J.L. Mackie's Moral Error Theory

[Kaz1983]

OK I've watched a few videos on Vegan Footsoldier's channel about Moral Error Theory - I decided to look into it (see, before I was looking into trans-subjective morality etc) - anyways, back to Moral Error Theory:

• No moral statements are true.

• There are no moral features of the world.

• Our sincere moral judgements try, and always fail, to describe moral features of things.

• There is no moral knowledge.

Error theorist claim that our morality is built on fundamental error: the belief in categorical reasons. Now categorical reasons are reasons that applies to us, regardless of whether acting on them gets us what we want or not. For example...

Let's say that you work at a bank and have the opportunity to steal a lot of money - it's just sitting there. Do you be honest and not take the money or be dishonest and pocket the cash? Categorical reasons will tell you not to take the money, regardless of if it will benefit you BUT IF there are no categorical reasons, whether or not you benefit from stealing the cash matters.

Or, say a child steals chocolate bar from the supermarket.. the parent will probably say something like... "Stealing is wrong" "you should not steal" ... the kid might say "why is stealing wrong?" The mum says "Because people don't like a dishonest person", "you will not be trusted" and "you will get into trouble with the police" etc etc... the mum says, the kid replies "you haven't told me why stealing is wrong, all you have told me is the consequences of stealing.."

It reminds me of this..

"How do you know whether we are moral because we desire to be good, full stop or do we only desire to be moral because it's seen as good by other people?"

Anyways Moral Error Theory denies the truth to all ethical claims. It's not an ethical system but a metaphysical system: a theory about what the world is truly like.. see here are two out of the four main arguments in support of moral error theory:

• 1. The argument from disagreement

• 2. The argument from atheism

1) In the western world, if we see an overweight lady wearing a bikini at the beach we say that is good BUT if you live in Saudi Arabia that is immoral behaviour. What is moral in one country, is immoral in another country.

There are widespread disagreements about human values, the best explanation of this widespread disagreement is the moral code we live by - there are no objective values for us to converge on.

2) It's the opinion of J.L. Mackie that objective morality can only exist if God exists and because God does not exist - objective morality cannot exist. For a moral system to be truly objective, moral law must stem from a source external to humanity.

More to come..

Oh just because I don't believe murder is immoral, that doesn't mean I can't believe that murder is unacceptable.

[Frank Quasar]

This is how I understand the position from reading Mackie's book (as well as a couple of papers on the companions in guilt strategy):

Error theory, as espoused by the likes of Mackie, is the idea that morality entails the commitment to a specific type of profile; categorical normativity. Such a profile for moral propositions is presupposed in moral language in everyday life, we make statements that appear to showcase such a categorical profile that is independent of our beliefs, desires and attitudes. However, entities in possession of such a profile do not exist, and subsequently moral facts, entities in possession of such a profile, do not exist.

This would entail the idea that all of our moral propositions which espouse a positive claim in favour of something, which purports to represent a fact, are thus false since no such moral properties exist.

Premise two of the argument for moral error theory (entities in possession of such a profile do not exist) is supported by two arguments (as posited by J.L. Mackie) - the argument from queerness and the argument from relativity.

As you pointed out, (1) is the belief that Mackie held. He believed that such widespread disagreement indirectly supports ethical subjectivism, and such a meta-ethical theory best explains the vast difference in moral codes throughout the world as oppose to the idea that many are just flat out wrong. However, I personally do not find this argument to be convincing. Just because many people may disagree about X, and such disagreement indirectly supports the subjectivist position about X, it doesn't entail the idea that there are no right/wrong answer with respect to X. There's vast disagreement across an array of issues, but it doesn't mean that they are subjective because of it, nor that there are no right/wrong answers with respect to it. The premise does not entail the conclusion that Mackie seeks, so I do not have good reason to accept what he's attempting to argue (nor the second premise for Error Theory itself).

