The Argument from Companion Animals
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The Argument from Companion Animals
Now that we've worked up this NameTheJustification [wiki/index.php/NameTheJustification] way of developing the central idea behind arguments like that from less able humans (/ "marginal cases" wiki/index.php/Marginal_Cases) and NTT / NTT 2.0 [wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait_2.0], I was thinking that its logical from might work just as well for presenting the "argument from companion animals." This argument from companion animals is, as Brimstonesalad has observed, often presented by individuals like Melanie Joy (see e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0VrZPBskpg&t=568s). A version of this argument is also a leading idea of Alastair Norcross's important "Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases" (http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/read ... rcross.pdf) paper, and it was a subject of a recent Vegan Gains video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FPB8yK_e2w&t=118s). I was thinking that we should add a discussion of this argument to the phil vegan wiki.
Here is the "all' sentient humans" version of the NameTheJustification Argument. In what follows 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure).
(P1) All sentient humans have non-trivial moral status.
(P2) If all sentient humans have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
Therefore
(C) Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.
All we'd have to do to turn this into a version of the argument from companion animals would be to replace 'all sentient humans' with 'sentient companion animals', to yield:
(P1) Sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) have non-trivial moral status.
(P2) If sentient companion animals have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
Therefore
(C) Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.
Does that look like a good way to present the general form of the argument form companion animals?
In terms of the differences between NameTheJustification and the argument from companion animals, I'd think that these would be:
(1) interlocutors are more likely to object to P1 in the argument from companion animals (and e.g. want to say that it's simply that we have emotional attachments to companion animals and perhaps the Kantian thing about how personally torturing them might make us more likely to be violent to humans - but that there's nothing apart from this, in itself, or owed to the companion animals that makes it wrong to harm them for relatively trivial reasons),
(2) there might be more tendency by some interlocutors to object to P2 in the case of the argument form companion animals (e.g. on the grounds that neither have non-trivial status independent of humans' arbitrarily granting it) - although this could perhaps be re-interpreted as an objection to P3 (E.g. "isn't it that you think that there is an important difference, namely whether humans have "granted" it to one but not the other?" "Sure." "Cool, so can you say a bit more about what you mean by humans granting this status?" etc.) or perhaps to P1 (E.g. "well, do you really mean that companion animals have non-trivial moral status in the sense that it would be wrong to harm them for trivial reasons if this didn't upset other humans, etc.?" "No." "Cool. So do you really think that it is OK to torture your pet dog just for fun even if no one ever finds out about it?"), and
(3) the arguments about whether there are morally relevant differences in P3 will probably in the case of the argument from companion animals focus more on whether humans have special obligations to members of companion animal species in virtue of potential for relationship and history of interaction with members of the species (whereas in the case of NameTheJustification arguments will focus more on the relevance of membership in a species that has moral status in its own right independent of potential for or history of interactions with other species). It seems to me that responses to contract-based arguments will be quite similar in both the case of the argument from companion animals and NametheJustificaiton, with some interlocutors being tempted to want to say that both severely intellectually disabled humans and members of companion animal species but not members of other species would be included in the allegedly relevant (actual or hypothetical) contract. One difference might be that of course which species are companion species differs from social group to social group (and I suppose there might even be some social groups where members of some species are both companion animals and killed / tortured for food or entertainment - perhaps even the same ones at different times). That said views about the moral status of human infants and severely intellectually disabled humans have also differed a great deal across different societies over time and do so even at the present time. Perhaps some interlocutors would be more willing to be more conventional about non-trivial moral status for members of companion animal species (e.g. more willing to say that it's OK for individuals in certain Asian societies to kill / torture dogs and cats for taste-pleasure but that it's wrong for us to do this because we're subject to different morally relevant contracts) than they will be for less able humans (e.g. more willing to insist that it was wrong for certain Greco-Roman societies to kill / torture infants / the severely intellectually disabled for relatively trivial reasons even though they were all subject only to contracts that said it was OK to do this).
Here is the "all' sentient humans" version of the NameTheJustification Argument. In what follows 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure).
(P1) All sentient humans have non-trivial moral status.
(P2) If all sentient humans have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
Therefore
(C) Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.
