EquALLity wrote:
I thought Randianism doesn't value the lives of others? Or does this violate the social contract?
They only care about one individual human harming another individual human against the latter's will.
They don't actually care about people dying by their own devices, or starving, etc. because those people could't fend for themselves. That would be "aesthetic".
However, I think Penn claims to care about that kind of thing, he might admit it's 'aesthetic'.
EquALLity wrote:And why do they randomly care about the social contract?
It's their dogma. Why do you expect them to have reasons for this? They decided that's the root of all good, and everything that claims to be morality beyond that is just personal preference.
EquALLity wrote:
UPDATE- Will they never violate the social contract then, even to save their own lives?
That sounds deontological, but they also base certain actions off of the consequences. So how do you decide how to classify it?
Generally, correct. Unless somebody else has violated it first. You're supposed to sit there and starve if you couldn't fend for yourself, and never steal from somebody no matter what.
One important thing to understand is that it's inherently inconsistent. There aren't really any Randian Objectivists in the world for the same reason there aren't really any Biblical Literalists -- there are just people who think they are these things. Due to contradictions, is an impossible view to fully hold and uphold.
It's deontological because it's absolute, and it doesn't weigh anything (although determining what degree of violation is harmless and inevitable and what even is a violation might be weighed, that's also arbitrary, and they wouldn't be likely to weigh it in terms of number of violations... this is more complicated*). There is no case where one person is permitted to violate the sovereignty of another who has followed the social contract. Either you're in the social contract, and so absolutely protected, or you're out, and so have no moral value whatsoever.
Violating the sovereignty of one person to save a billion people is unacceptable.
Let's say one person has some medicine, a cure to a disease. He doesn't want to share it, and it belongs to him. A billion people are dying of this disease which could be easily cured. You can't take it from him, that would be wrong. It's their own damn faults for dying of this disease (unless that person created the disease to begin with and released it, which would be a violation and allow you to kill him and take all of his stuff, including the cure).
Get it?
To them, the only wrong is violation of sovereignty. But it's not consequential; e.g. you shouldn't act to violate one in order to save a billion.
To put it more clearly:
Let's say it's a terrorist releasing that disease. To them, it's better to allow (by inaction to prevent) a terrorist (who is out of the social contract) who you can't find (if they could find the terrorist they'd stop them directly) kill a billion people (violate a billion individuals' sovereignty), rather than violate one yourself by stealing from the medicine man to put an end to the terrorist's plot (it wasn't the medicine man's fault, you can't violate his sovereignty).
This way there's no confusing it being those billion people's fault (although you could say it still is, because they failed to make their own medicine
). There is obviously an agent acting here. What an 'objectivist' would say is, that's horrible, but they would put all of the blame on the terrorist, and the medicine man hoarding his medicine is blameless (it's his own business), and the people who refused to steal his medicine to save a billion people are also blameless.
They also arbitrarily include all humans and exclude all non-human animals, even including potentially disenfranchised groups of humans without explanation.
*And, like Kant, they arbitrarily include or exclude items from the social contract (the social contract itself is ultimately arbitrary). For example: Native Americans didn't have a clear concept of land ownership, in the sense that we do now, and yet they had a social contract about killing, and other things like that. So, a social contract that includes a concept of land ownership is NOT the minimal social contract, because there have been societies that have functioned with much less. Indeed, you don't even need a concept of property at all for people to agree on the social contract (Communism, although this has not always been stable). Randroids arbitrarily define the edges of the social contract based on their own whims of what they would prefer, while ignoring what others might prefer to get out of a social contract. How do they resolve these discrepancies? They don't, really.