The argument from queerness just points out that if these categorical norms existed, then they'd be extremely different from the ordinary things in our universe, and that the means by which we come to know such norms is through a method that is not common with our ordinary ways of deriving knowledge. Thus, they are essentially weird, and Mackie thinks they do not exist because of this. If you presented an argument for such norms, Mackie would believe that the form or one of the premises is going to be flawed.

Again, like the above, I do not find this convincing either. Something being "weird" does not entail that such a thing does not exist.

Several people have objected to Mackie's arguments, and showcased why they are insufficient in their attempt to establish that there are no objective moral facts.

As of now I am not convinced of Moral Error Theory, but I'll continue to read further on the topic, and see what happens down the line. Someone like Olson is supposedly a good read, from what I remember.

A common strategy that moral realists employ against Moral Error Theory is the "Companions in Guilt" (CIG) argument (be it an entailment form or an analogy form), it's an interesting strategy, and some of the popular proponents of such a strategy is Richard Rowlands and Terence Cuneo. It has been objected to by Christoper Cowie, he released two papers where he attempted to undermine one of the central premises in the CIG strategy (the analogy based one). The objections pose dilemmas for the proponents, but his objections have received a fair bit of criticism, and spell out why Cowie is in error.

[Frank Quasar]

I'll give you a brief synopsis in regards to Cowie's objections, if you're interested.

[Kaz1983]

I'll give you a brief synopsis in regards to Cowie's objections, if you're interested.

What your wrote makes sense. I've read similar objections to Moral Error Theory on the 1-4 main arguments.

[Frank Quasar]

I'll try to reiterate Cowie's basic objections.

In his 2014 paper, Cowie argued that the CIG strategy runs into a dilemma - it either faces his objection from disparity, or the objection from dialectic redundancy. Before I get into the objections, let me give a brief overview of the strategy that Cowie was attempting to attack in his paper:

Moral error theorists critique categorical norms on the basis that such norms are in possession of a "queer" profile, and that such entities in possession of such a profile do not exist. However, the realist posits epistemic norms are companions in guilt in order to combat such criticism.

Epistemic norms, like moral norms, are categorical, also. If the arguments used to justify moral error theory are sufficient via attacking the profile in such a manner, then such arguments can also reek havoc against epistemic norms as they too possess such profiles (like moral norms). However, epistemic error theory is false, so the arguments used against such epistemic norms (which attack the profile of categoricity) cannot be sufficient to establish error theory about them, and likewise would apply to moral norms, too. In essence, the existence of such norms poses an issue for those who uphold the premise that entities in possession of such a profile (categoricity) do not exist (Ramon Das made this criticism against Christoper Cowie's 2014 objections in his response paper).

Throughout the paper you will often see Christopher Cowie make reference to this premise by calling it the "parity premise".

Objection from disparity - The objection from disparity is meant to operate as an objection that undermines P1 of the companions in guilt strategy (the parity premise) because it showcases that the (some) arguments used to justify the epistemic existence premise undermine P1 of CIG.

When one attempts to justify the existence of the epistemic existence premise in CIG, they do so by showcasing the inherent "self-defeating" nature of epistemic error theory, and thus, reveal why have good reason to reject such a position (Cowie believes that this does not mean that the theory is false). However, just because we have good reason to reject epistemic error theory (self-defeating), it does not therefore follow from this that we have good reason to reject moral error theory.

Likewise is the case with moral error theory. Moral error theory would establish that we have no moral reasons (our propositions would be in error), but it would not therefore follow from this notion that we do not have epistemic reasons.

Cowie points out that epistemic norms possess a special property whereby rejecting epistemic norms makes their denial self-defeating, however, moral norms do not possess such a property, and denying them is not self-defeating. This does not mean that such norms (epistemic norms) are not metaphysically unproblematic, Cowie argues, rather, they are in possession of such a property, and we are warranted in believing in their existence.

The objection from dialectic redundancy - When Cowie said "some" arguments used to justify the epistemic existence premise will undermine P1 of CIG, it was for a reason. Cowie thinks there might be other arguments that do not entail the unsavoury conclusion in the previous objection (first horn), such as the argument from merits/demerits, but such arguments will operate as direct arguments against moral error theory, and render CIG useless as there would be no point in the strategy if there exists a direct attack. CIG was meant to handle such a task.