All we'd have to do to turn this into a version of the argument from companion animals would be to replace 'all sentient humans' with 'sentient companion animals', to yield:
(P1) Sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) have non-trivial moral status.
(P2) If sentient companion animals have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
Therefore
(C) Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.
Does that look like a good way to present the general form of the argument form companion animals?
In terms of the differences between NameTheJustification and the argument from companion animals, I'd think that these would be:
(1) interlocutors are more likely to object to P1 in the argument from companion animals (and e.g. want to say that it's simply that we have emotional attachments to companion animals and perhaps the Kantian thing about how personally torturing them might make us more likely to be violent to humans - but that there's nothing apart from this, in itself, or owed to the companion animals that makes it wrong to harm them for relatively trivial reasons),
(2) there might be more tendency by some interlocutors to object to P2 in the case of the argument form companion animals (e.g. on the grounds that neither have non-trivial status independent of humans' arbitrarily granting it) - although this could perhaps be re-interpreted as an objection to P3 (E.g. "isn't it that you think that there is an important difference, namely whether humans have "granted" it to one but not the other?" "Sure." "Cool, so can you say a bit more about what you mean by humans granting this status?" etc.) or perhaps to P1 (E.g. "well, do you really mean that companion animals have non-trivial moral status in the sense that it would be wrong to harm them for trivial reasons if this didn't upset other humans, etc.?" "No." "Cool. So do you really think that it is OK to torture your pet dog just for fun even if no one ever finds out about it?"), and
(3) the arguments about whether there are morally relevant differences in P3 will probably in the case of the argument from companion animals focus more on whether humans have special obligations to members of companion animal species in virtue of potential for relationship and history of interaction with members of the species (whereas in the case of NameTheJustification arguments will focus more on the relevance of membership in a species that has moral status in its own right independent of potential for or history of interactions with other species). It seems to me that responses to contract-based arguments will be quite similar in both the case of the argument from companion animals and NametheJustificaiton, with some interlocutors being tempted to want to say that both severely intellectually disabled humans and members of companion animal species but not members of other species would be included in the allegedly relevant (actual or hypothetical) contract. One difference might be that of course which species are companion species differs from social group to social group (and I suppose there might even be some social groups where members of some species are both companion animals and killed / tortured for food or entertainment - perhaps even the same ones at different times). That said views about the moral status of human infants and severely intellectually disabled humans have also differed a great deal across different societies over time and do so even at the present time. Perhaps some interlocutors would be more willing to be more conventional about non-trivial moral status for members of companion animal species (e.g. more willing to say that it's OK for individuals in certain Asian societies to kill / torture dogs and cats for taste-pleasure but that it's wrong for us to do this because we're subject to different morally relevant contracts) than they will be for less able humans (e.g. more willing to insist that it was wrong for certain Greco-Roman societies to kill / torture infants / the severely intellectually disabled for relatively trivial reasons even though they were all subject only to contracts that said it was OK to do this).
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
I see what you mean, yes, I think it would. And I definitely think that can be a great argument for pet lovers who don't see farmed animals as having any significant moral value.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amI was thinking that its logical from might work just as well for presenting the "argument from companion animals."
My concern generally is with the moral value focus, rather than the treatment focus. I think that kind of complicates the argument in practice (naturally we have defined non-trivial moral value in terms of treatment, but I think it's conceptually cleaner to do it directly). Do you think that would be possible without making a mess of the structure? Since we're not trying to modify NTT here, it seems like there's no reason to talk about moral status and then define moral status in terms of treatment, rather than talk about the thing we're really trying to get at in that definition directly (the treatment).
If we're specific about eating them, that might help.
But the concern there is it may be more easily weakened by empirical differences. E.g. the more significant health problems with eating carnivores (typically pets), but as long as we're not just talking about eating/taste pleasure then the empirical case is very strong. In this way, we might show that eating meat when unnecessary for health/survival is entertainment, and we can make analogies to things like dog fighting.
We might still get some push back from virtue ethics which would argue that dog fighting is worse because it's entertainment from the violence itself, rather than the product of the violence... not sure how to head that off in any simple way.
I guess we could just have some discussion about how that might be a way to defeat the argument, if somebody believed that for no apparent reason.
Agreed.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amI was thinking that we should add a discussion of this argument to the phil vegan wiki.
