moral objectivst that I actually know of other than Inmendham. So I will thank you for this discussion and that novelty you have provided, but it's pretty clear to me at this point your interest in veganism is secondary to spreading your moral objectivity through veganism in the same way feminism tried to infect atheism in the atheism+ days and I am just not really interested in that I am only interested in veganism and from my experience with arguing with people deploying moral solipsism they not only reject moral objectivism they are correct in rejecting it because it is unfalsifiable at best so it will only weaken veganism by strapping the dead weight of moral objectivism to it and giving opponents to veganism valid ammunition to attack it. So I will read your response to this comment but I probably won't reply since I don't believe this conversation is useful for veganism.

vdofthegoodkind wrote: ↑Fri Sep 29, 2017 9:05 am Your correction also missed changing all occurances of the word 'humans' to 'sentient humans' in the premises.

Oh, you're right. Thanks! You should tell Ask Yourself (obviously he won't listen, but it's only fair to try).
I feel like I thought about doing that, then forgot. I can try to fix it. It's trickier to change because I have to mess a lot with formatting. Maybe I should just add a footnote.

The argument is ridiculously cumbersome. This is why there are better arguments, like argument from unnecessary suffering, or arguments defining morality then proceeding based on empirical facts. Of course, we're discussing reducetarianism in the other thread.

Here's the updated image:
Thanks again!
See any other issues?
It's hard to notice things when you've been staring at them so long, which is why avoiding echo chambers is so important.

I'm very new to philosophy of ethics, and I'm quite new to veganism as well. I think moral universalism is so imbedded in our way of thinking, especially as vegans (and I'd posit subjectivism is an absurd position and that really the only comfortable subjectivist is either a) a false subjectivist ie a subjectivist only when it suits them or b) a subjectivist who happens to be in more or less complete harmony with the way things are, ie in complete agreement with the majority culture, which ironically is a form of universalism in itself. And the moment that stops being the case, the moment the subjectivist cares enough about the wrongness of x that they wish to attempt to convince someone doing x that x is wrong... is the moment the subjectivist ceases to be a subjectivist) that most of us simply bring moral universalism along for the ride without even noticing how we've now occupied a seat.

I'm not entirely sure what Gary Sloth doesn't understand. Seems pretty straightforward once the hidden assumptions most of us make are exposed as just that. Assumptions. Just think about it this way, if moral subjectivism was actually logically contradictory in and of itself then literally no one could be a moral subjectivist in any philosophically interesting way and no philosopher would entertain the position (even if only to argue against it).

Gregor Samsa wrote: ↑Tue Oct 03, 2017 10:31 pm I'm not entirely sure what Gary Sloth doesn't understand. Seems pretty straightforward once the hidden assumptions most of us make are exposed as just that. Assumptions. Just think about it this way, if moral subjectivism was actually logically contradictory in and of itself then literally no one could be a moral subjectivist in any philosophically interesting way and no philosopher would entertain the position (even if only to argue against it).

The weirdest thing is that they (Ask Yourself, Gray Sloth, and the rest of that gang) are claiming to BE subjectivists.

The contradictions are dizzying. This is why I told Ask Yourself that he was a moral objectivist of some kind (or at least not a subjectivist if he doesn't want to group universalism with moral objectivism for some reason). The #namethetrait argument is not valid, but I doubt it's even possible to think you're employing a valid argument here unless you're already making moral objectivist assumptions.

To me, the nature of his hidden assumptions tell me he is a moral objectivst. Not that there's anything wrong with that, but his claim to be a subjectivst is just silly in that light and he makes it on the grounds of some incoherent semantic distinction he thinks exists.

The trouble is not debunking this argument for people in the know, because they seem to be pretty transparent, it's explaining it to people who don't have a background in this stuff that's throwing me for a loop.