^ This objection is relatively quick, and in his paper he lays it out nicely.

This is Cowie's 2014 objection against the CIG strategy. The paper that he wrote received a fair bit of criticism by the likes of Richard Rowland and Ramon Das, from what I recall. Cowie adapted his criticism to formulate his "master" argument in his 2016 paper (I was thinking about reiterating that as well, but this post alone is excessive, so never mind an additional essay), it's an interesting read because he poses yet another dilemma, but this dilemma poses a superior threat to the strategy.

You should read into it if you're interested in the debacle. I've been away from this discussion for a month or two (perhaps three even) because I'm trying to read into other areas before I go to university, and I'm reiterating what I remember, as well as double-checking from the notes that I had laying around. My grip on this topic has somewhat weakened, but I'm glad that I have those God damn notes to secure me.

[Kaz1983]

Anybody believe that Error Theory is compatible with veganism?

[brimstoneSalad]

There are plenty of vegan error theorists, although I don't think error theory is particularly compatible with sanity.

Error theory is a lot like broad positive atheism in some ways: Given a definition of a god, you can say where you stand on it.
Can we really be positively atheistic (100% certain that a god does NOT exist) to ALL possible definitions of a god? Even the god definitions that don't violate logic and are merely implausible? Think alien gods in their spaceships.

Atheism (just not believing) is sound and carries no burden of proof. But positive atheism to ALL god definitions is making a strong claim. In the very least, it's a semantic argument that has to be made to limit the definitions of 'god' under consideration.

Error theory goes further still: It makes a strong claim about notions that are only conceptual frameworks.

It's like being positively atheist v.s. the idea that "god" is a mere concept rather than an entity of empirical measure. Like "God is love"... and only love. Just synonyms.
A positive atheist in that case has two options: 1. Deny the existence of love. 2. Deny the validity of the definition "god is love" on the basis that people aren't talking about a concept when they question the existence of god.

The error theorist doesn't have the latter option, because conceptual moral frameworks are so overwhelmingly common that attempting to make that argument would be flagrantly intellectually dishonest. They have to deny the existence of a concept, which is madness.

I'm inventing a concept: blabadoo. It's when the number of spoons you have is precisely equal to the number of spoonfuls of sugar you have in your bowl.
How can you now say I'm in error about how blabadoo some situation is with reference to sugar and spoons? Maybe no situation is ever 100% blabadoo, but how can you deny that some situation is more or less blabadoo based on that concept I defined? Are you doing to deny the existence of concepts? Or of spoons? Or of sugar? What? You're nuts.

Now say I claim blabadoo is when the number of spoons you have is precisely equal to the color of your bowl. Well yeah, that't nonsense. Any analysis of the blabadooness of a situation is in error because the concept is incoherent.

You can be an error theorist to particular incoherent concepts of morality -- just like you and be a positive atheist about certain definitions of god which violate logic. But to be an error theorist to ALL concepts of morality is nuts. There are moral systems like utilitarianism that, while you may disagree with them, are internally consistent. Dismissing them all with error theory is something between dishonest and nuts.

[Kaz1983]

I always break it into "harder" moral nihilists and "softer" moral nihilists. I see myself as a "softer" moral error theorists.

So in more emotionally attached (in the moment) type situations - I talk in what's right and wrong. You can't be vegan and (like harder nihilist's) reject all moral language and discourse. You just can't.

See I believe it's like the hard determinists who will say that everything is determined but will still say "I'll choose the coke over the coffee" and the same can apply to error theory - fictionalisim holds that moral language and discourse should still be used day-to-day but when in un-emotional and un-attached situations - we should believe that moral discourse and moral language are both uniformly false.

I completely agree, "hard" moral nihilism is somewhere between nuts and dishonest.