The only thing that concerns me is the indirect treatment (talking about moral value then defining that in terms of treatment, rather than just addressing treatment directly). I'm not certain on that though. Maybe there are advantages to talk about moral value.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amDoes that look like a good way to present the general form of the argument form companion animals?
Agreed. It's hard to answer that if people are upfront about it, but at least it seems like that would be an uncommon response.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 am(1) interlocutors are more likely to object to P1 in the argument from companion animals (and e.g. want to say that it's simply that we have emotional attachments to companion animals
Always bizarre to see virtue ethics that are being substantiated by consequentialism (in terms of probability of outcome) shoehorned in as a fix to deontology.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amand perhaps the Kantian thing about how personally torturing them might make us more likely to be violent to humans - but that there's nothing apart from this, in itself, or owed to the companion animals that makes it wrong to harm them for relatively trivial reasons),
This would be a good article in itself. I think that can be debunked by demonstrating internal contradiction/that deontology doesn't work without appealing to consequentialism on some level.
Agreed, I think that can be answered very well in the discussion.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 am(2) there might be more tendency by some interlocutors to object to P2 in the case of the argument form companion animals (e.g. on the grounds that neither have non-trivial status independent of humans' arbitrarily granting it) - although this could perhaps be re-interpreted as an objection to P3 (E.g. "isn't it that you think that there is an important difference, namely whether humans have "granted" it to one but not the other?" "Sure." "Cool, so can you say a bit more about what you mean by humans granting this status?" etc.) or perhaps to P1 (E.g. "well, do you really mean that companion animals have non-trivial moral status in the sense that it would be wrong to harm them for trivial reasons if this didn't upset other humans, etc.?" "No." "Cool. So do you really think that it is OK to torture your pet dog just for fun even if no one ever finds out about it?"), and
I think so.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amIt seems to me that responses to contract-based arguments will be quite similar in both the case of the argument from companion animals and NametheJustificaiton,
I think that's very likely. But it also avoids the potentially offensive aspect of marginal cases.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 1:06 amPerhaps some interlocutors would be more willing to be more conventional about non-trivial moral status for members of companion animal species (e.g. more willing to say that it's OK for individuals in certain Asian societies to kill / torture dogs and cats for taste-pleasure but that it's wrong for us to do this because we're subject to different morally relevant contracts) than they will be for less able humans (e.g. more willing to insist that it was wrong for certain Greco-Roman societies to kill / torture infants / the severely intellectually disabled for relatively trivial reasons even though they were all subject only to contracts that said it was OK to do this).
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
Sure, let's give it a shot. How about this?:brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 3:55 pm My concern generally is with the moral value focus, rather than the treatment focus. I think that kind of complicates the argument in practice (naturally we have defined non-trivial moral value in terms of treatment, but I think it's conceptually cleaner to do it directly). Do you think that would be possible without making a mess of the structure?
(P1) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
(P2) If we should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, but it's OK to (i.e. it isn't true that we should not) inflict massive suffering upon or killing sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, then there must be some morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.
Therefore
(C) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
And if you want to make this a more explicit argument for veganism we could add the empirical premise:
(P4) Consuming animal products instead of being vegan does inflict massive suffering upon and kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
Therefore
(C2) We should not consume animal products; we should instead be vegan.
What do you think?
[Sorry about the parenthetical double negative in P2; I'm trying to avoid the language of 'It's wrong to...' because my sense is that it's more effective advocacy to talk about what we should change than to explicitly / saliently call behaviour in which one's audience is engaged wrong. This might also mitigate the extent to which we get push back about all of the other things that we should be changing. I do of course think it's technically fine and fine amongst those who have thought through this enough to put this in terms of there being many other things that we are doing wrong, and that it's very hard not to do moral wrong, and we all fall short of avoiding doing what's morally wrong, but it's important to minimize the extent to which we do wrong as much as we can, and being vegan is an extremely effective way of doing this. It's just that this is an alien way of thinking about moral wrongness to many and it's better not to have to get into it more than one has to.]
{Unfortunately formalizing the explicit argument for veganism part, where we conclude C2 just from C and P4, will require putting everything into FOL and makes the logical form and proof of validity a bit more complicated. But the inference from P1-P3 to C has the exact same extremely simple logical form and proof of validity as our current NameTheJustification argument].
