Just came across this post by @indy in 2018. Feel free to delete after a while if no one thinks it's worth discussing.
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Introduction
According to the extensive research of Ask Yourself and Philosophical Vegan, ethical non-naturalism is “magic” or “supernatural woo” that’s basically theism and witchcraft. Essentially, Richard Price, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Russ-Shafer Landau, and Michael Huemer are all basically Deepak Chopra. And of course, who is in a better position to know that non-naturalism is Chopra woo woo than our two Internet philosophers, both of which haven’t studied any of the philosophers listed.
As for the view of Ask Yourself, he waffles between self-described subjectivism, nihilism, and non-realism, and he’s since deleted one of his videos dedicated to discussing metaethics, so any criticism leveled at him here will predictably be labelled as a strawman and must be defended from know-nothings on his cesspit Discord. Philosophical Vegan, who likes to play philosopher king online but is likely just some computer science major, is a different case, as he’s left about 40,000 forum droppings across the Internet to be inspected and discarded. From what I can tell (in part from whatever view is dogmatically accepted on his forum), he went from moral naturalism (per his uncritical empiricism) to a hipster Wittgensteinian quietism (per the usual suspects). Now allow me to defang these two little boogers and knock them into each other.
Question Begging & Torturing Babies
According to Ask Yourself/Isaac, morality requires a valuer for there to be right or wrong actions. Also, one cannot err in choosing what to value. One can only err in securing one’s subjectively preferred ends. As a comparison, the rules of chess, while they may be made up by us, can have “good” or “bad” moves made within the chosen rules. Morality, according to Isaac, works in a similar way.
The problem here is that Isaac’s account of morality leads to absurd conclusions and his dismissal of objective morality is question begging. That is, he assumes that objective moral values require a valuer. In his words, since “morality doesn’t care,” there can be no objective moral values. I’ve heard no substantive argument from Isaac as to why there must be a valuer for there to be objective moral values. In fact, having a valuer to make morality objective would be to go against the very definition of an objective morality, as it would make moral truths dependent on minds, preferences, or attitudes. Morality that is determined by a “valuer” would threaten to become Isaac’s anti-realist view. At best, Isaac relies on something akin to J.L. Mackie’s argument from queerness, where an objective morality without a valuer is just too weird to exist.
But I would ask if the following proposition seems too weird or not: “If someone tortures a baby for fun, then that person acts immorally.” This is a conditional statement that does not require an actual torturer or baby to exist. It simply states that if this situation obtains, it would be immoral. Now, in the absence of any torturers or babies, does it seem to be the case that this statement could still be true? Perhaps one wants to say that the absence of the torturers and babies is irrelevant. Instead, it’s wrong because of the presence of our evaluative judgment that it is true. That is, after all, the crux of the issue. Well, if the world were only full of babies and unreflective baby torturers, does it seem that the proposition could still be true without us around to evaluate it? That is, would baby torturers still be subjected to this moral constraint without us around to approve of it? If so, then you don’t accept Isaac’s view. Objectively, one ought not to torture babies for fun. It’s
objectively not desirable to torture babies for fun. If, however, you think the evaluative content of that conditional is entirely dependent on and determined by the preferences of individuals, then, whether we exist to condemn the act or not, baby torture would be morally right for the torturers. This is Isaac’s view.
In short, Isaac’s metaethical account leads to absurd conclusions. According to Isaac, individuals decide what is of moral value—or what is good or bad, right or wrong, permissible or impermissible. If Ted Bundy decides that inflicting pain on others for fun is moral, then it’s moral for Ted Bundy to torture others. In response, Isaac will attempt to point out an inconsistency in Bundy’s beliefs to show why Ted Bundy or others should not hold to it. This, however, is a disastrous and absurd position to take for anyone arguing for veganism as a moral obligation.