Being a complete sceptic makes zero sense, I still use moral discourse and language.. so in certain situations talk of actions being right and wrong.

For me it's just that there are no objective values and anyways imo if you believe morality is subjective.. you have already started doubting things and slowly have become a moral sceptic about knowledge.

[brimstoneSalad]

I always break it into "harder" moral nihilists and "softer" moral nihilists. I see myself as a "softer" moral error theorists.

So in more emotionally attached (in the moment) type situations - I talk in what's right and wrong.

That kind of just sounds like being inconsistent, or letting your feelings lead you to say things you believe to be untrue or nonsense for purposes of rhetoric.

You can't be vegan and (like harder nihilist's) reject all moral language and discourse. You just can't.

Why not?

Plenty of people are vegan and don't like the idea of eating animals but don't believe in morality per se.
There's a lot of "I'm personally uncomfortable with it due to my empathy for animals so I don't do it"
Of course, they also have to say the same thing to explain why they don't murder people, or appeal to the consequences of going to jail.

See I believe it's like the hard determinists who will say that everything is determined but will still say "I'll choose the coke over the coffee"

No, because even if you choose something that doesn't contradict determinism. You can choose coke over coffee because you don't like coffee because of any number of reasons having to do with your genetic taste ability and your upbringing. "I chose this because..." is not inconsistent.

and the same can apply to error theory - fictionalisim holds that moral language and discourse should still be used day-to-day but when in un-emotional and un-attached situations - we should believe that moral discourse and moral language are both uniformly false.

That's just a rationalization for intellectual dishonesty. Most people do not take those words to mean those things, so you're conveying something you don't believe. "Choice" carries no denotation or connotation of being completely free of deterministic factors of mind, or even free of material consequence. A will is not necessarily free, and that has been understood since antiquity.

I completely agree, "hard" moral nihilism is somewhere between nuts and dishonest.

Hard nihilism is nuts, but it's probably more honest than ad hoc rationalizations like fictionalism.

For me it's just that there are no objective values and anyways imo if you believe morality is subjective..

There's no objective math if you believe numbers are subjective. What's your point? *WHY* would you believe numbers are subjective in the first place?

In order for error theory to be true, there would have to be NO POSSIBLE way to form an objective moral system. Do you have a logical proof of that assertion? If not, why do you accept error theory on blind faith despite the cost to your intellectual honesty and/or ability to express yourself in moral terms like normal human beings? If so, please share it.

By analogy, atheists have an easy time of proving certain god concepts logically impossible or empirically improbable. All knowing all powerful omnipresent etc. indicates any number of logical contradictions, and there are clear empirical falsehoods to other assertions.
The response to a possible god should be agnosticism; the best way to argue for positive atheism is to clarify theism as a positive belief and make clear that atheism encompasses agnosticism too.

The same doesn't apply to conceptual frameworks. On what basis can you reject morality?

you have already started doubting things and slowly have become a moral sceptic about knowledge.

About all knowledge?
That tends to be how it is with subjectivists. They reject morality, then they reject all science and logic after that. Subjectivism is a slippery slope.

[Graeme M]

I am no philosopher so most of this discussion is way over my head. But I do have a question, though I am not sure I can state it well. And I apologise if my question seems ignorant!

Why is moral error theory not consistent with the way the world is, notwithstanding that it may be possible to form an objective moral system? Put another way, our brains function in particular ways due to their evolutionary heritage - they are not objective interpreters of the world. Most likely, they form views of the world that best suit our functional needs.

While moral claims might tend to be inconsistent with respect to time and place (moral relativism), it doesn't seem to me to be impossible to devise a moral system that remains true across all cultures (ie is objectively true insofar as the dispositions of humans go?) yet doesn't represent any true state of the (objective) world.

Put more simply (in my own terms), the fact that there is no such actual thing as morality doesn't mean that we are committed to the idea that moral states of belief cannot exist as representational modes of behaviour. After all, colours do not objectively exist, and yet we can presume that colours are a universally and objectively consistent representational mode of behaviour across the world.