In fact if you like this then I think we could go ahead and put the NameTheJustification argument this way, since NameTheJustification is already willing to depart in significant ways from the basic layout of NTT. That would look like this:
(P1) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill any sentient humans for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
(P2) If we should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill any sentient humans for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, but it's OK to (i.e. it isn't true that we should not) inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.
(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.
Therefore
(C) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
And if you want to make this a more explicit argument for veganism we could add the empirical premise:
(P4) Consuming animal products instead of being vegan does inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.
Therefore
(C2) We should not consume animal products; we should instead be vegan.
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
That's pretty good. Also like the extra premise about veganism.
It could probably just say "we shouldn't kill", since that one is unavoidable, but I can see how the suffering comments could be powerful.
Makes sense.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 am[Sorry about the parenthetical double negative in P2; I'm trying to avoid the language of 'It's wrong to...' because my sense is that it's more effective advocacy to talk about what we should change than to explicitly / saliently call behaviour in which one's audience is engaged wrong.
Could be a two-part argument? Then the second half at least is very simple.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 am{Unfortunately formalizing the explicit argument for veganism part, where we conclude C2 just from C and P4, will require putting everything into FOL and makes the logical form and proof of validity a bit more complicated. But the inference from P1-P3 to C has the exact same extremely simple logical form and proof of validity as our current NameTheJustification argument].
By necessity it had to depart in those ways, but you might be right.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 amIn fact if you like this then I think we could go ahead and put the NameTheJustification argument this way, since NameTheJustification is already willing to depart in significant ways from the basic layout of NTT. That would look like this:
I guess the question stands: are we trying to make something as close to the spirit of Isaac's argument as possible so he or his fans are more likely to accept it, or are we just trying to provide the best arguments possible?
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
Yeah, it's just that I do think that the philosophical issues about the moral reasons not to painlessly kill are a lot more controversial and more likely to be seriously doubted than those against inflicting suffering. Moreover there is a great deal of evidence that in practice consuming animal products inflicts suffering (see e.g. the reality of farming conditions on allegedly "humane" farms, even with hunting not every kill being a head-shot rendering immediate death, etc.). So my sense is that in practice it is very important to talk about suffering.brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Sun May 27, 2018 3:10 amThat's pretty good. Also like the extra premise about veganism.
It could probably just say "we shouldn't kill", since that one is unavoidable, but I can see how the suffering comments could be powerful.
Yes - it will involve in the first part formalizing the conclusion in predicate logic without any further structure, and then in the second part going on to re-formulate it in FOL with further internal structure. Probably not a problem.Could be a two-part argument? Then the second half at least is very simple.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 am{Unfortunately formalizing the explicit argument for veganism part, where we conclude C2 just from C and P4, will require putting everything into FOL and makes the logical form and proof of validity a bit more complicated. But the inference from P1-P3 to C has the exact same extremely simple logical form and proof of validity as our current NameTheJustification argument].
Here would be my thoughts about this. A very important audience may be neither Isaac or his fans nor those who have already heard and thought very much about NTT, but those who have recently heard about NTT for the first time and are looking around to see what it is, if it is any good, and if they should be convinced by it or by something like it (note that the phil vegan wiki on NTT is the number 1 search result for NTT on google). By popularizing NTT Isaac has very helpfully popularized the idea of an argument (like that from less able humans / "marginal cases") to the effect that we morally ought to be substantially concerned with the interests of non-human animals for their own sakes by reference to the paucity of morally relevant differences between non-human animals and all of the humans about whose interests we think (and should continue upon reflection to think) we ought morally to be substantially concerned for their own sakes. Various individuals are hearing about this for the first time and wondering if this sort of argument is any good. In this context, I think it's important to point out why the details of NTT can be confusing but that it points towards a perfectly sound argument which does in fact successfully establish its conclusion. The argument should thus preserve the general idea of pointing to a lack of morally relevant differences between non-human animals and all of the (actual and counterfactual) humans who we think and should continue upon reflection to think have non-trivial moral status, and support non-trivial moral status for non-human animals on this basis.By necessity it had to depart in those ways, but you might be right.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 amIn fact if you like this then I think we could go ahead and put the NameTheJustification argument this way, since NameTheJustification is already willing to depart in significant ways from the basic layout of NTT. That would look like this:
I guess the question stands: are we trying to make something as close to the spirit of Isaac's argument as possible so he or his fans are more likely to accept it, or are we just trying to provide the best arguments possible?