Take the following debate debacle. Ask Yourself has argued with the perennial clown Friended over the latter’s belief that it’s okay to slaughter pigs but not humans. Isaac holds that there is no morally relevant distinction between pigs and humans that permits slaughtering one and not the other. Friended will say that the difference is in species membership. Granted, this criterion Friended employs is entirely arbitrary, but what can Isaac say in response? That Friended shouldn’t hold arbitrary or inconsistent beliefs? Well, what if Friended believes that it’s permissible to do so? As either an ethical or epistemic norm, Friended may see no problem with being inconsistent and arbitrary. As either an ethical or epistemic norm, Ask Yourself cannot categorically disallow this move (after all, why aren’t epistemic values just as subjective, or why couldn’t Friended hold, as a moral norm, that it’s okay to have inconsistent or arbitrary moral beliefs?). If individuals are the ultimate arbiters of value, and if Friended sees nothing wrong with his arbitrary and inconsistent beliefs, then he does nothing morally wrong by uncritically shoving pig flesh into his maw. Finally, the obvious must be pointed out: Under subjectivism, all of Ass Yourself’s moral beliefs are as equally arbitrary and justified as Friended’s speciesism.
This was taken from Philosophical Vegan’s wiki. Like Isaac, Philosophical Vegan is an egotistical dweller with an anime avatar. Just look at it. Look at it. This is the guy who wrote the script for this dumpster fire of a video, and who wants us to believe he’s some serious intellectual.The self-defeating evolutionary argument
A common argument against ethical intuitionism specifically is that intuitions are epistemically suspect because they are the products of evolution. Ask Yourself raised this point in his now deleted video on metaethics, and I’m sure Philosophical Vegan has raised a similar point sometime during his prolific and shameless Internet dwelling career. Well, I’m here to give a pithy argument as to why it’s a self-defeating Lawrence Kraussism.
We rely on science to demonstrate the objectivity of evolution. Science is in the business of using empirical evidence or sensory perceptions for its conclusions, such as evolutionary theory. Well, our sensory perceptions are a product of evolution. If our intellectual perceptions in grasping moral truths are suspect because of their evolutionary heritage, then why is the same not also the case for our sensory perceptions? If our sensory perceptions are suspect, too, then this evolutionary argument is self-defeating. It undercuts a justification it relies on.
The YouTube version of the argument from queerness
At the core, AY and PV, whether they know it or not, are basically relying on J.L. Mackie’s argument from queerness. The argument is, roughly, that objective morality (specifically, non-naturalism) is just too unlike anything else we know of that exists. Because of this “weirdness” it’s metaphysically suspect (and epistemically suspect when it comes to intuitions), and, therefore, it’s likely wrong.
I have two main objections to this argument.
First, I suspect that underneath the argument is lurking some uncritical empiricism or scientism. According to those views, there would not only be something weird about ethics, but there’s also something weird about logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. Contrary to what Mackie hints at in “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong,” it’s not clear that an empiricist or scientismist can give an objective account of significant logical, epistemic, or metaphysical claims. And, according to Mackie, if there is no empiricist account of these things, then they fall prey to the argument from queerness. In the case of logic and epistemology especially, if the argument leads to their dismissal, then it’s self-defeating. It’s on empiricists to show that they can have knowledge of objective truths concerning logic and epistemology without relying on “spooky” intuition or metaphysics. Here, I think W.V.O. Quine’s critique of contemporary empiricists is on the money. Empiricists still rely on intuitions and concede more than they’d like to rationalists.
Second, in the absence of an empiricist account of the objectivity of these claims, the proponent of the argument from queerness is relying on intuitions as a justification against ethical non-naturalism/intuitionism. The argument from queerness, however, wants to deny intuitions as an epistemically meaningful way to grasp moral truths or truths in general. At least, Mackie and his ilk would like to. After all, intuitions seem “weird.” It seems that intuitions and non-natural facts ought to fit an empiricist/naturalist scheme. In this sense, ethical intuitionism is epistemically queer and, therefore, is likely to be false. But, this objection in itself relies on intuitions. In other words, it assumes the very things it attempts to dismiss. Making it, again, self-defeating.
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