My sense is that both NTT 2.0 and NTJ in their current form do this. But my sense is also that they would continue to do this if we were more explicit in the argument itself about what 'non-trivial moral status' amounted to in behavioural terms. I think that spelling it out in terms of not killing or inflicting enormous suffering for reasons as trivial as taste-pleasure is a nice way of simplifying things, and adding a second part that draws on this and an empirical premise (where considerations of health, ecology, etc. fit in) about how our only reasons to consume animal products are as trivial as taste pleasure is a clear and correct way of showing how this supports veganism. (That said we might want to be a little careful about how exactly we put things here, since there might e.g. be cultural or in some cases economic reasons that aren't as trivial as taste pleasure; maybe something like 'as trivial as taste pleasure, or at most as small as making a lifestyle change with some cultural adaptation,' etc., but we probably want a reasonably compact way of putting this here).
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
@Margaret Hayek Good points, I agree with all of that.
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
@Margaret Hayek
Companion Animals and The Argument from Companion Animals seem to be the same.
Should I delete Companion Animals?
Deleting will lose the history as well, so it's not done lightly. I want to make 100% sure there's nothing important there that isn't in the new article.
Companion Animals and The Argument from Companion Animals seem to be the same.
Should I delete Companion Animals?
Deleting will lose the history as well, so it's not done lightly. I want to make 100% sure there's nothing important there that isn't in the new article.
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
Yes, thanks so much - they are indeed the same; please do delete the 'Companion Animals' one but leave in place the 'Argument from Companion Animals' one. I accidentally created the page under the title 'Companion Animals', then realized that this title was too broad (since we have e.g. an entry on companion animal care), and I wanted to change the title to 'The Argument from Companion Animals'. I didn't know how to change the title this except by creating a new page (and copy and pasting everything over). Is that the only way to do it? If so is there a way for us to delete a page created under a mistaken title ourselves, or do have to get you to do it?brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Mon May 28, 2018 2:05 am @Margaret Hayek
Companion Animals and The Argument from Companion Animals seem to be the same.
Should I delete Companion Animals?
Deleting will lose the history as well, so it's not done lightly. I want to make 100% sure there's nothing important there that isn't in the new article.
Thanks,
Margaret
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
The bare-bones phil vegan wiki on the argument from companion animals is now up at:
wiki/index.php/The_Argument_from_Companion_Animals
I still need to fill in a lot, especially the defenses of the premises. As I indicated in a separate forum post, I think that we should have more on the empirical issues that go into defending premise 4 (there are two existing phil vegan wiki pages on health, on adequate nutrition [wiki/index.php/Adequate_Nutrition] and nutrients of concern [wiki/index.php/Nutrients_of_Concern]. But we don't yet have anything on ecology or animal agriculture & suffering).
wiki/index.php/The_Argument_from_Companion_Animals
I still need to fill in a lot, especially the defenses of the premises. As I indicated in a separate forum post, I think that we should have more on the empirical issues that go into defending premise 4 (there are two existing phil vegan wiki pages on health, on adequate nutrition [wiki/index.php/Adequate_Nutrition] and nutrients of concern [wiki/index.php/Nutrients_of_Concern]. But we don't yet have anything on ecology or animal agriculture & suffering).
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals
I thought so.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Mon May 28, 2018 2:19 am I accidentally created the page under the title 'Companion Animals', then realized that this title was too broad (since we have e.g. an entry on companion animal care), and I wanted to change the title to 'The Argument from Companion Animals'. I didn't know how to change the title this except by creating a new page (and copy and pasting everything over). Is that the only way to do it? If so is there a way for us to delete a page created under a mistaken title ourselves, or do have to get you to do it?
Just let me know and I can change a title. I'm not sure if other users can or not (it's in the top right under more options). It's a rare thing, though, so I'm not sure if it's worth the 20 minutes figuring out how to give permissions to do it. I think changing a title also creates a redirect, so that's a good way to go most of the time.